Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of accountability for arson, a felony, and accountability for theft, a felony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) defense counsel’s failure to offer a “mere presence” jury instruction constituted deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland v. Washington, counsel’s conduct fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness,” and Defendant was prejudiced by her counsel’s inadequate performance; and (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by telling the jurors to base their decision on factors other than the law and evidence. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Chafee" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled no contest to the felony offense of mitigated deliberate homicide. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea, which the district court denied. Appellant appealed from the denial of his motion but later waived his appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel against his trial and appellate counsel. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide to Appellant a copy of a report by a forensic pathologist, but Appellant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s error; and (2) Appellant failed to establish that appellate counsel was deficient by advising Appellant to withdraw his direct appeal in order to file a petition for postconviction relief. View "Haagenson v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed claims against the Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks Commission (FWP) for violating their rights to know and participate under Sections 8 and 9, Article II, of the Montana Constitution by, among other things, failing to provide prior public notice and opportunity to participate in FWP’s decision to close certain areas to wolf hunting during a meeting. The district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting FWP from further enforcing its decision. Thereafter, the Legislature acted to ban these types of closures in the future, and the FWP ultimately allowed the wolf season to expire on its own. Subsequently, the court granted FWP’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims as moot. The court then awarded attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiffs after determining that it had prevailed on its constitutional claims by obtaining the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiffs, holding that because Plaintiffs obtained the relief they sought to procure through litigation, they must be considered a “prevailing party” under the relevant statute. View "Citizens for Balanced Use v. Fish, Wildlife & Parks Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with ninety-one counts of felony cruelty to animals after law enforcement officers applied for and obtained a warrant to search Defendant’s home and kennels, where Defendant bred Malamutes. The dogs were found to be ill and malnourished. One hundred and thirty-nine adult dogs and twenty-three puppies were seized. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding, among other things, that probable cause was well established. Defendant was subsequently convicted as charged, and the district court ordered the forfeiture of every seized dog. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) did not abuse its discretion in limiting evidence to the time period of the charged offenses; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in requiring Defendant to forfeit all of his dogs. View "State v. Chilinski" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with, among other offenses, aggravated DUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Mark Fiorentino, an off-duty officer who arrested Defendant, lacked probable cause to effectuate a citizen’s arrest. The municipal court denied the motion, holding that the off-duty officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant under the circumstances. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, reserving the right to appeal the suppression order. The district court affirmed the municipal court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that Fiorentino had probable cause to arrest Defendant and that the existing circumstances required Defendant’s immediate arrest. View "City of Missoula v. Iosefo" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lawrence J.C. VanDyke filed his declaration of nomination as a candidate for election to the Montana Supreme Court. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint in the district court seeking to have VanDyke’s candidacy invalidated on the basis that VanDyke was not admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of election as required by the Montana Constitution. The district court ruled that VanDyke did not meet the minimum eligibility requirements because, although VanDyke was a member of the State Bar of Montana continuously from 2005 to the present day, when VanDyke elected to assume inactive status from 2007 until 2012, he was not authorized or qualified to practice law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that VanDyke’s admission to the practice of law in Montana in 2005 satisfied the Constitution’s requirement that a candidate for Supreme Court Justice be “admitted to the practice of law in Montana for at least five years prior to the date of appointment or election,” notwithstanding VanDyke’s choice to take inactive status for some of those years. View "Cross v. VanDyke" on Justia Law

In 2002, Elizabeth “Betsy” Baumgart was appointed to be the administrator of the Montana Tourism and Promotion Division of the Department of Commerce (DOC). In 2010, after Dore Schwinden was appointed as DOC director, Schwinden terminated Baumgart’s employment, citing a lack of management competencies and sufficient understanding of the Division’s budgeting process. Baumgart sued the DOC and Schwinden, individually and as DOC’s agent, alleging that DOC wrongfully discharged her and discriminated against her on political grounds because she was a Republican and Schwinden was a Democrat. The district court granted DOC’s motion for summary judgment as it pertained to Baumgart’s political affiliation discrimination claims and all claims against Schwinden. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Baumgart failed to establish a prima facie case for political discrimination, the district court did not err in granting DOC’s motion for summary judgment on this issue; (2) the district court correctly dismissed the individual claims against Schwinden, as Schwinden was entitled to statutory immunity under the circumstances of this case; and (3) the district court correctly concluded that the DOC had good cause to terminate Baumgart. View "Baumgart v. Dep't of Commerce" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trespass to property and possession of dangerous drugs, both misdemeanor offenses. Defendant subsequently decided to enroll in the Mineral County Treatment Court. Defendant was aware that he could be sanctioned with incarceration if he was dishonest during his participation in the Treatment Court. During his participation in the Treatment Court Defendant tested positive for drug use and was interviewed by the Treatment Team regarding the results. Subsequently, a member of the Treatment Team sent a report to law enforcement detailing the information he learned from the interviews with Defendant. Defendant was subsequently charged with distribution of dangerous drugs and two counts of possession of dangerous drugs. Defendant filed motions to suppress and dismiss, arguing that the State violated the confidentiality provision of Mont. Code Ann. 46-1-1111(4) and his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination by disclosing the confidential Treatment Court material to law enforcement. The district court denied the motions. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motions to suppress and dismiss, holding that the State violated section 46-1-1111(4) by disclosing confidential drug testing information to law enforcement in order to investigate a new criminal offense. View "State v. Plouffe" on Justia Law

Martin Vincent Lau was charged with deliberate homicide. Lau claimed that the fatal shooting was an act of self-defense. Lau sought to offer his own out-of-court statement to prove that at the time of the shooting, he knew of specific instances of violence by the victim. The State moved in limine to prohibit Lau from introducing the statement on hearsay grounds. Lau, in turn, argued that the exclusion of his statement would limit his ability to put forth a defense and that he would be required to testify in order to establish his knowledge of specific instances of conduct by the victim. The district court ruled that Lau would be permitted to cross-examine witnesses about the victim's specific acts of violence and Lau’s knowledge of those acts, as contained in his statement. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for writ of supervisory control, holding that the Montana Rules of Evidence did not permit Lau to offer his own out-of-court statement in support of his claim of justifiable use of force. View "State v. District Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that the State had failed to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence relevant to the case in violation of Brady v. Maryland and that his trial attorneys failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Defendant’s postconviction petition because the petition did not fulfill the elements of a Brady violation; and (2) any alleged error on the part of trial counsel did not prejudice Defendant, and therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that Defendant had not received ineffective assistance of counsel. View "McGarvey v. State" on Justia Law