Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

At 1:37 a.m., Haddad reported to Missoula 911 that he was driving on Hillview when a black Acura 2.0 CL with gold badging pulled out in front of him; that the driver was swerving; that he could not describe the driver due to the vehicle’s tinted windows nor see the license plate; and that he would “possibly” be willing to sign a complaint. He provided his name and phone number, but declined to provide his address, indicating he was willing to be contacted by law enforcement. Officers Jones and Horton responded; on Hillview, Horton passed a vehicle that fit Haddad’s description. Jones saw it turn onto 34th Street, searched the area and found a black Acura 2.0 CL in an apartment complex parking lot. Tye was standing near the vehicle. Jones observed that she was swaying, had watery eyes and slow, slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol, and determined Tye was intoxicated. Tye admitted she had several drinks before driving down Hillview. Jones arrested her, then discovered that Haddad lied about his location. Haddad admitted calling 911 from his residence after Tye left that location intoxicated. Haddad did not want Tye to know he was the complainant. The court heard evidence that 911 dispatchers do not regularly use the GPS system, but rely on the information callers provide because it is more accurate, concluded that Jones reasonably relied on Haddad’s information, and denied a motion to suppress. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, based on the “Pratt” factors: whether the informant identifies himself and exposes himself to criminal and civil liability if the report is false; whether the report is based on the informant’s personal observations; and whether the officer’s own observations corroborated the informant’s information. View "Missoula v. Tye" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count each of sexual intercourse without consent, sexual assault, and sexual abuse of children. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into his request for substitute counsel and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s request for substitute counsel, and further investigation by the court was unnecessary; and (2) Defendant’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel is dismissed without prejudice to raising it in a postconviction relief proceeding. View "State v. Cheetham" on Justia Law

Jeffry Weber appealed after a jury convicted him of felony theft. Weber was a janitor at Sidney High School. A Thermal Dynamics Cutmaster 82 plasma cutter, a tool used to cut metal and steel, went missing from the high school shop classroom on a night Weber was working. The high school principal later identified Weber as the person on surveillance video in the shop the night the plasma cutter disappeared. After an investigation, the State charged Weber by information with theft of property in excess of $1,500 for stealing the plasma cutter from the high school. At issue during trial was the admission into evidence an inventory list that was prepared by a former shop teacher. Defense counsel sought to admit the inventory to challenge the value of the missing cutter. If the value was less than $1,500, the Weber could have been charged with a misdemeanor. Witnesses testified that the cutter was not new, therefore, $1,500 represented a "new" value, and that replacement cost was not the correct basis for determining the cutter's value. Weber was convicted nonetheless. On appeal, Weber argued the trial court's rulings with regard to the inventory were made in error, and his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance, thus warranting him a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that Weber demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. "Weber has shown there is a probability that, given the benefit of the lesser valuation of the plasma cutter, Weber may have been convicted of a lesser crime of misdemeanor theft, rather than the felony conviction he received under trial counsel’s deficient performance." The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Montana v. Weber" on Justia Law

Anne Hislop appealed the denial of a motion to dismiss an aggravated DUI charge. In 2007, Hislop’s license was suspended because she declined to submit to the preliminary alcohol screening test after being arrested for DUI. Ultimately, she was acquitted of the criminal charge after trial. In 2013, Hislop was arrested for DUI. Hislop did not provide a breath or blood sample as required under 61-8-402, MCA. Hislop was charged with aggravated DUI based on her 2007 refusal to submit a breath or blood test. In 2011, the Montana Legislature enacted 61-8-465, MCA, the aggravated DUI statute. A person commits aggravated DUI if the person operates a vehicle under the influence of alcohol and refuses to provide a breath or blood sample as required under 61-8-402, MCA, the implied consent law, and has had his or her license suspended for a prior refusal to provide a breath or blood sample under 61-8-402, MCA, within ten years of the current offense. Hislop filed a motion to dismiss the charge on the ground it violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, finding that 61-8-465(1)(d) only took into consideration Hislop's 2007 behavior while punishing her 2013 conduct, and was not ex post facto legislation. View "Montana v. Hislop" on Justia Law

