Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Al Ballard and Ecosafe Gold Recovery, LLC (Ballard), appealed a district court's order entered following the Supreme Court’s remand in the first appeal of the case. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of judgment in favor of Ballard, and reversed the award of attorney fees to Ballard and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Upon remittitur, Russell and Melissa Levens moved for an order on remand that would provide various forms of relief, including attorney fees. When Ballard did not initially respond, the District Court entered an order requiring Ballard to immediately restore a 30-foot buffer zone by appropriate filling, compacting, and buttressing. The court ordered Ballard to commence work immediately and to complete the restoration within 30 days, and imposed a $100 per day penalty for every day beyond the 30-day deadline that the restoration was incomplete. The court required Ballard to mark the boundary of the buffer zone and to pay Levens' attorney fees and costs, and scheduled a hearing to determine the proper amount of fees. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err on remand of the case. "Ballard has no meritorious defense and the takings claim was raised for the first time on appeal." The District Court properly awarded attorney fees to Levens under the agreement. The Levens were likewise entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

Appellant Robert Arthur Wing appealed his conviction on felony driving while under the influence of alcohol (fourth or subsequent offense). Appellant argued at trial that he had not been driving on the day of his arrest, and that another man, Michael Halverson, had been the driver before the vehicle was disabled. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the district court abused its discretion by preventing a defense witness from testifying about a statement against interest made by Halverson. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Halverson's alleged statements should have been admitted into evidence, and the jury should have been given the opportunity to consider it. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2011, the State filed identical Petitions for Emergency Protective Services, Adjudication of Youths in Need of Care, and for Temporary Legal Custody in two causes involving K.H. and K.M., the daughters of Appellee K.H. (Mother). The children were two and five years old, respectively, at the time of the petition. The petition was ultimately dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Counsel for the children appealed the dismissal. The issues before the Supreme Court were whether the children had standing to appeal the dismissal of the State's petition for their adjudication as youths in need of care, and whether the district court erred in dismissing the State's petition. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Defendant Laurie Kay Corbino appealed a district court's judgment and order of commitment. Defendant entered into a plea agreement wherein she pled guilty to felony burglary. Defendant admitted to entering the Lendmans’ residence and taking cosmetic items that belonged to them. In the presentence investigation report, Mrs. Lendman submitted an affidavit of pecuniary loss wherein she listed as missing two large bags of personal items and a large gold ring with opal, emeralds and diamonds. Because the other items were recovered, the only restitution Mrs. Lendman requested was $1,500 for the ring. Defendant admitted to taking the personal items, but denied taking the ring. The District Court also determined that "with no current resources, [the Defendant did not have the] ability to pay for the type of programs that she needs if she were on probation, including the [Cognitive Principles and Restructuring] program." Defense counsel objected to Defendant's sentence on the grounds that she was being incarcerated based on her inability to pay. The court denied Defendant's objection because, even though she had a counselor for her drug and alcohol addictions, Defendant's compulsive thievery was different than addiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the District Court properly applied the law to the facts of this case, and affirmed the district court's decision.

In 2007, Defendant Ralph Fox was charged with two counts of felony sexual assault against minor females, CS (Count I) and HS (Count II). A federal grand jury handed down an indictment in the United States District Court charging Defendant with three felony offenses: sexual exploitation of children, receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography. He was convicted on all charges and sentenced to federal prison for 110 years. Subsequently, Defendant moved to dismiss the State action against him on the ground of double jeopardy. The District Court dismissed one count of sexual assault and Defendant was convicted on the remaining count. Nevertheless, the court sentenced Defendant to two fifty-year sentences (one for each count of sexual assault) and five years for failing to register as a sex offender. The fifty-year sentences were to run concurrently with each other and with the federal sentence. The five-year sentence was to run consecutively to the fifty-year sentences for assault but concurrently with the federal sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing the District Court erred when it sentenced him to a term of fifty years for the dismissed assault charge. He also claimed the court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the remaining assault charge. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The case was remanded to the District Court for correction of the illegally-imposed sentence pertaining to Count II. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I.

