Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff submitted an application for a 119-lot subdivision, which the Board of Missoula County Commissioners denied. Plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of the Board's action and alternatively claimed that the Board's actions constituted a regulatory taking that entitled him to just compensation. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all of Richard's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing Plaintiff to conduct further discovery before ruling on the summary judgment motion; (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment to the County on the Board's decision to deny the subdivision; and (3) the County was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's regulatory taking claim. View "Richards v. County of Missoula" on Justia Law

At issue on review in this case was whether the State Board of Land Commissioners properly issued leases to Ark Land Co., a subsidiary of Arch Coal, Inc., without first conducting environmental review under the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The State Land Board did not conduct environmental review prior to entering the leases, relying on Mont. Code Ann. 77-1-121(2). The district court granted summary judgment to the State Land Board, Ark Land Co., and Arch Coal (Defendants), determining that the State retained sufficient ability to require adequate environmental protections sufficient to meet its constitutional and trust responsibilities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the leases did not allow for any degradation of the environment and specifically required full environmental review and full compliance with applicable State environmental laws, the act of issuing the leases did not impact or implicate the right to a clean and healthful environment in Mont. Const. art II, 3; and (2) therefore, section 77-1-121(2) was not subject to strict or "middle-tier" scrutiny. View "N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from his conviction in the district court of one count of felony aggravated assault. Appellant argued (1) his conviction should be reversed under the plain error doctrine because law enforcement failed to investigate his claim of justifiable use of force as required by Mont. Code Ann. 45-3-112; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move for dismissal of his charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to establish that any alleged failure of law enforcement officials to comply with section 45-3-112 prejudiced his defense requiring the Court to exercise plain error review; and (2) Appellant failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective. View "State v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Bobby Cooksey was convicted of deliberate homicide. The district court sentenced Appellant to a term of fifty years in prison with credit for time served. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion for a new trial; (2) the district court properly excluded Appellant's offered evidence concerning the presence of the drug Paxil in the deceased's blood; (3) the investigation of the crime was conducted in compliance with Mont. Code Ann. 45-12-112; and (4) Appellant failed to establish that the prosecution's statements during closing argument constituted unfairly prejudicial misconduct. View "State v. Cooksey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against a district court judge, seeking damages for the judge's acts or omissions while presiding over a telephone pretrial conference in a civil action then pending before him. At all relevant times the judge was acting in his official capacity as a district court judge with regard to that case and the pretrial conference. The district court granted the judge's motion to dismiss on the grounds of judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the acts of which Plaintiff complained occurred while the judge was conducting the pretrial conference and were clearly within the authority and responsibility of a district court judge, the judge was immune from suit, and the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. View "Hartsoe v. McNeil" on Justia Law

LR-123 was enacted by the Montana Legislature in 2011. It proposed a vote in the November 2012 general election on whether to provide a tax credit and potential tax refund, or outright State payment, to individuals in years in which there is a certain level of projected surplus revenue. Plaintiffs filed a complaint contending LR-123 was unconstitutional because it unlawfully delegated legislative powers. The constitutional issue in this case turned upon whether LR-123 impermissibly delegated legislative power to an employee (the legislative fiscal analyst) of one of the Legislature's committees. The district court found that LR-123 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the legislative fiscal analyst. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LR-123 was unconstitutional on its face and therefore may not appear on the ballot in November 2012. View "MEA-MFT v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony partner or family member assault. The district court designated Defendant a persistent felony offender and committed him to the department of corrections (DOC) for the statutory minimum period of five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the complaining witness had a history of a felony forgery charge over a decade before Defendant's trial based on the remoteness in time of the forgery charge and the substantial evidence in the record to support the assault against the witness; and (2) the district court lawfully based its sentence upon Defendant's likelihood of reoffending and the court's desire to rehabilitate him.

