Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Amanda Goforth, a former high-school teacher, was indicted on five counts of sexual battery involving one of her former students. She was convicted on two counts and acquitted on the remaining three. Because the Supreme Court in its review found that Defendant was not afforded a constitutionally adequate opportunity to confront one of the witnesses against her, the Court reversed the trial court's decision. Further, the Court found that Defendant's conviction and sentence must be reversed and rendered: "[a]ny subsequent reprosecution would subject Goforth to the dangers of double jeopardy due to the multiple, identically worded counts in her indictment and the juryâs split verdict."

Defendant Michael Richardson was convicted by a jury capital murder and of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The State sought the death penalty at the sentencing phase, but the jury returned a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the capital murder charge. The trial judge sentenced Defendant to serve a term of life without parole for the capital-murder conviction, and to serve a term of ten years imprisonment for the felony-possession-of-firearm conviction. These two sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, all in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. After the trial court denied Defendant's motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts, Defendant appealed, alleging errors at the trial court level. Finding Defendant's assignments of error to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Defendant Roger Thorson was indicted in 1987 and charged with the capital murder of Gloria McKinney, his ex-girlfriend, during the commission of a kidnapping. On Thorsonâs direct appeal of his capital-murder conviction and sentence of death, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on all issues except a 'Batson' issue, and the case was remanded to the trial court to conduct a Batson hearing. On remand, the trial court found no Batson violation, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court had committed reversible error in allowing the State to peremptorily strike a member of the jury venire based solely on her religious affiliation, in violation of Article 3, Section 18 of the Mississippi Constitution and Mississippi Code Section 13-5-2. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. After another jury trial, Defendant was again convicted for the crime of capital murder and sentenced to death by lethal injection, and on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. Defendant subsequently filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with this Court, seeking an 'Atkins' hearing pursuant to 'Atkins v. Virginia.' Once all briefs had been submitted, the court entered an eight-page order thoroughly discussing the issue before him and finding that Defendant was not mentally retarded under 'Atkins.' Upon entry of this order denying his petition for post-conviction relief under Atkins, Defendant appealed again to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Defendant was not mentally retarded.

On May 11, 2010, a Tishomingo County jury found Defendant Cliff Hensley guilty of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of Mississippi Code. Defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender to a term of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). In this appeal, Defendant asserted his sentence of twenty years was an improper sentence under the governing statutes. Because Defendant was properly sentenced under Mississippi Code, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence.

In November 2008, P. Leslie Riley and an organization known as "Personhood Mississippi" filed an initiative, now known as Measure 26, with the Office of the Secretary of State. The initiative was qualified by the Secretary of the State to be placed on the general election ballot. Thereafter, Deborah Hughes and Cristen Hemmins ("Plaintiffs") filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in Hinds County Circuit Court against Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann, challenging Measure 26 as a violation of Article 15, Section 273(5)(a) of the Mississippi Constitution. On August 10, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Secretary of State replied with a response to that motion. Then, on September 30, 2010, the trial court entered and approved an Agreed Order, allowing Riley and Personhood Mississippi to intervene. In that same order, all parties agreed that this case was "based on questions of law" and "should be resolved by way of judgment on the pleadings." Subsequently, after considering the motion and responses, having heard oral argument, and being otherwise fully advised in these matters, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that they had not carried their heavy burden in attempting to restrict the citizenry's right to amend the Constitution. Thereafter, the trial court entered an additional order, titled "Final Judgment." The trial court ruled that the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings disposed of the case. Additionally, the trial court ruled that "final judgment is hereby entered in favor of the" Secretary of State and the Intervenors. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Measure 26 was not ripe for review. Thus, the Court vacated the trial court's final judgment in favor of Intervenors and Secretary Hosemann. The Supreme Court finally dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice.

Defendant Kenneth Hugh Knight was convicted in the Pearl River County Circuit Court for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, raising three issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the denial of his motion for a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and (3) the denial of his motion for a new trial. Because the record was not sufficient to address Knight's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court dismissed the claim without prejudice. The Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment on the remaining issues.

