Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Defendant Michael Kelly was charged with reckless driving, found guilty, and fined $114. Arising out of these same facts, a grand jury handed down a two-count indictment against Defendant several months later: count I charged Defendant with the aggravated assault of Tiffany Walker (by hitting Walker while driving his truck); count II charged Defendant with felony malicious mischief for the destruction of an outdoor ice machine. Defendant moved for dismissal of his indictment, asserting his double-jeopardy rights. The trial court denied his motion. Aggrieved, Defendant filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order with the Supreme Court. A three-justice panel of the Court granted Defendant's petition to assess his double jeopardy claim. Finding that reckless driving was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault for double-jeopardy purposes: "[t]o prove reckless driving, it is not necessary to prove the elements of injury or attempt to injure. Since each of these charges contains separate elements, the prosecution of [Defendant] for aggravated assault does not violate his double-jeopardy rights, and that contention is without merit."

This appeal arose from a dispute between the Third Circuit Drug Court and the Lafayette County Board of Supervisors regarding Lafayette County's alleged duty to administer the drug court’s funding and the drug court's having required that county to place a drug court employee on its payroll. Because Union County replaced Lafayette County as the lead county for the Third Circuit Drug Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot.

Defendants Arvind Kumar, individually and d/b/a Holiday Inn of Columbus, Tony Savage, and Tracey Savage appealed a circuit court's denial of their motion to set aside a default judgment which was entered against them based on a complaint filed by Plaintiff Shanna Loper. Before the complaint was filed, Defendants' attorney, Ed Pleasants, had written a letter to Plaintiff's attorney denying her claims. However, once the complaint was filed in circuit court, Defendants did not file a formal answer to the complaint. The only further communication Loper’s counsel received from Pleasants was a phone call stating that he would no longer be representing Defendants. After a default judgment as to liability was entered, without notice to Defendants, the circuit court set a date for a hearing to assess damages, again without notice to Defendants. The Court of Appeals found that, since Defendants clearly expressed their intent to defend against Plaintiff's claims, they were entitled to notice prior to the entry of the default judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari. Finding that the circuit court's denial of Defendants' motion to set aside the default was an abuse of discretion, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Pursuant to 42 United States Code Sections 2000e-5 and 1983, Appellee Shirley Johnson brought suit against Defendants the City of Belzoni, Police Chief Mickey Foxworth, and Officer David James. Appellee claimed she was sexually harassed at work by James for approximately a year. She reported the harassment to her supervisor Foxworth, but claimed insufficient action was taken to remedy the situation. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a unanimous verdict of $150,000–$50,000 against each Defendant, in favor of Appellee. Aggrieved, Defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial. The motion was denied and the defendants appealed. Finding that the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Defendant Arturo Aquirre Moreno filed a motion to proceed in the trial court with his third petition for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court granted him leave to proceed solely on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court held a hearing only on that issue. The Court concluded that it improperly exercised authority to consider Defendant's motion and thus should not have remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Notwithstanding its own error, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief to Defendant on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim: "[t]o reverse based on the procedural error would be futile, as the result is the same: the trial court was the first (and therefore proper court) to pass on the merits of that claim." Further complicating the issues in this case, Defendant also raised double jeopardy and venue claims for the first time on appeal. The Court of Appeals addressed all of Defendant's claims and denied him relief. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erroneously considered Defendant's double jeopardy and venue claims. The Supreme Court declined review of Defendant's claims.

Defendant Frederick Watts was convicted of felony fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer in a motor vehicle and was sentenced to five years in custody, with two years suspended and three years of post-release supervision. On appeal, he argued that his conviction for felony fleeing subjected him to double jeopardy, because he previously had pled guilty to reckless driving in the Lauderdale County Justice Court. He also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence.

Defendant Damien Anderson (also known as Damien Wise) was convicted of murder arising from the homicide of Darnell “Sporty” Smith. Defendant contended the circuit court erred when it refused to grant a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. He stated that the trial court improperly forced the defense to choose between manslaughter and self-defense instructions. However, because no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.

Defendant Deric Bailey was convicted by a jury of deliberate-design murder for which he was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Defendant's conviction and sentence were reversed by the Court of Appeals and the case was remanded for a new trial. At his second trial, Defendant again was convicted of deliberate-design murder and sentenced to life in prison. The trial court denied his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial, and Defendant timely filed this appeal. Defendant Bailey presented five issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying certain jury instructions; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the statement Defendant gave at the time of his arrest; (3) whether the jury selection process was constitutionally infirm under "Batson"; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to grant a speedy trial; and (5) whether Bailey was deprived of his right to a fair trial, or at the very least, denied his right to a fair and impartial judge. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant's claims were without merit, and affirmed Defendant's conviction and life sentence.

Defendant Gary Lee pled guilty to accessory after the fact to armed robbery in 1982. In 2010, he filed a petition for habeas corpus (post-conviction relief under Mississippi law) at the circuit court. The court denied Defendant's petition, finding it barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 2011). Because Defendant's petition fell outside the three-year statute of limitations and because the trial court may dismiss a petition when it plainly appears from the face of the motion that the movant was not entitled to any relief, the Supreme Court affirmed.

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant David Trejo's conviction and sentence for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, finding the State had violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. The Court held that the arresting officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop that led to the discovery of cocaine; thus, the trial court should have suppressed the cocaine as fruit of the poisonous tree. While in its review the Supreme Court agreed that the officer lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle, the Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the stop was reasonable under the "community caretaking" function in "Cady v. Dombrowski." Finding the stop unreasonable under that doctrine too, the Court affirm the Court of Appeals' reversal of Defendant's conviction and sentence.