The State appealed an order that preliminarily enjoined parts of the Montana Marijuana Act. Montana Cannabis Industry Association, Mark Matthews, Shirley Hamp, Shelly Yeager, Jane Doe, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Michael Geci-Black, John Stowers, Point Hatfield, and Charlie Hamp (collectively, Plaintiffs) cross-appealed. The 2004 Medical Marijuana Act left in place those provisions in the Montana criminal code that make it illegal to cultivate, possess, distribute or use marijuana, while simultaneously protecting authorized users of medical marijuana from being prosecuted. The Legislature enacted Senate Bill 423, which repealed the 2004 Medical Marijuana Act and replaced it with the Montana Marijuana Act (MMA), which dramatically changed the landscape for the cultivation, distribution, and use of marijuana for medical purposes. In 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking to both temporarily and permanently enjoin the implementation of the MMA in its entirety. Based on a motion filed with the complaint, the District Court immediately entered a temporary restraining order blocking implementation of the MMA which prohibited the advertising of "marijuana or marijuana-related products" and which was scheduled to take effect that day. By stipulation, the temporary restraining order remained in effect pending the preliminary injunction hearing. The court ultimately issued its Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The issues raised on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the District Court erred when it applied a strict scrutiny, fundamental rights analysis to preliminarily enjoin the MMA; (2) whether the District Court erred in not enjoining section 50-46-308(2), MCA; (3) whether the District Court erred in not enjoining section 50-46-308(7), MCA; and, (4) whether the court erred in declining to enjoin the MMA in its entirety. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) the MMA did not implicate the fundamental right to employment, and reversed the District Court’s holding on this issue; and in pursuing health, an individual does not have a fundamental affirmative right of access to a particular drug. The Court reversed the District Court's holding with respect to this issue. Because the Court remanded the case on the scrutiny issue, it declined to address Issues Two, Three and Four.

Petitioner Caryn Lewis asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ of supervisory control over the Eighth Judicial District Court in Cascade County Cause No. ADV 10-895. The District Court action arose from a 2003 motor vehicle/pedestrian accident in which Lewis was the pedestrian. The vehicle that struck Lewis left the scene, and neither the vehicle nor the driver was ever located. Lewis’s complaint stated she suffered serious bodily injuries from the accident, and her medical reports showed that those injuries included a cause for a Rule 35 examination. The Court never ruled that a plaintiff's claim for general emotional distress damages is, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for ordering a Rule 35 mental examination. Lewis did not claim damages for any mental or psychological disorder or injury due to the accident, nor did she claim that a pre-existing mental condition was exacerbated by the accident or assert an independent tort claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Rather, she made only a general claim for "emotional pain, suffering and anxiety" associated with her physical injuries from the accident. Upon review, the Court concluded that the matter involved a legal issue as to which the District Court made a mistake of law. Because Lewis did not put her mental condition in controversy, the District Court erred in granting State Farm's (her insurer) motion for an independent psychological examination of her under M. R. Civ. P. 35. "And, because Lewis's loss of privacy in submitting to a Rule 35 psychological examination would be irretrievable, the normal appeal process would be inadequate to address the District Court's error." The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant Raul Sanchez appealed a district court order that denied his amended petition for postconviction relief. The issue on appeal was whether the court erred in doing so. Appellant admitted to shooting his girlfriend Alesha in 2004. He objected to the admission of a hearsay statement Alesha made in a handwritten note she addressed "to whom it may concern" and suggested that should tragedy befall her, that she suspected it was at the hands of Appellant. Appellant raised his objection as a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The Montana Supreme Court concluded that while the note constituted hearsay not subject to an exception, its admission was harmless error because the State presented other admissible evidence that proved the same facts. Furthermore. the Court concluded that Appellant forfeited his constitutional right to confront Alesha when he killed her. Appellant filed his application for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to appeal the Montana Supreme Court's confrontation decision to the United States Supreme Court. The district court denied Appellant's application for relief. Finding "overwhelming" evidence to support Appellant's conviction and that there was no error by his counsel for "failing" to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of relief.