Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual assault of a child and related crimes. Defendant was sentenced to forty-one to 110 years of imprisonment, thirty-five of those years being “hard” years. Defendant appealed both his convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and remanded the cause for resentencing, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain exhibits into evidence; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony regarding Defendant’s photo albums; (3) the trial court did not err in allowing hearsay testimony as prior consistent statements; (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (5) Defendant waived his right to assert the issue that the court erred in not declaring a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) the trial court made a mistake in law in imposing Defendant’s sentences. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was acquitted of first degree sexual assault and convicted of attempted first degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Thereafter, the State filed a motion to amend the information. Defendant filed a plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds. The district court denied the plea in bar. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the operative information, after the amendment, violated Defendant’s right to not be subject to double jeopardy because the primary issue had already been litigated and decided in Defendant’s favor. View "State v. Lavalleur" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four felonies arising from his assaults of his former wife. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State violated his Sixth Amendment right to confidential communications with his counsel and the right to have appointment of trial counsel without the interference of the prosecutor because a series prosecutors had possession of his confidential trial strategy before his trial. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and vacated Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) when Defendant’s confidential trial strategy was disclosed to prosecuting attorneys, a rebuttable presumption arose that Defendant’s trial was tainted by a Sixth Amendment violation; and (2) the court’s procedures were inadequate to rebut this presumption and ensure that Defendant received a fair trial. View "State v. Bain" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four counts of criminal nonsupport for failing to pay four months of child support. The district court found Defendant was a habitual criminal and enhanced his sentences accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions; (2) the district court did not violate the Sixth Amendment when it failed to submit to the jury the issue of whether Defendant’s nonsupport was in violation of any order of the court; (3) there was no error in the court’s failure to require a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense of misdemeanor criminal nonsupport; (4) the State violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2221 in by failing to give Defendant three-day notice of the enhancement hearing, but the violation did not require reversal; and (5) Defendant’s sentences were not excessive and were not in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "State v. Erpelding" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded no contest to second degree sexual assault. Defendant appealed, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s alleged breach of the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State materially breached the plea agreement but that the Court could not resolve Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the record did not show if Defendant’s trial counsel had a strategic reason for not objecting. Thereafter, Defendant moved for postconviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court overruled the motion, concluding that the State’s breach of the plea agreement had not made the proceeding “fundamentally unfair” and that an objection would have “no merit.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the State’s material breach of the plea agreement. Remanded. View "State v. Sidzyik" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court overruled Defendant’s postconviction motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing and directed the trial court to decide if Defendant’s trial counsel failed to utilize a statement the State’s key witness made to Defendant’s girlfriend to the effect that Defendant was innocent. On remand, the district court again overruled Defendant’s postconviction motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err by (1) excluding certain out-of-court statements on hearsay grounds; and (2) concluding that Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Poe" on Justia Law

After a bench trial in 1984, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing, inter alia, that his mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately inform him of his right to a jury trial. The district court denied postconviction relief, concluding that Defendant had no Miller claim because he was eighteen years old at the time of the crime for which he was convicted and that counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in not granting a new sentencing hearing under Miller, as Miller applies only to individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time a crime punishable by a life sentence without the possibility of parole was committed; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "State v. Ware" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant, who was not a citizen of the United States, pled guilty to attempted sexual assault in the first degree. After Appellant was released from incarceration he filed a motion to withdraw his plea and vacate the judgment, alleging that not allowing him to withdraw his plea would result in “manifest injustice” because his trial counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The district court dismissed the motion, determining that Appellant could have brought his Padilla v. Kentucky claim in an earlier postconviction action. Appellant appealed, arguing that postconviction relief was never available to him because he could not have reasonably discovered the factual predicate of his claim while incarcerated, as he did not receive notice of the government’s decision to deport him until after his release. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the exercise of due diligence, Appellant should have discovered and brought his Padilla claim while incarcerated through a postconviction action; and (2) therefore, the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s claim for manifest injustice relief. View "State v. Mamer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether federal law preempts Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2602.01(f)(4), which generally prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Here, Allied Professionals Insurance Company (APIC), which is registered with the Nebraska Department of Insurance as a foreign risk retention group, issued a professional liability insurance policy to Dr. Brett Speece that included a provision requiring binding arbitration. After Speece filed an action seeking a declaration that APIC was obligated to provide coverage for his defense in a Medicaid proceeding, APIC filed a motion to compel arbitration. The district court overruled the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause in the policy was not valid and enforceable pursuant to section 25-2602.01, and that neither the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) nor the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (LRRA) preempted the state statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order overruling APIC’s motion to compel arbitration, holding (1) the FAA does not preempt section 25-2602.01(f)(4), but the LRRA does preempt application of the Nebraska statute to foreign risk retention groups; and (2) therefore, the district court erred when it determined that section 25-2602.01(f)(4) prohibited enforcement of the arbitration clause in the parties’ insurance contract in this case. View "Speece v. Allied Prof'ls Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Nebraska Constitution generally prohibits the Legislature from authorizing games of chance but contains an exception for live horseracing under certain conditions. At issue in this case was L.R. 41CA, a resolution to amend Neb. Const. art. III, 24 by permitting wagering on “replayed” horseraces in addition to wagering on live horseraces and specifying how the Legislature must appropriate the proceeds from a tax placed on wagering for live and replayed horseraces. The Secretary of State granted the writ of mandamus sought by the relator in this case, holding (1) the separate-vote provision of Neb. Const. art. XVI, 1 requires the Legislature to present constitutional amendments to voters in a manner that allows them to vote separately on distinct and independent subjects; and (2) L.R. 41CA violates the separate-vote provision, and therefore, article XVI, section 1 bars its placement on the November 2014 general election ballot. View "State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale" on Justia Law