Petitioners brought an original proceeding to the Supreme Court to challenge the validity of Initiative 166. They requested the Court rule that the Attorney General and Secretary of State did not comply with their responsibilities under law when they failed to bar I-166 from appearing on the general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General and Secretary of State acted in compliance with their duties under law, and that the initiative met all statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition.

Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Fellows appealed a district court's order that dismissed his complaint. Plaintiff owned a water right in Spring Creek. He claimed that the flow of the creek was for many years recharged by water seeping from the natural channel of the Teton River. He claimed that the practice of diverting water from the natural channel of the Teton implemented by the district court's water commissioner on the Teton adversely affected the water available to satisfy his water right in Spring Creek. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action as a dissatisfied water user unless he could prove a hydrological connection between Spring Creek and the Teton River. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's factual allegations and his request for a declaratory ruling were sufficient to invoke the district court's power to issue a ruling on the issue of connectivity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Kingsley Ariegwe appealed a district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Defendant virtually met a fifteen-year-old female in an internet chat room. After chatting, the two telephone one another, and eventually met in person. Allegedly a sexual encounter occurred at that in-person meeting. Shortly thereafter, the fifteen-year-old told a friend that she had sex with a 32-year-old man. Unknown to either girls, the phone conversation was inadvertently recorded on an answering machine at the friend's house. The tape of the conversation was preserved, and was at issue in this appeal. Defendant was charged with sexual intercourse without consent, attempted sexual intercourse without consent, and unlawful transactions with children. In his opening statement at trial, Defendant told the jury about the taped conversation and implied that the jury would get to listen to the recording. However, defense counsel never offered the tape into evidence. He later noted the omission in his closing statement. Defendant appealed his conviction. The district court determined that Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to introduce the tape recording into evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court ,Defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant's petition for postconviction relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment and dismissed Defendant's application for relief.

Sherman Anderson and other concerned residents of the City of Deer Lodge (Anderson) appealed a district court order that denied their petition for a writ of mandamus. The issue in this case arose from the revocation of Zoo Mountain Natural Care, Inc.'s business license. Zoo Mountain contacted the City in 2010 regarding a business license. Zoo Mountain had purchased property in the City limits for the purpose of lawfully growing and selling medical marijuana. The City was not issuing business licenses at that time, however, due to a change from a calendar-year licensing system to a fiscal year licensing system. The City previously had determined that it would waive the business license requirement for new applicants during this transition period. The City accordingly allowed Zoo Mountain to operate lawfully without a business license until July 2010. The City Council convened shortly after Zoo Mountain’s move to Deer Lodge. Anderson expressed concern over Zoo Mountain’s location at this meeting. He specifically disliked the fact that Zoo Mountain was located in a residential neighborhood, and that Zoo Mountain was located near the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Anderson believed that the City’s decision to issue the business license violated Ordinances 130 and 136. Anderson further believed that the City violated the 2009 version of the Medical Marijuana Act when it issued the business license to a corporation, rather than to an individual. Anderson sought a writ of mandamus from the District Court to require the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The court declined to issue the writ. It concluded that the MMA provided no clear legal duty for the City to revoke the business license. It similarly concluded that the City Code, particularly Ordinances 130 and 136, contained no clear legal duty to revoke the business license. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: Anderson has failed to establish any clear legal duty that requires the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The District Court acted accordingly in denying the writ.

Defendant Shawn Stoner appealed a district court's order to deny his motion to dismiss several marijuana charges against him. The sole issue on appeal was whether the District Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss after he acquired a medical marijuana card. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Defendant was required to have obtained and be in possession of a valid registry identification card at the time of the offense for which he sought immunity from prosecution. Because Defendant did not obtain a registry identification card until after he was charged, he was not entitled to dismissal of the charges against him.