Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court overruled Defendant’s postconviction motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing and directed the trial court to decide if Defendant’s trial counsel failed to utilize a statement the State’s key witness made to Defendant’s girlfriend to the effect that Defendant was innocent. On remand, the district court again overruled Defendant’s postconviction motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err by (1) excluding certain out-of-court statements on hearsay grounds; and (2) concluding that Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Poe" on Justia Law

After a bench trial in 1984, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing, inter alia, that his mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately inform him of his right to a jury trial. The district court denied postconviction relief, concluding that Defendant had no Miller claim because he was eighteen years old at the time of the crime for which he was convicted and that counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in not granting a new sentencing hearing under Miller, as Miller applies only to individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time a crime punishable by a life sentence without the possibility of parole was committed; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to postconviction relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "State v. Ware" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant, who was not a citizen of the United States, pled guilty to attempted sexual assault in the first degree. After Appellant was released from incarceration he filed a motion to withdraw his plea and vacate the judgment, alleging that not allowing him to withdraw his plea would result in “manifest injustice” because his trial counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The district court dismissed the motion, determining that Appellant could have brought his Padilla v. Kentucky claim in an earlier postconviction action. Appellant appealed, arguing that postconviction relief was never available to him because he could not have reasonably discovered the factual predicate of his claim while incarcerated, as he did not receive notice of the government’s decision to deport him until after his release. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the exercise of due diligence, Appellant should have discovered and brought his Padilla claim while incarcerated through a postconviction action; and (2) therefore, the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s claim for manifest injustice relief. View "State v. Mamer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether federal law preempts Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2602.01(f)(4), which generally prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Here, Allied Professionals Insurance Company (APIC), which is registered with the Nebraska Department of Insurance as a foreign risk retention group, issued a professional liability insurance policy to Dr. Brett Speece that included a provision requiring binding arbitration. After Speece filed an action seeking a declaration that APIC was obligated to provide coverage for his defense in a Medicaid proceeding, APIC filed a motion to compel arbitration. The district court overruled the motion, concluding that the arbitration clause in the policy was not valid and enforceable pursuant to section 25-2602.01, and that neither the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) nor the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (LRRA) preempted the state statute. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order overruling APIC’s motion to compel arbitration, holding (1) the FAA does not preempt section 25-2602.01(f)(4), but the LRRA does preempt application of the Nebraska statute to foreign risk retention groups; and (2) therefore, the district court erred when it determined that section 25-2602.01(f)(4) prohibited enforcement of the arbitration clause in the parties’ insurance contract in this case. View "Speece v. Allied Prof'ls Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Nebraska Constitution generally prohibits the Legislature from authorizing games of chance but contains an exception for live horseracing under certain conditions. At issue in this case was L.R. 41CA, a resolution to amend Neb. Const. art. III, 24 by permitting wagering on “replayed” horseraces in addition to wagering on live horseraces and specifying how the Legislature must appropriate the proceeds from a tax placed on wagering for live and replayed horseraces. The Secretary of State granted the writ of mandamus sought by the relator in this case, holding (1) the separate-vote provision of Neb. Const. art. XVI, 1 requires the Legislature to present constitutional amendments to voters in a manner that allows them to vote separately on distinct and independent subjects; and (2) L.R. 41CA violates the separate-vote provision, and therefore, article XVI, section 1 bars its placement on the November 2014 general election ballot. View "State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted for driving under the influence, third offense. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals committed reversible error when it affirmed the district court’s overruling of Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop that was based on an anonymous tip, as, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, there was not reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop; and (2) double jeopardy did not preclude a remand for a new trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while on duty as a deputy sheriff with the Douglas County sheriff’s office. While Appellant was receiving workers’ compensation benefits, a County employee had Appellant placed under surveillance. The Sheriff’s Office later terminated Plaintiff’s employment on the basis that Appellant had been “untruthful and deceptive” regarding the extent of his injuries. The Douglas County Sheriff’s Merit Commission affirmed the termination. The district court affirmed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition in the district court against the Douglas County Sheriff and the County (collectively, Appellees), alleging wrongful discharge in retaliation for having pursued a workers’ compensation claim and violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on three theories of liability. The district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it determined (1) Appellant’s first cause of action was barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-919(1); and (2) Appellees did not violate Appellant’s constitutional right to property, right to freedom of speech, or right to privacy. View "Brock v. Dunning" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Nebraska Legislature amended the Nebraska Clean Indoor Act to prohibit smoking in public places and places of employment. Four indoor facilities were exempted from that prohibition. Plaintiff, a corporation that operates a billiards hall, filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that three exemptions from the Act violated the prohibition against special legislation. The district court concluded that the exemptions for guest rooms, tobacco retail outlets, and cigar bars were unconstitutional special legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the exemptions for tobacco retail outlets and cigar bars are unconstitutional special legislation which are severable from the Act; (2) the exemption for guest rooms is not special legislation; and (3) the Act is not an unconstitutional impairment of contract or an unconstitutional regulatory taking. View "Big John's Billiards, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder in connection with the shooting death of an acquaintance of Defendant. Defendant filed three motions to suppress evidence, all of which were denied. Defendant appealed the denials of his motions to suppress and argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it (1) denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the search of Defendant’s person; (2) failed to suppress evidence found at Defendant’s residence pursuant to a search warrant; (3) did not exclude expert testimony and exhibits concerning the ShotSpotter system, which detected the location of the shots fired the night of the murder; and (4) found the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Hill" on Justia Law

In 2013, Francisco Rodriguez moved to withdraw his guilty plea and to vacate his 2004 conviction for attempted possession of a controlled substance (Class I misdemeanor). He argued that before entering a guilty plea in the 2004 proceedings, he did not receive the proper advisement under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02(1) (Reissue 2008), and that he currently faced immigration consequences from the resulting conviction. Because Rodriguez moved to withdraw his plea after he had completed his sentence of 2 years’ probation, the district court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that the court did have jurisdiction, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nebraska v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law