Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Jesse Dorris, Jose Lopez-McCurdy and Louis Hill were denied the right to appeal their post-conviction relief motions on the merits because they were filed out of time. The State did not raise the issue of timeliness below. The Supreme Court (1) held that, pursuant to Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15 and 24.035 (the Rules), the motion court had no authority to hear the motions, regardless of the State's failure to raise the issue, because the motions were filed out of time; (2) affirmed the dismissal of Dorris' and Lopez-McCurdy's cases because they were filed outside the mandatory time limits provided in the Rules and resulted in Dorris and Lopez-McCurdy completely waiving their post-conviction relief claims; and (3) remanded Hill's case for a hearing on the timeliness of his motion.

This case involved four appeals that were consolidated because each involved the issue of whether evidence obtained in a search of a motor vehicle incident to a traffic arrest was admissible. In each case, there was no reason to believe that evidence of the crime for which each Defendant was arrested was in any of their vehicles. The searches were performed in compliance with binding appellate precedent, but while these cases were pending, Arizona v. Gant was decided, holding that such searches were unlawful. Each defendant, relying on Gant, filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the searches. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the exclusionary rule suppresses evidence obtained in a search conducted in compliance with binding precedent when such precedent was later overturned. The Supreme Court held (1) in accord with Davis v. U.S., the exclusionary rule did not apply because the searching officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on settled, binding appellate precedent; and (2) the trial court's judgments sustaining the motions to suppress in three cases were reversed and remanded, and the trial court's judgment in the remaining case overruling the defendant's motion to suppress was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of felonious restraint, deviate sexual assault, and first-degree sexual misconduct. Prior to sentencing, Defendant entered into an agreement with the State in which Defendant would plead guilty to two additional criminal counts and waive his rights to a jury trial, to direct appeal, and to seek post-conviction relief. In exchange, the State recommended that Defendant be sentenced to a combined total of fifteen years incarceration on all counts. The circuit court rendered and judgment and sentence in accord with the agreement. Defendant subsequently filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for, inter alia, incorrectly advising Defendant to waive his rights to a direct appeal. The motion court denied the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the motion court's judgment, holding that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently agreed to waive his post-conviction rights after his trial. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Defendant's post-conviction motion.

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of stealing property of a value of more than $500. As part of the plea agreement, Cooper waived his right to file any future motion for post-conviction relief under Mo. R. Crim. P. 24.035 in exchange for the State recommending a fifteen-year sentence on each count to run concurrently with a suspended execution of the sentences and a five-year probationary term. The circuit court rendered judgment and sentences in accord with the plea agreement. After Defendant violated the terms of his probation, his fifteen-year sentences were ordered executed. Defendant subsequently filed a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that defense counsel was ineffective. The motion court overruled the motion on the merits. The Supreme Court vacated the motion court's judgment, holding that Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his post-conviction rights. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Defendant's post-conviction motion.

Several businesses filed a petition in the circuit court challenging the validity of Mo. Rev. Stat. 573.525 to 573.540, which regulate certain aspects of sexually oriented businesses in Missouri. The businesses argued that the limitations contained in the statutes concerning, among other things, touching of dancers by patrons and buffer zones around dancers violated the businesses' freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the restrictions were not content-based limitations on speech but rather were aimed at limiting the negative secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses on the health, welfare, and safety of Missouri residents; (2) the statutes were reasonable time, place and manner or comparable restrictions, and accordingly, the statutes did not unconstitutionally limit speech; and (3) the General Assembly did not violate Mo. Rev. Stat. 23.140 in enacting the statutes.

Ashley Morse was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Director of Revenue administratively suspended Morse's license for ninety days. Morse completed the suspension as well as the other requirements for reinstatement of her license, including completing a substance abuse traffic offender program, showing proof of liability insurance coverage, and paying reinstatement fees. Morse was later convicted for DWI after violating the conditions of her probation. The Director informed Morse that her driving privileges would again be suspended Morse once more had to complete the requirements for reinstatement of her license. The district court granted Morse's petition for de novo review and entered a judgment in favor of Morse, concluding that Morse's first administrative suspension had to be credited against the second administrative suspension pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 302.525.4 because both suspensions arose from the same occurrence. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred in holding that giving Morse credit for her first period of suspension eliminated her obligation to offer proof of insurance and to pay reinstatement fees to obtain reinstatement of her driver's license.

Son was removed from Mother's custody after Mother was arrested for soliciting herself for prostitution. The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding that (1) Mother had abused or neglected Son by clear and convincing evidence and (2) termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interest of Son. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the trial court articulated the correct burden of proof for the evidence it found supporting the termination, (2) the burden of proof articulated by the trial court was constitutional and did not violate Mother's due process rights, and (3) the trial court did not err in its consideration of Mother's mental capacity in relation to future harm.

The State filed a felony complaint charging Melvin Davis, a registered sex offender, with violating Mo. Rev. Stat. 566.150 for knowingly being present within 500 feet of a public park that contains playground equipment or a public swimming pool. Davis moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that section 566.150 was unconstitutional as applied to him because it violated the prohibition against retrospective laws in Mo. Const. art. I, 13. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Davis, holding that because the statute was not enacted until after Davis's original guilty plea, the statute placed a new disability on Davis based on a prior conviction and, therefore, was unconstitutionally retrospective in operation. On appeal, the State argued the constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws in art. I, 13 did not apply to section 566.150 because it was criminal in nature and the prohibition applied only to civil statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State's issue on appeal was not properly preserved for appellate review.

Laclede Gas Company maintained gas lines along Pitman Hill Road in St. Charles County. Pitman Hill Road and the gas lines were located within areas established as public roads on five recorded subdivision plats. Each of the subdivision plats first established public roads and then designated the roads as utility easements. The plats specifically stated that one of the purposes of the utility easements was for the installation and maintenance of gas lines. The County planned to widen Pitman Hill Road, which required Laclede to relocate its gas lines. Laclede declined to pay for the relocation, after which the County filed a declaratory judgment action to require Laclede to bear the cost of relocation. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County was required to reimburse Laclede for displacing the gas lines from Laclede's utility easement because the easements were constitutionally cognizable property interests and, therefore, requiring Laclede to relocate its gas lines without compensation would amount to an unconstitutional taking of private property.

William Foster was convicted of capital murder, first-degree robbery, and armed criminal action. Many years later, the department of corrections informed Foster that any funds deposited into his prison account to pay for college correspondence courses or an attorney would be subject to seizure by the state, pursuant to the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act (MIRA). Foster filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that MIRA could not be applied to require reimbursement from him for the cost of his incarceration because the criminal acts that resulted in his incarceration were committed prior to the law's enactment. The trial court dismissed Foster's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts alleged in Foster's petition were not developed sufficiently to give rise to a ripe controversy because the petition did not allege that Foster would receive sufficient assets to trigger the state's authority to seek reimbursement under MIRA.