David Waide filed an Initiative with Mississippi Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann, and Hosemann approved it for placement on the November, 2011 general election ballot. Plaintiff Leland Speed filed a complaint against Hosemann in the Hinds County Circuit Court, along with a Motion for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, asking the Supreme Court to declare Initiative 31 unconstitutional and to enjoin Hosemann from placing it on the ballot. Speed argued that Initiative 31 "violates Section 273(5)(a) because that section prohibits use of the initiative process for the proposal, modification or repeal' of any portion' of the Constitution's Bill of Rights." Speed argued that Initiative 31 was a "proposal, modification or repeal' of the Bill of Rights . . . and more specifically of its Section 17, which governs taking of private property for a public use." After Hosemann and Waide responded to Speed's pleadings, Speed filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, in which he argued that the case "involve[d] a pure issue of law with no material facts in dispute" and asked the court to enter judgment in his favor under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The trial judge both denied Speed's motion for judgment on the pleadings and ruled on the merits, finding that Speed's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and ordering that Hosemann be allowed to proceed in placing Initiative 31 on the ballot. On appeal, Speed asked the Supreme Court to reverse the trial judge, declare that Initiative 31 violates Section 273(5) of the Mississippi Constitution, and "keep Initiative 31 off the November ballot." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issue presented in this appeal (the constitutionality of proposed Initiative 31) was not ripe for adjudication by the Court, such that any opinion thereon would be improperly advisory. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's decision and dismissed the case.

In October 2006, Defendant Rachel Nelson was involved in an automobile collision. The City of Richland charged her with driving under the influence. In November Defendant pled ânolo contendereâ in the Municipal Court of Richland. Later that month, Defendant filed a notice of appeal in the Rankin County Circuit Clerkâs office stating that a sufficient cash appeal and cash bond had been posted, and requesting a jury trial in county court de novo. The trial date was set for April 2, 2007. On March 27, 2007, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on writ of procedendo and to return the cause of action to the Municipal Court of Richland for imposition of sentence. On the same day, the Rankin County Court granted Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss and ordered the matter back to the Municipal Court of Richland on writ of procedendo. On March 30, 2007, a Richland city prosecutor filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal, to reinstate Defendantâs appeal, and to stay the proceedings. Defendant argued to the Supreme Court that: (1) the county court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo; and (2) double jeopardy was invoked because the county court ânolle prossedâ the charge after the appeal was taken. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the decision to hear the cityâs arguments on the motion to dismiss in this case was within the county courtâs sound discretion: âthe entry of a nolle prosequi does not bar another prosecution for the same offense under a new indictment . . [Here, Defendant] did not claim she had been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. Rather, she contended that she may be prosecuted in the future for felony DUI. Therefore, the question of whether the municipal court proceedings would bar a subsequent prosecution under double-jeopardy considerations was not ripe for determination.â The Court affirmed the county courtâs decision.

Appellant Jeremy Davis was convicted of aggravated assault on a law-enforcement officer, escape, burglary and possessing a firearm as a felon. Appellant's attorney filed an appeal, the briefs to which provided only generalized assertions that the State had violated Appellant's constitutional rights by exercising all of its six peremptory strikes against African-American jurors. After reviewing the briefs and the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found no error and upheld the trial court's decision and Appellant's convictions.

A caller informed Claiborne County Sheriff's deputies that Wendell Barnes was in Port Gibson driving a car with Texas plates. Officers knew Barnes had three warrants against him. They happened upon a vehicle matching the caller's description and initiated an investigatory stop. A deputy searched and arrested the driver, Defendant Terrance Eaddy, for possession of cocaine and weapons. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the drugs and gun discovered in the search. At the suppression hearing, on cross-examination of the arresting deputy, defense counsel pointed out that the deputy's report contained a different version of events that took place at the time of Defendant's arrest than his testimony. In ruling on Defendant's motion, the court recognized the deputy's report differed from his testimony, but that "an arrest report does not represent the officer's entire description of the arrest." Accordingly, the court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. A jury convicted Defendant of the charges against him. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence presented at trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the deputies did not have reasonable grounds to justify the investigatory stop and subsequent search and seizure of evidence from Defendant. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's conviction.