Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Sandra K. Nieveen owned property in Lincoln, Nebraska, which was free of encumbrances. After failing to pay property taxes, TAX 106 purchased a tax certificate for the delinquent taxes. TAX 106 later transferred its interest to Vintage Management, LLC, which obtained a tax deed for the property. Nieveen alleged that the property was worth significantly more than the tax debt and claimed that the issuance of the tax deed violated her constitutional rights.The District Court for Lancaster County dismissed Nieveen’s constitutional claims for failure to state a claim and later granted summary judgment in favor of the county on her remaining claim. The court found that Nieveen was not entitled to an extended redemption period due to a mental disorder. Nieveen appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court initially affirmed the district court’s decision.The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Nebraska Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Tyler v. Hennepin County, which recognized a plausible takings claim when a property was sold for more than the tax debt. Upon reconsideration, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that Nieveen had alleged a plausible takings claim against Vintage Management, LLC, as the issuance of the tax deed deprived her of property value exceeding her tax debt. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against other defendants and declined to reconsider the Excessive Fines Clause claim, as just compensation under the Takings Clause would provide complete relief.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the takings claim against Vintage Management, LLC. View "Nieveen v. TAX 106" on Justia Law

Kevin L. Fair and his wife owned property in Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, but failed to pay property taxes. The county treasurer sold a tax certificate to Continental Resources for the unpaid taxes. After three years, Continental notified the Fairs that they needed to redeem the property by paying the total amount due, which they did not. Consequently, Continental requested and received a tax deed from the county treasurer, transferring title to the property free of any encumbrances.The District Court for Scotts Bluff County granted summary judgment in favor of Continental Resources, rejecting Fair’s constitutional claims, including those under the Takings Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. Fair argued that the issuance of the tax deed constituted a taking without just compensation. The district court found no merit in Fair’s claims and ruled in favor of Continental. Fair appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court initially affirmed the district court’s decision.The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Nebraska Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Tyler v. Hennepin County. Upon reconsideration, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Continental on Fair’s takings claim. The court found that Fair had a protected property interest in the value of his property exceeding the tax debt and that Continental’s acquisition of the tax deed constituted a taking without just compensation. The court determined that Continental, as a state actor, could be liable for the taking.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects but reversed the summary judgment in favor of Continental on the takings claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Continental Resources v. Fair" on Justia Law

The case involves William Zitterkopf, who was charged with unlawful distribution of an intimate image under Nebraska law. The charges stemmed from allegations that Zitterkopf recorded a sexual encounter with the victim, L.E., without her consent and later distributed a screenshot from the video to his ex-wife and L.E. The image showed L.E. nude from the waist down. Zitterkopf sent the image to L.E. with a message suggesting she confess to lying in an affidavit related to his divorce proceedings.The Scotts Bluff County District Court overruled Zitterkopf’s motion to quash the charge, in which he argued that the statute under which he was charged was unconstitutional. The court found that the statute was not overbroad and did not violate free speech protections because it targeted the nonconsensual nature of the disclosure rather than the content of the image. The court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny and concluded that the statute served an important governmental interest without burdening more speech than necessary.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and assumed for the sake of argument that the statute was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny. The court found that the statute served a compelling interest in protecting individual privacy and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The statute required a lack of consent both when the image was created and when it was distributed, and it required that the distribution be done knowingly and intentionally. The court concluded that the statute was not substantially overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment.The court also addressed Zitterkopf’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. It found that the record on direct appeal was sufficient to determine that Zitterkopf could not show prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object to certain testimony. However, the court found the record insufficient to review Zitterkopf’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain testimony. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Zitterkopf’s conviction. View "State v. Zitterkopf" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of a Nebraska legislative bill, L.B. 574, which regulates both abortion and gender-altering care. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., and its medical director, Sarah Traxler, M.D., argued that the bill violated the single subject requirement of the Nebraska Constitution, which mandates that no bill shall contain more than one subject. The bill, titled "Let Them Grow Act," was initially introduced to prohibit gender-altering procedures for minors but was later amended to include provisions from a stalled bill, L.B. 626, which restricted abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy.The District Court for Lancaster County ruled that Traxler lacked standing but found the single subject challenge justiciable. The court concluded that L.B. 574 did not violate the single subject requirement and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, including Nebraska Attorney General Mike Hilgers. Planned Parenthood appealed, and Hilgers cross-appealed, arguing that the single subject challenge was a nonjusticiable political question.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that L.B. 574 did not violate the single subject requirement of the Nebraska Constitution. The court reasoned that the bill's title, "public health and welfare," was sufficiently broad to encompass both the regulation of abortion and gender-altering care. The court found that all provisions of the bill were germane to the subject of public health and welfare, thus meeting the constitutional requirement. The court also rejected Hilgers' argument that the single subject challenge was nonjusticiable, reaffirming its authority to review legislative acts for constitutional compliance. View "Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Hilgers" on Justia Law

