Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jeffrey Havard was found guilty of capital murder (murder during the commission of sexual battery) of six-month-old child. The jury also found that Defendant's sentence should be death, and the Adams County Circuit Court imposed the death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. His motion for rehearing was subsequently denied, as was his motion for post-conviction relief filed in 2007. Defendant sought habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi; however, that case was stayed pending the outcome of his second motion for post-conviction relief before the Mississippi Supreme Court. Finding no merit in Defendant's successive motion for post-conviction relief, the Court denied his successive petition.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court had the right, authority, and power to declare itself superior to and above both the other two branches of government in all matters of constitutional compliance. Attorney General Jim Hood asked the judicial branch of government to void several pardons, alleging that the applicants failed to publish notice as required by Section 124 of the Mississippi Constitution. After the Court received this appeal, Governor Barbour (who issued the pardons) submitted an amicus curiae brief, and the Court allowed his counsel to participate in oral argument. At oral argument, the Court asked Attorney General Hood to point out any pardon that was not facially valid, and he could not. The Court noted that the parties and Governor Barbour presented numerous issues for consideration, including: whether those who did not apply for a pardon were required to publish notice; whether the governor(and not the convicted felons) applied for some of the pardons; whether some of the pardons had any applicant at all; whether the publication provision requires four or five weekly publications; whether the governor, the attorney general, or the pardonees have the burden of proof; and whether the attorney general is estopped from objecting to the pardons. "No judicial duty is more central to the proper operation of our system of government than is [the Court's] duty to decide this issue correctly. . . . [the Court was] compelled to hold that – in each of the cases before us – it fell to the governor alone to decide whether the Constitution’s publication requirement was met."

The issue before the Supreme Court in this product liability/breach of warranty case was whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion to transfer venue when the plaintiff sued in the county where the product was located when the alleged defects first appeared and not where the product was purchased or repaired. Finding that the general venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a) (Rev. 2004), requires that the case be brought in the county where the product was purchased and/or repaired, the Court reversed and remanded the case for transfer to the proper venue.

Two appeals were consolidated from chancery-court cases. In the first case, Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association, Inc. sued Thomas Alfonso, III, and Anne Scafidi Cordova (d/b/a Bay Jourdan Publishing Co., "BJP") for breach of a contract to publish "The Diamondhead News." In 1997, the chancery court entered a preliminary injunction order preventing BJP from publishing "The Diamondhead News," selling advertising for the paper, collecting or disposing of advertising revenues derived from the publication of the paper, and interfering with the printing, publication, or distribution of "The Diamondhead News." The chancery court also found that an arbitration clause in the publishing contract was inapplicable to the lawsuit. The chancery court denied BJP's two subsequent motions to compel arbitration of the breach-of-contract dispute. BJP appealed the chancery court's denial of arbitration. In the second case, BJP sued Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing Co., Inc. (d/b/a The Sun Herald) for intentional interference with the publishing contract. Gulf Publishing filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Gulf Publishing and directed the entry of a final judgment as to Gulf Publishing pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). BJP appealed that grant of summary judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's order denying BJP’s second motion to compel arbitration because the issue was ruled upon previously, and no appeal was taken. Finding genuine issues of material fact for trial, the Court reversed the chancery court's order granting summary judgment to Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing, and remanded that case for further proceedings.

Defendant Kevin Dale McCain was convicted of robbery. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed the permissibility vel non of a post-conviction amendment of Defendant's indictment to include habitual-offender status. In 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. Two days later, the Supreme Court's mandate issued in "Gowdy v. Mississippi," (56 S.3d 540 (Miss. 2011)), which held that a a post-conviction amendment of an indictment to include habitual-offender status "was prohibited[,]"such that the “enhanced portion” of Gowdy's sentence was vacated and his case was remanded for resentencing. Defendant's Motion for Rehearing on appeal contended that "Gowdy should apply to this case" and requested that the Court of Appeals "vacate [his] sentence and . . . have him resentenced under [Section] 97-3-73." The Court of Appeals denied Defendant's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in considering a post-conviction amendment of an indictment to include habitual offender status, the requirements of "a fair opportunity to present a defense" and no "unfai[r] surprise" are assessed on a case-by-case basis. In Defendant's case, both requirements were satisfied. The Court therefore affirmed Defendant's conviction for robbery and sentence of life as a habitual offender in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without eligibility for parole or probation.

Defendant William Matthew Wilson was indicted in a multiple-count indictment for capital murder with the underlying felony of child abuse and for a separate count of felonious child abuse. He pled guilty to capital murder and to the separate child-abuse count. Defendant purportedly waived a sentencing hearing before a jury. He was sentenced to death for capital murder and to twenty years for felonious child abuse. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's death sentence, with the mandate issuing on December 10, 2009. Defendant timely filed his motion seeking post-conviction collateral relief. The Attorney General filed a response, and Defendant filed a reply to that response. Upon review of the claims raised, the Supreme Court found that Defendant established that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on certain grounds; therefore, his PCR motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Defendant Dennis Jerome Beal allegedly offered Lieutenant Tommy Jones, a Madison County Sheriff’s Department deputy, $10,000 in hopes that Jones could make Defendant's pending drug charge disappear. On April 28, 2010, Defendant was indicted by grand jury for bribery as a habitual offender. A Madison County jury unanimously found Defendant guilty of bribing Jones, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in prison as a nonviolent habitual offender. Defendant appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly permitted the State to amend Defendant's indictment before trial. Nevertheless, the trial court committed prejudicial error regarding admission of a videotape, as it became relevant to the case once the State opened the door by eliciting testimony about its contents. The Court found that Defendant's arguments regarding opening and closing statements and entrapment were without merit. Therefore, Defendant's conviction and sentence were reversed, and this case was remanded for a new trial.

On September 17, 2008, Defendant Joshua King and Terrance Stanton were indicted for two counts of capital murder. Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial in July 2009. In 2010, Defendant was retried in the Circuit Court of Bolivar County for the deaths of Alfred Quong and So Ha Jung during the commission of a robbery. The jury found Defendant guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) and ordered that his sentences run concurrently. Defendant appealed his conviction. Finding no error, the Supreme Court found that the jury verdict and life sentence in the custody of the MDOC should have been affirmed.

Defendant Jermell Victory was convicted for the murder of Darron Sykes and for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. The circuit court sentenced Defendant, respectively, to life and ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant raised one issue on appeal: "whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellant Jermell Victory's proposed jury instruction on eyewitness identification where said instruction embodied his theory of the case." Upon review of that instruction, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court did not err by denying Defendant's proposed jury instruction.

Defendant Sylvia Montgomery filed suit against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (Commission) in the Circuit Court of Yazoo County after she was injured when her car struck a pothole in the northbound lane of Interstate 55 near Vaughan. The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming it was exempt from liability under several provisions of the Mississippi Torts Claim Act (MTCA). The court denied the Commission's motion. A three-justice panel of the Supreme Court granted the Commission's petition for interlocutory appeal. Upon review of the parties' briefs and the record, the Court found the trial court erred by not determining whether the duty to warn of a dangerous condition on the highway is a discretionary duty under the "public-function" test. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's denial of the Commission's motion for summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.