Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Madeline Schmitz and Steven Sickler were divorced in 2001. The property division awarded a percentage of Steven’s individual retirement account to Madeline. Madeline’s percentage had not been transferred to her in the fourteen years since the decree. The district court found Steven in contempt and ordered him to serve a sentence of ninety days’ incarceration. The sentence could be purged by payment of $37,234 to Madeline within a period of seventeen days. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) imprisonment for contempt for failing to comply with the order of property division in a dissolution decree does not violate Neb. Const. art. I, 20; (2) the district court did not err in finding Steven’s conduct to be willful; and (3) the order is modified so as to permit Steven to purge the contempt at any time during his period of incarceration. View "Sickler v. Sickler" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of first degree murder, three counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s out-of-court statements to several witnesses in the weeks following the murders under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements of one witness, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Britt" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty in county court of driving under the influence and was sentenced to six months’ probation. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the police did not act reasonably in stopping Defendant, and therefore, the stop was unconstitutional under Brown v. Texas. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for further review. The Court then reversed, holding that the stop was reasonable under Brown, and the court of appeals erred in its balancing of the Brown factors. View "State v. Woldt" on Justia Law

After EyeCare Specialties, P.C. of Lincoln terminated the employment of Cindy Marshall, Marshall sued, alleging that EyeCare discriminated against her because of her skin condition, tremors, and perceived disability related to her past prescription drug abuse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of EyeCare. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether EyeCare discriminated against Marshall because of her skin condition and tremors, both of which EyeCare perceived to substantially limit Marshall’s ability to work; and (2) Marshall failed to present evidence that EyeCare discriminated against her for having a perceived drug addiction that substantially limited one or more major life activities. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialties, P.C." on Justia Law

After EyeCare Specialties, P.C. of Lincoln terminated the employment of Cindy Marshall, Marshall sued, alleging that EyeCare discriminated against her because of her skin condition, tremors, and perceived disability related to her past prescription drug abuse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of EyeCare. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether EyeCare discriminated against Marshall because of her skin condition and tremors, both of which EyeCare perceived to substantially limit Marshall’s ability to work; and (2) Marshall failed to present evidence that EyeCare discriminated against her for having a perceived drug addiction that substantially limited one or more major life activities. View "Marshall v. EyeCare Specialties, P.C." on Justia Law

Shortly after his release from prison, Nikko Jenkins shot Shamecka Holloway. Holloway sued the State, Correct Care Solutions (CCS), and certain State employees, claiming that the State and CCS, which contracted with the State to provide medical services for inmates, were negligent in failing to provide Jenkins with adequate mental health treatment and failing to seek mental health commitment prior to Jenkins’ release. The district court dismissed Holloway’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State and its employees were entitled to immunity from suit because whether to seek commitment falls under the discretionary function exception to the State Tort Claims Act; and (2) Holloway failed to plead sufficient facts to show that CCS was liable. View "Holloway v. State" on Justia Law

Marilyn Waldron, a seventy-eight-year-old woman, sustained injuries when Deputy Sheriff James Roark and his partner entered Waldron’s home to serve an arrest warrant on Waldron’s grandson. Waldron brought this action against Roark pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the entry was in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that Roark used excessive force against her. The district court granted summary judgment to Roark, concluding that the circumstances justified the deputies’ entry into the home and that Roark’s use of force was objectively reasonable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a question of fact existed as to whether Roark’s entry into Waldron’s home violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) a question of fact existed as to whether the force Roark used was excessive. Remanded. View "Waldron v. Roark" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to terms of life-to-life imprisonment for each murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, primarily, that because sudden quarrel provocation negates the malice element of murder, the step instruction for first degree murder violated his due process rights because the jury was not instructed that the State had to prove that the killings were not the result of a sudden quarrel brought about by a sufficient provocation. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) when the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with premeditated and deliberate malice, the jury necessarily simultaneously found no sudden quarrel provocation beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) Defendant’s remaining arguments lacked merit. View "State v. Hinrichsen" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of terroristic threats, kidnapping, first degree sexual assault, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and that Defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to the prosecutor’s improper comments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor’s statements, when considered in the context of all the trial proceedings, were not misconduct because they were not misleading and did not unduly influence the jury; and (2) because counsel cannot be deficient for failing to object to statements that were not misconduct, Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance. View "State v. McSwine" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance and was sentenced to eight to ten years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s direct appeal was dismissed because his poverty affidavit was untimely filed. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied relief, concluding that Defendant failed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Defendant appealed. The court of appeals vacated the district court’s order and remanded the cause for further proceedings after addressing the procedure the district court should follow when considering a postconviction motion that raises both an allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal and other ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, while this Court adopted a slightly different procedure than the one proposed by the court of appeals, the proper disposition of the appeal in this case was that the district court’s order denying certain of Defendant’s postconviction claims should be vacated and the cause remanded. View "State v. Determan" on Justia Law