Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants, St. Louis County and St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission (CVC), filed suit against Prestige Travel and numerous other online travel companies that facilitate the booking of hotel and motel rooms via the internet. The appellants argued that Prestige and the other companies were required to pay hotel and tourism taxes imposed by the revised ordinances of St. Louis County and state law. Prestige moved to dismiss the petition, and the circuit court overruled the motion. Shortly thereafter, H.B. 1442, which specifically exempted online travel companies such as Prestige from the tax, was passed. Prestige filed a motion to reconsider its motion to dismiss, and the circuit court dismissed the case. Appellants appealed, arguing the law violated the state constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) appellants waived their constitutional challenge to the law by failing to raise it at the earliest opportunity; (2) the law does not violate the original purpose requirement of the state constitution; and (3) the argument that the title of the law is so general that the bill should be invalidated in its entirety is not supported by the current state of law.

Plaintiffs Michelle Schaefer, Cindy Brandt, and Dale Price were charged with intoxication-related driving offenses, and each plaintiff had prior convictions for intoxication-related driving offenses. The plaintiffs filed a consolidated petition for a declaratory judgment, asserting that the provisions of Mo. Rev. Stat. 577.023 that pertain to enhanced penalties for individuals with multiple prior convictions for intoxication-related driving offenses violate the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, each plaintiff had an adequate remedy of law. The Court concluded that an alternative remedy to a declaratory judgment action for each plaintiff would be litigating the constitutional issues in each separate criminal case.

Pamela Carothers was found in contempt of court for failing to satisfy a support judgment against her. She was not represented by counsel, and no waiver of her right to counsel appeared in the record. Although she timely filed her notice of appeal, her appeal was dismissed. The appellate court reversed the trial courtâs decision, and the case was then transferred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that the judgment of contempt was in error because Mrs. Carothers did not waiver her right to counsel. The Court reversed the lower courtâs judgment and set aside Mrs. Carothersâ warrant of commitment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Anthony Brown appealed his convictions for firearms charges and second-degree murder. At trial, Appellant claimed self-defense. During closing arguments, the trial court permitted the State to use a âpropâ gun to rebut Appellantâs self-defense argument. The State used the gun to show that the victim could not have carried and drawn the gun as Appellant had asserted. There was no evidence that the gun that was used as an exhibit in the Stateâs closing argument was similar in size or shape to the victimâs gun. During deliberations, the jury asked to see the âprop.â The trial court denied the request because the prop was not evidence. Upon review of the trial records, the Supreme Court found that the State âshould not have been able to bypass normal evidentiary limitationsâ by showing the gun to the jury: âthe Stateâs closing argument demonstration was necessarily speculative and carried with it the distinct possibility of misleading the jury . . . Under these circumstances, there is a substantial likelihood that the juryâs decision was influenced by the improper demonstration.â Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial courtâs judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

A jury found Appellant Donald Nash guilty of capital murder for the 1982 killing of Judy Spencer. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole or probation for 50 years. Appellant argued on appeal that he was wrongly convicted under a section of state law that had been repealed in 1983, and that no other statute replaced it that criminalized the murder for which he was charged. Furthermore, Appellant argued that he was convicted on insufficient evidence at trial, because the trial court excluded his evidence that someone else committed the murder. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by Appellantâs interpretation of the statute in question, finding that âthe apparent purpose of the 1983 enactment of the new section . . . was to make clear that an offense committed in 1982 should be charged and prosecuted according to the laws existing in 1982â and not after the changes were enacted. The Court also found that the evidence presented at Appellantâs trial was sufficient to support the jury verdict against him. The Court affirmed Appellantâs conviction and sentence.