Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Riley Styren's vehicle was struck by Sherry Roos's vehicle. Styren and the owner of her vehicle (collectively, Styren) filed a complaint against Roos, Roos's mother, Julia, and Curtis Stordahl, who together owned the car Roos was driving. The complaint alleged claims of negligence against Roos and negligent entrustment and liability under the family purpose doctrine against Julia and Stordahl. The district court granted summary judgment for Julia and Stordahl. A jury then found Roos was not negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly (1) granted summary judgment to Julia on the negligent entrustment claim as there was no evidence that Julia knew that Roos was an incompetent driver or that Roos would drive in a manner that created an unreasonable risk to others; (2) granted summary judgment to Julia on the family purpose doctrine claim where Styren did not meet her burden to raise genuine issues of material fact in opposition to Julia's motion; and (3) denied Styren's motion for a new trial where Styren did not meet her burden on appeal to demonstrate that the district court erred and the jury's verdict was legal and supported by substantial evidence.

The State charged Michael Hass with three offenses, one of which was a DUI. The Stated alleged that Hass had three prior DUI convictions, making the DUI a felony. Hass filed a motion challenging the validity of one of his prior DUI convictions, arguing that his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process were violated when the trial judge in that case allowed Hass's counsel to withdraw on the day of trial and then proceeded to try and convict Hass in absentia. In the instant case, pursuant to a plea agreement, Hass pleaded guilty to fourth-offense DUI, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision denying Hass's motion challenging the validity of his earlier DUI conviction and vacated the felony DUI sentence imposed by the district court, holding that the prior DUI conviction was constitutionally infirm and could not be used for sentence enhancement purposes. Remanded with instructions to resentence Hass for misdemeanor DUI.

The City Police Department conducted an internal investigation of an administrative coordinator, who was placed on administrative leave after she allegedly misused public funds. The Department created a sixteen-page due process letter detailing the evidence against the coordinator, who subsequently resigned. The Billings Gazette requested the letter, but the City declined to release it. The Gazette sued the City. The district court ordered that the document be provided to the Gazette. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where two constitutional rights are implicated, including the public's right to know about the actions of public agencies and employees and the employees' right to privacy, the district court must balance the two rights to determine whether the employees' right to privacy outweighs the public's right to know; (2) in this case, the coordinator did not have a reasonable expectation of individual privacy to the document because she held a position of trust with the Department and she was accused of breaching that trust; and (3) the mere prospect of a criminal case will not deprive the public of its right to access a public document once that right has been balanced against the right to privacy.

Susan Overfield was charged with assault and disturbing the peace after appearing to speak at a City Commission meeting about perceived conflicts of interest between City officials and the Animal Foundation of Great Falls. Overfield subsequently sued the City. Before the City and Overfield settled the case, the district court concluded (1) the Animal Foundation, its trustee, and its attorney (Petitioners), who were non-parties in the underlying case, were in contempt for wrongfully redacting information from documents produced to Overfield, and (2) the Foundation was in contempt for failing to appear at a deposition with subpoenaed documents. After the case was settled, the district court entered an order awarding Overfield attorney fees against the Petitioners based on the contempt orders. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the contempt orders of the district court, holding that the district court properly considered and decided the contempt issues below without referral to another judge, and the contempt orders were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) vacated the district court's order to arrest the trustee, the court's imposition of sanctions against an attorney who filed a protective order on behalf of the Foundation, and the court's order awarding attorney fees. Remanded.

Charley Johnson entered a nolo contendere plea to intimidation for repeated sexually assaultive behavior against his stepdaughter. During sentencing, the district court (1) sentenced Johnson to a ten-year commitment to the department of corrections, (2) required Johnson to pay for counseling costs previously incurred by his stepdaughter as well as an undetermined amount for future counseling costs she would incur the period of Johnson's sentence, and (3) imposed a condition restricting Johnson from places where children can congregate. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed, holding that Johnson failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the district court erred in imposing restitution for past and future counseling expenses incurred by the victim, but (2) remanded for calculation for future restitution in compliance with Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-244.

After a police officer arrested Jason Jenkins for driving a motorcycle under the influence of alcohol, Jenkins agreed to a breath test. Jenkins was subsequently convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). On appeal, Jenkins contended that the district court erred by admitting field certification documents as part of the foundation for the admission of the results of his breath test, alleging that they were hearsay because the officer who submitted the documents was not the author or custodian of the documents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results of the breath test because case law has established that when a district court is determining whether there is adequate foundation for admission of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, Mont. R. Evid. 104(4)(a) authorizes the court to do so without regard to whether the certification forms are hearsay.

Bill Thomas was convicted and sentenced for deliberate homicide. Thomas subsequently field a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. Thomas filed a notice of appeal. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court would continue to consider a party's appeal from a district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus as an original petition. The Supreme Court held (1) a district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a criminal proceeding is not appealable to the Court; (2) because a writ of habeas corpus may be granted by either a district court or the Supreme Court, the district court's denial of such a writ is not res judicata because it does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to grant a subsequent petition; and (3) a party must file an original petition for writ of habeas corpus for the Court to consider it. The Court then (1) granted Thomas's motion to proceed on appeal without payment of a filing fee; and (2) ordered that Thomas's appeal from the district court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice.

Brent Wilson appealed from his conviction for involvement in a fraudulent scheme to illegally take possession of real property. Prior to and throughout the jury trial, Wilson invoked his constitutional right to represent himself. On appeal, Wilson argued, inter alia, that he was not competent to waive his constitutional right to counsel and the district court should have compelled standby counsel to represent him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial credible evidence that Wilson unequivocally waived his right to counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and (2) Wilson's sentence was legal because the length of the commitment was within the district court's statutory authority, the court took the sentencing criteria of Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-225(2) into account, and the court did not punish Wilson for refusing to confess to his crimes.

Ross Habets pled guilty to aggravated assault. The district court sentenced Habets to a one-year commitment to the Department of Corrections followed by placement at the state prison for nineteen years. Habets appealed, arguing that (1) the district court failed to account for Habets's mental illness and his attempts to seek health treatment before the incident in violation of Montana's sentencing policy and principles, and (2) the court failed to comply with the rehabilitative section of the sentencing policy statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court followed the law in this case by properly considering the necessary factors in sentencing Habets.

Following a jury trial, Larry Daniels was convicted of deliberate homicide. In defense, Daniels asserted justifiable use of force. Daniels' arguments on appeal pertained to the 2009 legislative changes to the justifiable use of force statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) justifiable use of force is still an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the initial burden of providing evidence to raise the defense, and then the burden of proof shifts to the State; (2) the district court correctly disallowed cross-examination concerning specific instances of the victim's violent acts under Mont. R. Evid. 405(a); (3) proper foundation was necessary before the victim's character evidence could be admitted, and under the facts of this case, the district court correctly required Daniels to lay a proper foundation by testifying; and (4) the district court correctly refused Daniels' proposed jury instructions on justifiable use of force in defense of an occupied structure and burglary as a forcible felony.