Christopher Brunette appealed an order denying his petition for reinstatement of his driver’s license. Brunette argued the arresting officer lacked probable cause for a stop of his vehicle, and therefore the ensuing revocation of his license was predicated on an illegal stop. The Supreme Court found the evidence supported a finding of probable cause, and resulting proceedings against Brunette. The Court therefore affirmed denial of Brunette's motion to reinstate his driver's license. View "Brunette v. Montana" on Justia Law

The State appealed an order granting Daniel Colvin's motion to dismiss. In 2014, the State charged Colvin by information with attempted deliberate homicide in the September 4, 2014 shooting of Michael Aja. At the time of the incident Aja was sitting in his Jeep vehicle. Colvin claimed that he was holding the pistol inside the driver’s side window when it accidentally fired and hit Aja. On the same day as the shooting, law enforcement officers seized and impounded the Jeep as evidence. As the case developed, the position of the pistol and its distance from the victim when fired became important issues to the prosecution and the defense. The State’s theory was that the pistol shot came from several feet outside the vehicle, while Colvin’s theory was that it came from very near or inside the window. Colvin also contends that each eyewitness to the incident, including the victim, supports his theory that the shot was fired from near or inside the vehicle window. The District Court entered an order granting a defense discovery motion, requiring disclosure of “all materials known or discovered . . . pertinent to this case.” That same day the State filed a motion for leave to return a wallet and keys to Michael Aja. A few days later, the State returned the vehicle to Aja. The State did not notify the defense or the District Court that it intended to release the vehicle and did not seek leave of the District Court to do so. The District Court determined that after release of the vehicle and Aja’s daily use, the defense had no means to obtain evidence as it existed at the time the State’s expert gathered his evidence. The District Court concluded that the State’s “negligent” release of the impounded vehicle in the face of an order requiring disclosure “deprived the defense of the opportunity to investigate and prove their theory of the case. This is a fundamental violation of due process.” Finding no reversible error in the District Court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed granting Colvin's motion to dismiss. View "Montana v. Colvin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence, second offense. Defendant appealed, demanding a trial de novo. Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that his constitutional rights had been violated by his trial being conducted by a non-lawyer judge in a court of record without trial de novo. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s trial before a non-lawyer justice of the peace, even where a trial de novo was not available on appeal, did not violate his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel or to due process. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff’s employment with Butte-Silver Bow County was terminated, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the County alleging several counts. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on most of Plaintiff’s claims. The court, however, denied summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that the County violated Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-904(1)(b), holding that factual questions remained as to whether the County had good cause for Plaintiff’s termination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting summary judgment in the County’s favor with respect to Plaintiff’s claims that the County violated Montana’s open meeting laws and public participation laws; (2) granting summary judgment in the County’s favor with respect to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim; (3) ruling that the County did not discharge Plaintiff in violation of its own policies or for refusing to violate public policy; and (4) concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to a trial on her claim that the County terminated her employment without good cause. View "Moe v. Butte-Silver Bow Co." on Justia Law

In 2012, Montana voters passed Legislative Referendum 121 (LR 121). The referendum denied certain state services to “illegal aliens.” Before the law went into effect, Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance (MIJA) filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from LR 121, arguing that the referendum violated certain constitutional rights and was preempted by federal law. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction as to the majority of LR 121 but enjoined the use of the definition of “illegal alien” so as to preclude the State from using an individual’s unlawful entry into the United States as a factor in determining that individual’s entitlement to state benefits. The district court subsequently concluded that LR 121 was preempted by federal law. The court then awarded MIJA attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that MIJA has associational standing to challenge LR 121; (2) did not err in concluding that LR 121 is preempted by federal law; and (3) erred in awarding “supplemental relief” to MIJA in the form of attorney fees. View "Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance v. Bullock" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of criminal possession. The district court sentenced him as a persistent felony offender to a term of twenty years, with ten of those years suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of methamphetamine that law enforcement officers found on Defendant’s person after conducting a search incident to his lawful arrest for violating the terms of his parole; (2) Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law following the evidence hearing relating to his suppression motion; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s third discovery request; (4) the district court did not err by denying Defendant’s post trial motion to dismiss based upon the Court’s failure to arraign him on the second amended information; and (5) the district court conducted an “adequate initial inquiry” into Defendant’s complaints concerning his assigned counsel. View "State v. Crawford" on Justia Law