Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

While serving as county attorney, Defendant established a pretrial diversion program wherein participants paid an enrollment fee and court costs. The fees and costs were deposited into a separate bank account with Defendant as the only authorized signer on the account. After the state auditor's office conducted an audit, Defendant was charged with three counts of theft by unlawful taking, among other charges. The third theft charge was based on a check Defendant wrote on the account of the diversion program to a local trapshooting team. The jury acquitted Defendant of the first two theft counts but convicted him of the third. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court plainly erred in instructing the jury on Defendant's affirmative defense of entrapment of estoppel. Remanded for retrial. View "State v. Edwards" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of life to life for the second degree murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in giving jury instructions on "sudden quarrel"; (2) did not err in giving a step instruction; (3) did not abuse its discretion in admitting autopsy photographs into evidence, as their potential prejudice did not substantially outweigh their probative value; and (3) did not err in imposing a sentence of life to life for second degree murder. View "State v. Abdulkadir" on Justia Law

Effective in 2010, the Legislature changed the manner in which wind energy generation facilities are taxed. The change (1) exempted personal property used by wind energy generation facilities from the personal property tax and imposed a new tax based upon the facility's nameplate capacity, and (2) allowed taxpayers who had paid personal property tax prior to 2010 to claim a credit against nameplate capacity taxes assessed for the year 2010 and onward. Plaintiffs, Nebraska taxpayers, challenged the constitutionality of the credit. The district court determined that the credit provision of the new statute constituted an improper commutation of taxes and was therefore unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the nameplate capacity tax credit did not violate the constitutional prohibition against commutation of taxes because the prohibition does not apply to an excise tax, and the tax in this case was an excise tax; and (2) the statute authorizing the credit was not special legislation prohibited by the state constitution. Remanded with directions to dismiss. View "Banks v. Heineman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced on nine counts involving actual or attempted violence or physical abuse upon persons with intellectual disabilities who required residential care. All counts arose from Defendant's employment at a developmental center and involved three adult residents at that facility. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the district court erred in permitting the jury to take into the jury room for use during deliberations the State's "road map," a chart admitted for demonstrative purposes only. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the use of this demonstrative exhibit during jury deliberations without providing adequate limiting instructions or employing any other safeguards against prejudice. View "State v. Pangborn" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault, use of a weapon to commit a felony, and robbery. Defendant was determined to be a habitual criminal and sentenced to eighty to 140 years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) overruling Defendant's two motions for mistrial; (2) overruling Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the victim's identification of him as her assailant and in admitting her identification testimony at trial over Defendant's objection; (3) overruling Defendant's motion for a directed verdict; (4) determining that Defendant was a habitual criminal and sentencing him accordingly; and (5) sentencing Defendant. View "State v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The City of Papillion condemned property owned by Appellant for a road project. The City built a new road on Appellant's new property along with an iron fence on the north side of the road, which abutted Appellant's remaining property. Appellant brought suit. The trial court concluded that the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and that the City's building of the fence was not a second taking that limited Appellant's access to the new road. Appellant appealed these issues. The City cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Appellant interest, fees, expenses, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to timely appeal its claims that the trial court erred in concluding the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and the City's building of the fence was not a second taking; and (2) the court's award of interest, fees, expenses, and costs was proper. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several counts of child abuse and sexual assault of a child. Defendant appealed, asserting, among other things, that the district court erred in receiving evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-414. Before trial, the trial court heard testimony from Defendant's prior victims, compared the testimony to the current charges, and made a conditional ruling of admissibility under 27-414. The court, however, prohibited the State from mentioning or presenting the section 27-414 evidence at trial until after the evidence of the current alleged victims. At trial, the State first presented the current evidence and then, outside the presence of the jury, the State alerted the court of its intent to call a prior victim as a witness, which the court allowed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in receiving evidence under section 27-414; and (2) Defendant's other assignments of error were rejected. View "State v. Valverde" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault of a child and four counts of child abuse. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction and vacated the sentences, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to sever the sexual abuse charge from the child abuse charges, and Defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a limiting instruction that the jury could not consider the evidence of sexual assault to prove the charges of child abuse and vice versa, and Defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance. Remanded. View "State v. Rocha" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was born in Zaire and immigrated to the United States after being granted asylum, pled no contest to two misdemeanors in 2010. Because of credit for time served, Defendant was released from custody on the same day he was sentenced. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not properly advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of conviction at the time he entered the pleas. The district court denied Defendant's motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because Defendant had completed his sentences and had been released from custody. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide Defendant's common-law motion to withdraw his pleas because (1) the statutory remedy under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02 did not apply and the motion asserted a constitutional issue which was not addressed under the Nebraska Postconviction Act; and (2) the fact that Defendant served his sentences was not relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. Remanded. View "State v. Yuma" on Justia Law

Defendant obtained controlled substances pursuant to prescriptions written for chronic pain issues but did not inform her medical providers that she was being prescribed similar medications elsewhere. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of ten counts of acquiring a controlled substance by fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that she should not be charged with multiple counts based on multiple prescriptions from the same doctor because the fraudulent act was the singular failure to disclose to the other medical providers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission of Defendant's pharmacy records did not violate her constitutional or statutory rights; (2) the trial court did not err in concluding that Defendant committed multiple violations of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-418 each time she obtained and filled a prescription by her treating family physician; and (3) probable cause supported the warrant for Defendant's medical records. View "State v. Wiedeman" on Justia Law