Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The City of Papillion condemned property owned by Appellant for a road project. The City built a new road on Appellant's new property along with an iron fence on the north side of the road, which abutted Appellant's remaining property. Appellant brought suit. The trial court concluded that the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and that the City's building of the fence was not a second taking that limited Appellant's access to the new road. Appellant appealed these issues. The City cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Appellant interest, fees, expenses, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to timely appeal its claims that the trial court erred in concluding the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and the City's building of the fence was not a second taking; and (2) the court's award of interest, fees, expenses, and costs was proper. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of several counts of child abuse and sexual assault of a child. Defendant appealed, asserting, among other things, that the district court erred in receiving evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-414. Before trial, the trial court heard testimony from Defendant's prior victims, compared the testimony to the current charges, and made a conditional ruling of admissibility under 27-414. The court, however, prohibited the State from mentioning or presenting the section 27-414 evidence at trial until after the evidence of the current alleged victims. At trial, the State first presented the current evidence and then, outside the presence of the jury, the State alerted the court of its intent to call a prior victim as a witness, which the court allowed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in receiving evidence under section 27-414; and (2) Defendant's other assignments of error were rejected. View "State v. Valverde" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault of a child and four counts of child abuse. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of conviction and vacated the sentences, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to sever the sexual abuse charge from the child abuse charges, and Defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a limiting instruction that the jury could not consider the evidence of sexual assault to prove the charges of child abuse and vice versa, and Defendant was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance. Remanded. View "State v. Rocha" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was born in Zaire and immigrated to the United States after being granted asylum, pled no contest to two misdemeanors in 2010. Because of credit for time served, Defendant was released from custody on the same day he was sentenced. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not properly advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of conviction at the time he entered the pleas. The district court denied Defendant's motion, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because Defendant had completed his sentences and had been released from custody. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to decide Defendant's common-law motion to withdraw his pleas because (1) the statutory remedy under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1819.02 did not apply and the motion asserted a constitutional issue which was not addressed under the Nebraska Postconviction Act; and (2) the fact that Defendant served his sentences was not relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. Remanded. View "State v. Yuma" on Justia Law

Defendant obtained controlled substances pursuant to prescriptions written for chronic pain issues but did not inform her medical providers that she was being prescribed similar medications elsewhere. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of ten counts of acquiring a controlled substance by fraud. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that she should not be charged with multiple counts based on multiple prescriptions from the same doctor because the fraudulent act was the singular failure to disclose to the other medical providers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission of Defendant's pharmacy records did not violate her constitutional or statutory rights; (2) the trial court did not err in concluding that Defendant committed multiple violations of Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-418 each time she obtained and filled a prescription by her treating family physician; and (3) probable cause supported the warrant for Defendant's medical records. View "State v. Wiedeman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court's step instruction to the jury regarding second degree murder and manslaughter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court plainly erred in giving the instruction, as (1) although the instruction was correct when it was given, the Court's subsequent holding in State v. Smith rendered the instruction an incorrect statement of the law; (2) Smith applied retroactively to this case; and (3) there was evidence upon which a jury could conclude that the killing was intentional but provoked by a sudden quarrel and therefore constituted manslaughter. View "State v. Trice" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of third degree sexual assault and admitting a minor to an obscene motion picture, show, or presentation. The district court affirmed the convictions. The court of appeals affirmed the sexual assault conviction but reversed the obscenity-related count. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) insufficient evidence supported his conviction for third degree sexual assault, and (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in (1) affirming Defendant's conviction for third degree sexual assault; and (2) indicating that the ineffective assistance claim could not be reached on direct appeal on the existing record. View "State v. Osborne" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a firearm to commit a felony. Defendant's sentence on the firearm conviction was twice vacated and the cause remanded to correct the amount of credit for time served. Defendant subsequently filed an amended motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, holding that Defendant's motion did not allege facts constituting a denial of constitutional rights, and, as to certain allegations, the record refuted his claims. View "State v. Marks" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled no contest to second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to sixty years to life imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his counsel was deficient for not informing him about potentially exculpatory information disclosed at an in-chambers conference. The district court denied the motion, concluding that even if trial counsel's performance had been deficient, Defendant would still have accepted the plea agreement, and thus suffered no prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to disclose to Defendant exculpatory evidence relevant to his plea. View "State v. Keyser" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to the unauthorized use of a financial transaction device with a value between $500 and $1,500. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated when private counsel was prohibited from entering a limited appearance in Defendant's case, as Defendant was found to be indigent, Defendant was represented throughout the proceedings, and at no point throughout her proceedings did Defendant waive her right to her appointed public defender or report to the court that her appointed counsel was incompetent; (2) Defendant failed to establish that her trial counsel was deficient; and (3) the district court did not err in sentencing Defendant on the same day it accepted her plea. View "State v. Dixon" on Justia Law