Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This interlocutory appeal involved two consolidated actions in which the trial court denied competing summary judgment motions. The case arose from University of Mississippi Medical Center's (UMMC) intent to purchase a platform linear accelerator system and to make renovations to its basement to house the new accelerator. UMMC represented that the accelerator would be an important aspect to the planned radiation oncology residency program. UMMC applied for a Certificate of Need (CON) to get the project started. Jackson HMA (HMA) and St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital (St. Dominic) filed a request for a public hearing in response to UMMC's CON application. The Mississippi State Department of Health (MSDH) thereafter sought an official opinion from the Attorney General (AG) on the issue of the CON statutes' applicability to UMMC. The Attorney General issued an opinion opining that UMMC was not subject to CON laws, and that it did not have to file an application for a CON. The AG issued a second opinion opining that there was no express exemption for UMMC within the CON laws, but that it was within the MSDH's power to make determinations of reviewability under the CON laws which carve out exemptions for equipment and/or services deemed necessary by UMMC. HMA and St. Dominic's filed a complaint with the Chancery Court requesting declaratory relief over the issue of whether the CON statutes applied to UMMC, and that MSDH had no authority to exempt UMMC from obtaining a CON. UMMC countered with its motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning (IHL) approved the project and had exclusive authority to" manage and control" UMMC, and was not subordinate to the MSDH. Finding genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the CON statutes applied to UMMC, the chancellor denied both motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the CON statues applied to UMMC and that MSDH does have authority to create a "teaching" exception regarding when UMMC is required to apply for a CON. Therefore, the Court did not reach the question of whether the application of the CON statutes to UMMC unconstitutionally infringed on IHL's constitutionally vested authority to "manage and control" UMMC.

Defendant Justin Springer was convicted of capital murder by a jury in the Circuit Court of Lee County on May 6, 2011. The underlying felony was burglary. For this conviction, he was sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without the possibility of parole. After the trial court's denial of his post-trial motions, Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging that the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding that the verdict against him was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, the Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.

In 2009, Charles Larry McGraw filed a personal-injury action against four sand suppliers: Clark Sand Company, Inc.; Mississippi Valley Silica Co., Inc.; Precision Packaging, Inc.; and Custom Aggregates and Grinding, Inc. McGraw alleged the four defendants' sand caused his lung disease, silicosis. On the day of the trial, after the jury had heard the parties' opening statements, the court recessed, and the parties reached a settlement agreement. Subsequently, McGraw filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add his wife as a plaintiff and American Optical Corporation as an additional defendant. He then filed an amended motion for leave to amend his complaint (First Amended Complaint) to modify his request to add four more defendants: Lonestar Industries, Inc.; Specialty Sand Company; Pearl Sands, Inc.; and Pearl Specialty Sand, Inc. In early 2010, the trial court granted McGraw's amended motion and allowed him to add the five new defendants to the complaint. McGraw later filed a Second Amended Complaint, which added a sixth defendant, Dependable Abrasives, Inc., without seeking leave of court. All six defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal concerning the trial court's order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint and Dismiss First Amended Complaint. The defendants argued that, because the original parties settled with McGraw prior to his motions for leave to amend, the trial court improperly allowed the filing of the First Amended Complaint to add new parties. The defendants also argue that, because McGraw did not seek court approval in filing his Second Amended Complaint, that complaint should be struck. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing McGraw to file his Second Amended Complaint, because he was required to obtain court approval. However, the Court found that the trial court did comply with the rules of procedure when it allowed McGraw to file his First Amended Complaint. The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and reversed the denial of the motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint.

Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Tippah County, Mississippi, fifty-fouryear-old Roger Green was convicted of two counts of sexual battery and two counts of touching a child for lustful purposes involving D.W., Green's ten-year-old stepdaughter. Following denial of Green's "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative For a New Trial," Green filed this appeal. Before the Supreme Court, Green argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other sexual offenses through the testimony of four other minor girls whom he allegedly inappropriately touched. He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the charges against him. Finding no error from trial nor an abuse of discretion by the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed Green's conviction.