The case involves the defendant, Michael C. Hoehn, who was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) after a motion to suppress evidence from his stop and arrest was denied by the county court. The arresting officer, Officer Matt Rockwell of the Minatare Police Department, had left his primary jurisdiction after receiving a report of a white pickup driving erratically. Rockwell observed the pickup straddling the centerline and trash coming from the driver’s-side window. After the pickup turned into oncoming traffic and down into the grass median, Rockwell stopped the vehicle and identified the driver as Hoehn. Rockwell observed Hoehn had slurred speech, bloodshot, watery eyes, and detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle. Rockwell administered a preliminary breath test and other field sobriety tests, which Hoehn failed, leading to his arrest for DUI.Hoehn appealed to the district court, arguing that Rockwell did not have jurisdictional authority to perform the traffic stop. The district court affirmed the conviction, interpreting Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-215(3)(c) to mean that when probable cause exists, officers have authority to perform stops and arrests outside of their primary jurisdiction that are solely related to enforcing laws that concern a person operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs.Hoehn then appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of § 29-215(3)(c) and found that Rockwell lacked jurisdictional authority to make the stop and arrest. However, the Court of Appeals held that under the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, Hoehn’s conviction, based on the evidence from his stop and arrest, did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution. Both Hoehn and the State petitioned for further review by the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, albeit on different grounds. The court held that a law enforcement officer’s jurisdictional power and authority to make a stop or arrest is irrelevant to the admissibility, under the Fourth Amendment and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution, of the evidence obtained from the stop or arrest. Therefore, the county court did not err in denying Hoehn’s motion to suppress brought under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution. View "State v. Hoehn" on Justia Law

The case before the Nebraska Supreme Court involved an appeal by Nathaniel L. Gnewuch, who was convicted of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. Gnewuch had requested a deferred sentence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 29-2292, but the district court refused to consider his request, deeming the statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court examined the language of § 29-2292, which allows for a deferred judgement and probation for a guilty defendant, without the entry of a final judgement of conviction, under certain circumstances.The court rejected the district court's assertion that it lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence of probation before the entry of a judgement of conviction, finding nothing in the Nebraska Constitution that prevented the Legislature from granting the district court such jurisdiction. The court also disagreed with the argument that § 29-2292 violates the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution by allowing the judiciary to invade the charging function, an inherent executive power. It concluded that the power to define criminal conduct and fix punishment is vested in the legislative branch, while the imposition of a sentence within these legislative limits is a judicial function.Therefore, the court held that § 29-2292 does not violate the separation of powers clause in the Nebraska Constitution and remanded the case back to the district court for consideration of Gnewuch's request for a deferred judgement. View "State v. Gnewuch" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court heard an appeal from Angelina M. Clark who was convicted for terroristic threats and third-degree sexual assault. Clark argued that her trial before an all-male jury violated her constitutional rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury. She also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for terroristic threats and that her trial counsel was ineffective.The court held that Clark waived any objection to the all-male jury by failing to challenge the jurors for disqualification during the trial. It also determined that there was sufficient evidence to support Clark's conviction for terroristic threats. The court found that Clark's claim of ineffective counsel was without merit as the statements her counsel failed to object to were not hearsay, and any objection to them on hearsay grounds would have been meritless. Finally, the court rejected Clark’s claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine to exclude certain testimony, as she failed to show she suffered prejudice as a result of this alleged failure.The court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that Clark's claims were without merit. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and unlawful discharge of a firearm, holding that there was no reversible error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant's motion for new trial; (4) Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not sufficiently pled; and (5) the cumulative error doctrine did not apply in this case. View "State v. Dap" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ordering reinstatement of D.H.'s firearm rights, holding that there was no error on the part of the district court.After D.H. attempted suicide in 1995 a mental health board obtained a mental health commitment. As a result of D.H.'s commitment, federal and state statutes restricted his rights to purchase and possess firearms. In 2011, the Legislature enacted Neb. Rev. State. 71-963, which created a procedure whereby those subject to firearm restrictions resulting from a mental health-related commitment or adjudication could petition to have those restrictions removed. D.H. filed a motion to remove his firearm restrictions under section 71-963. The Mental Health Board of the 10th Judicial District of Nebraska denied the petition. The district court initially affirmed the denial but, upon reconsideration, granted the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion in sustaining D.H.'s motion to reconsider, alter, or amend. View "In re Interest of D.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint against the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and three of its officials regarding computation of Plaintiff's tentative mandatory release date (TRD), holding that there was no error.Plaintiff, an inmate, filed an action for declaratory judgment alleging that DCS was responsible for actions infringing on her constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by concluding that her TRD was consistent with Nebraska statutes and case law. The district court dismissed the case for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted under 42 U.S.C. 1983; and (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-911 for Plaintiff's claims against DCS. View "Williams v. Frakes" on Justia Law