Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was a pregnant sixteen-year-old who sought authorization for an abortion with consent of a parent or guardian. In general, an abortion can only be performed on a unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen with the consent of both the pregnant woman and one of her parents or a legal guardian. The district court denied Petitioner's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a waiver of consent under the provision of Neb. Rev. Stat. 71-6903(3) for abuse or neglect by a parent or guardian, the pregnant woman must establish that a parent or guardian has abused or neglected her; (2) Petitioner did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that she was a victim of abuse or neglect under section 71-6903(3); and (3) Petitioner failed to establish that was sufficiently mature and well informed to decide on her own whether to have an abortion. View "In re Petition of Anonymous 5" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) filed an application with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to appropriate additional surface water from the Niobrara River. The Middle and Lower Niobrara Natural Resources Districts (collectively, NRDs) and Thomas Higgins, who held senior existing and pending Niobrara River surface water appropriations, objected to the application. The DNR dismissed all objections sua sponte, concluding that the objectors lacked standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DNR did not err in (1) dismissing the NRDs' objections for lack of standing because they failed to allege any legal right, title, or interest in the subject water of the Niobrara River and because the NRDs' allegations that the granting of the application would cause a portion of the Niobrara River Basin to be declared fully appropriated in the future were based on mere conjecture; and (2) finding that Higgins lacked standing, as Higgins failed to allege sufficient allegations of harm. View "In re Application A-18503" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erroneously gave a step jury instruction relating to the charge of first degree murder, and the court erred in refusing to give a "negative element of 'sudden quarrel'" instruction; and (2) his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in using a step instruction, the elements of first degree murder exclude any reference to "sudden quarrel," and the jury's presumed adherence to the step instruction precluded any prejudice regarding the rest of the instruction; and (2) the record was insufficient to address two of Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and Defendant's remaining claims of ineffective assistance lacked merit. View "State v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with first degree sexual assault stemming from his conduct toward his stepdaughter, M.H. During trial, M.H.'s therapist testified, over Appellant's objection, that Appellant's sexual abuse of M.H. caused M.H.'s posttraumatic stress disorder. The court subsequently granted Appellant's motion for a mistrial on the grounds that the therapist's testimony was "over the edge." Appellant then filed a plea in bar, arguing that the State's questioning of the therapist was intended to provoke a mistrial so that the State could have a second change at a more favorable prosecution and thus circumvent the protections of the double jeopardy clause. The trial court denied the plea in bar. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the prosecutor did not intend to goad Appellant into moving for a mistrial, Appellant's plea in bar was properly denied. View "State v. Muhannad" on Justia Law

Michael and April are the biological parents of Avalyn, born out of wedlock in 2002. A court ordered Michael to pay child support but did not order visitation. In 2005, the state took temporary emergency custody of Avalyn after April attempted suicide. The county sought an adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a), but did not give Michael notice. Avalyn was placed in foster care with her maternal grandmother in April’s home. Michael claims that because he was paying support through the state, caseworkers knew or should have known how to contact him. About six months after the disposition he received notice and intervened. The court placed Avalyn with Michael until November 2007, when the parties stipulated that Avalyn should be placed with April but divide her time between her parents. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Michael alleged that in failing to notify him of the juvenile proceedings, the defendants interfered with constitutional rights to familial integrity, substantive due process, and equal protection and that the Nebraska statutes were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that claims against state defendants for monetary damages were barred by sovereign immunity; qualified immunity shielded employees from liability in their individual capacities because they did not violate a clearly established right. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were not barred. In a juvenile proceeding alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard for a child’s known adjudicated or biological father who is providing substantial and regular financial support; the statutes at issue are not facially unconstitutional, but cannot be constitutionally applied to avoid notification. View "Michael E. v. State" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder, and in 2007, Defendant pled guilty to a separate charge of first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive life sentences for the murders. Defendant subsequently filed motions for postconviction relief in both cases, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The district court denied Defendant's motions without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief in each case without an evidentiary hearing, as Defendant's motions in the two cases did not allege facts constituting a denial of his constitutional rights, and the record refuted his claims as to his other allegations. View "State v. Baker" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder under a theory of aiding and abetting, criminal conspiracy to unlawfully possess and deliver a controlled substance, and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) Defendant was not prejudiced when the district court allowed his counsel to withdraw prior to counsel and by accepting Defendant's waiver of conflict of interest created by the former counsel's new employment with the county's attorney's office, which was prosecuting Defendant in this case; (2) the district court did not err in allowing evidence of prior bad acts; (3) Defendant's trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness for failing to request jury instructions regarding robbery and attempted robbery as lesser-included offenses of felony murder did not prejudice Defendant; (4) a jury instruction error did not require reversal of Defendant's second degree murder conviction; (5) the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; and (6) the district court did not impose excessive sentences. View "State v. McGuire" on Justia Law

Child was born out of wedlock to Mother in 2005. Six years later, Sherman filed an amended complaint seeking to establish paternity both as an individual and behalf of Child as "next friend." Alternatively, Sherman asserted that Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1411 denied him due process and equal protection. The district court dismissed the amended complaint filed by Sherman as an individual as untimely and dismissed the amended complaint as to Sherman's filing as the next friend of Child, determining that suit may be brought on behalf of a child as next friend only when the child lacks a guardian. The court made no findings as to Sherman's constitutional claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's dismissal of Sherman's constitutional claims, holding that Sherman's complaint stated plausible due process and equal protection claims, and the factual allegations suggested the existence of the elements required to show both a due process and an equal protection violation; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Sherman T. v. Karen N." on Justia Law

Employee, an African-American, was employed by the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services for several years. Employee filed suit against the State and individual defendants in their official capacities, alleging she was denied the opportunity to enroll with the health insurance carrier that had insured her prior to 2007 due to a ZIP code exclusion plan. Specifically, Employee alleged she was discriminated against on the basis of her race because most African-American employees resided in three excluded ZIP codes and were offered substandard health insurance based on the ZIP codes associated with their residential addresses. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all causes of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Employee's claim of disparate impact arising under Title VII, as the evidence presented by Defendants established that the plans offered in the excluded ZIP codes were equivalent to the plans offered statewide. View "Cartwright v. State" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant pled no contest to attempted first degree arson pursuant to a plea agreement. Defendant was discharged from prison in 2003 and was thereafter removed from the United States. In 2012, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea of no contest and vacate his conviction, alleging that his plea and conviction were obtained in violation of his due process rights and that his counsel was ineffective because he did not advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The district court denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that neither the postconviction statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02, nor the common-law "manifest injustice" procedure, all of which Defendant attempted to collaterally attack his plea under, provided a basis for relief in this case. View "State v. Osorio" on Justia Law