A corporation settled its delinquent tax liability to the State of Mississippi by paying $100 million to the State, $4.2 million to a private charity, and $14 million to a private law firm hired by the Attorney General to pursue the claim. Mississippi's Auditor demanded that, because the $18.2 million paid to the private charity and the law firm constituted public funds, it must be turned over to the State. The charity complied; but the law firm refused, claiming the payment of its fees was not made with public funds and, in any case, the Auditor had waived the State’s claim. The Auditor filed suit and the trial court granted summary judgment to the law firm. The state Auditor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that when the Attorney General pays special assistants, Mississippi statutory law requires that they be paid from the Attorney General’s contingent fund or from other funds appropriated to the Attorney General's office by the Legislature. Furthermore, the Mississippi constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury." Neither of these requirements was met in this case. Neither the Attorney General nor the Langston Firm provided sufficient evidence to establish that the Auditor waived the State’s claim to the funds. The Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A corporation settled a lawsuit by agreeing to pay the State of Mississippi $50 million, $10 million of which it disbursed directly to outside counsel retained by Attorney General Hood to pursue the litigation. The chancery court held that the payment was proper. But because the law requires that outside counsel retained by the Attorney General to pursue litigation in "the state or federal courts" be paid from his contingent fund or from other funds the Legislature appropriates to his office, and because the Mississippi Constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury," the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Attorney General failed to use his contingent fund.

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was an appeal by the City of Cleveland of a judgment by the DeSoto County Chancery Court which denied the City's motion for attorney fees. The chancery court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the City's appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that, after the Court of Appeals rendered the underlying case and the Supreme Court denied certiorari review, the case was at its end. The chancery court did not thereafter have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the lower court did not have jurisdiction.

Defendant Shawn States was found guilty of capital murder for killing two people while committing armed robbery. Defendant raised three arguments on appeal: (1) the prosecution discriminated based on race and gender in its peremptory strikes; (2) the trial court failed to grant circumstantial-evidence instructions; and (3) the trial court improperly granted the prosecution a "flight" instruction. Because the Supreme Court found no reversible error, Defendant's conviction was affirmed.

In early 2011, Defendant Jonathan Havard was convicted by a jury in George County Circuit Court for the deliberate-design murder of his girlfriend, Joy Hodges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant requested his conviction and sentence be overturned, or, in the alternative, reversed and remanded for a new trial. Appellate counsel filed a "Lindsey"1 brief certifying to the Supreme Court there were no appealable issues in the record. Believing otherwise, Defendant filed a brief pro se assigning error to both the trial court and defense counsel. The alleged errors include violations of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, his Fifth Amendment right to refrain from testifying, inadequate jury instructions, ineffective assistance of counsel, and failure to grant a change in venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and found the allegations of error to be lacking in merit. Therefore, the Court denied Defendant's requested relief and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Charlotte and Larry Wilson, parents of Crystal Wilson (deceased), filed an action requesting visitation with their grandchildren. The chancellor granted the request. Aggrieved, Stephen Smith, Crystal's former husband, and Melissa LuAnn Smith, Stephen's current wife, appealed the chancellor’s decision and challenged the constitutionality of Mississippi’s grandparent-visitation statutes. The Smiths raised four issues on appeal; the Supreme Court addressed each and held: (1) Mississippi's grandparent-visitation statute and the "Martin v. Coop" (693 So.2d 912(Miss. 1997)) factors do not violate the Constitution. (2) the chancellor did not err in applying the grandparent-visitation statutes, the "Martin" factors and "Troxel v. Granville" (530 U.S. 57 (2000)) to this case; (3) the chancellor properly applied the "Martin" factors; and (4) the Wilsons' visitation was not excessive. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's judgment.