Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Montana Supreme Court
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Douglas Kirn was charged with two felony counts of assault on a police officer by causing reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury by use of a weapon. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, and Kirn was convicted. Kirn appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Kirn's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence because, under these circumstances, the State presented sufficient evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Kevin Kichnet was babysitting his young nieces when he met three-year-old Eternity after the Head Start bus dropped her off after school. Kichnet was allegedly holding her hand as they crossed the street when Eternity collapsed. Kitchnet called 9-1-1. After Eternity reached the hospital she was pronounced dead. Kichnet was subsequently arrested for deliberate homicide and jailed. More than six months later, charges against Kichnet were dropped when it was determined that the Head Start school bus had run over Eternity. Kichnet sued (1) Butte-Silver Bow County, claiming County law enforcement officers performed their investigation negligently, resulting in Kichnet's arrest and incarceration; and (2) the State, claiming that the State Medical Examiner performed his duties negligently when he reported Eternity's death as a homicide. The district court granted the County's and State's motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment, as (1) the State was immune under the cited statutes from Kichnet's negligence claim; and (2) the court did not err in determining that there was probable cause for the arrest and incarceration of Kichnet, and that the investigation by the County was not negligent.

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After receiving reports of an erratic driver, a deputy sheriff approached the driver of a truck matching the report's description and asked the driver, William Muller, to perform a field sobriety test and to take a preliminary breath test. Muller refused both tests, after which the deputy sheriff arrested Muller for DUI. Muller again refused to submit to a breath test at the detention center, which resulted in the automatic suspension of his license. The district court denied Muller's subsequent petition for reinstatement of drivers license. Muller appealed, arguing that he was not properly arrested for DUI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined that the deputy officer legally arrested Muller, and therefore, the court did not err in denying Muller's petition for reinstatement of driver's license.

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Defendant Michell Anders was found unconscious and lying face down on the floor of a movie store. After several police officers and EMTs arrived on the scene and were unsuccessful at reviving Anders, one of the officers searched inside Anders' purse to look for identification and medical information. Inside the purse were drugs and drug paraphernalia. Anders subsequently pled guilty to criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, and reserved her right to appeal the order of the district court denying her motion to suppress evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by denying Anders' motion to suppress the evidence found within her purse on the basis of the community caretaker doctrine, as the police acted appropriately under the standards the Court had adopted for application of the community caretaker doctrine.

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John Lacey was convicted in district court for sexual intercourse without consent based on his sexual intercourse with a minor while the minor was either asleep or intoxicated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecutor's statements during closing argument in the aggregate did stray so far from the permissible to satisfy the Court's standard of the exercise of plain error review, and counsel's failure to object to the statements did not constitute unreasonable conduct; and (2) the State did not impermissibly change or expand its legal theory of how Lacey committed sexual intercourse without consent, as Lacey's argument neglected the material available in the affidavit in support of the information.

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Lionel Ellison was convicted in the county justice court of misdemeanor party or family member assault. He appealed the conviction to the district court. Ellison subsequently appealed from an order of the district court denying his motion to supplement the record and denying his issues on appeal. The court denied the motions, which were based upon the State's alleged withholding of exculpatory information in violation of Ellison's right to due process according to Brady v. Maryland, concluding that Ellison's claims were not ripe for appellate review. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the district court did not err in denying Ellison's motions, as Ellison failed to establish a prima facie Brady violation and did not establish that his defense was prejudiced under the facts.

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Before being arrested for DUI, Richard Bollman underwent the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. Bollman was subsequently convicted of his fifth DUI offense, a felony, after a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the court did not err in (1) finding that a highway patrol trooper was qualified under Mont. R. Evid. 702 to testify as an expert about the correlation between alcohol consumption and HGN, which was the scientific basis of the HGN test; and (2) denying Bollman's motion for a mistrial based on a police officer's reference to "felony DUIs" during questioning by the State, as any prejudice from the statement was very minor, if it was prejudicial at all, and the statement did not contribute to Bollman's conviction.

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Husband and Wife filed for divorce. During the dissolution proceeding, a guardian ad litem (GAL), who was appointed for the parties' two daughters, recommended co-parenting with equal visitation by both parents. At the final hearing, the parties stipulated to the district court that they had reached agreement on a final parenting plan. They also agreed that no child support or maintenance would be paid to either party. The district court took judicial notice of the GAL's recommendations. Subsequently, and prior to dissolution, the GAL revised her recommendations and recommended that Husband be the children's primary residential parent with Wife having visitation rights. The court adopted the GAL's custody recommendation and also ordered Wife to pay Husband child support. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the GAL's revised plan constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in relying upon the hearsay evidence in order to determine the matter of child custody. Remanded.

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After a jury trial, Jimmy Booth was charged with, inter alia, felony criminal possession of precursors to dangerous drugs pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-107. Booth appealed, claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of the charge and that his defense counsel was ineffective in failing to move for dismissal at the close of the State's case. At issue was whether the plain language of section 45-9-107 required a showing that Booth possessed a combination of listed precursors set forth in the statute or whether possession of pseudoephedrine alone was sufficient for a conviction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) section 45-9-107(1)(a) requires possession of two or more of the statute's listed precursor chemicals as an element of the offense; and (2) therefore, the jury could not have rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence seized from Booth met the statutory requirements of the statute.

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Appellants, a group of individuals, filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) against NorthWestern Energy (NWE) concerning NWE's provision of street lighting services. The PSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the four named complainants lacked standing under Mont. Code Ann. 69-3-321. Appellants then filed an amended complaint in which they named four additional complainants. The PSC concluded (1) Appellants were procedurally barred from amending their complaint, and (2) the court would not reconsider its earlier ruling on standing in any event. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the original complainants lacked standing to pursue their complaint in the PSC under section 69-3-321; but (2) the PSC's and district court's rationales for rejecting the amended complaint were incorrect as, in this case, there was not a categorical procedural bar to the filing of an amended complaint following an order of dismissal for lack of standing.