Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

On October 5, 2011, Defendant appeared in county court and pled guilty to four misdemeanors in three separate cases. When Defendant failed to appear for the scheduled sentencing in the cases, the county court issued a bench warrant for her arrest. Defendant was arrested on January 3, 2012 and was released on January 11, 2012. On April 4, 2012, Defendant was sentenced. Defendant appealed, claiming that the county court erred when it failed to give her credit for time previously served. The district court rejected Defendant's assertion, citing to State v. Heckman. The Supreme Court vacated the sentences, holding that Defendant was entitled to credit for time served from January 3 through 11. Remanded. View "State v. Bree" on Justia Law

On November 10, 2010, the State filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that Appellant carried a concealed weapon on his person and possessed a "pistol, revolver or other form of short-barreled hand firearm." On October 12, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to discharge for failure to adjudicate within the time statutorily required. At the adjudication hearing on October 14, 2011, the juvenile court denied the motion to discharge. The hearing was then continued to December 22, 2011. On November 8, 2011, Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to discharge. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in affirming the decision of the juvenile court; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in not addressing Appellant's constitutional speedy adjudication rights. View "In re Shaquille H." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the City of Columbus after raw sewage that Plaintiffs claimed was the result of a malfunction of the City-run sanitary sewage system flooded into Plaintiffs' home. The district court found in favor of the City on all theories of recovery, including inverse condemnation, negligence, nuisance, and trespass. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's rulings with respect to negligence and inverse condemnation. The court of appeals affirmed the district court with respect to negligence but reversed the court's finding in the City's favor with regard to inverse condemnation. The Supreme Court granted review of inverse condemnation issues and reversed, holding that Plaintiffs did not establish an inverse condemnation claim because Plaintiffs failed to show the City exercised its right of eminent domain. Remanded. View "Henderson v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in several respects. Defendant's trial counsel was also his appellate counsel. The district court ruled that Defendant's counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, as Defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel's representation, and there was no merit to Defendant's assignments of error. View "State v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the unlawful sale or purchase of a motor vehicle under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-1416. Defendant was classified as a habitual criminal and sentenced to twelve to thirty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed ad remanded the cause for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting "expert" testimony interpreting section 60-1416 because the testimony instructed the jury on how to make its decision of Defendant's guilt, and only the trial court should instruct the jury on the relevant law. In addition, the Court held that acting without a dealer's license under section 60-1416 is a public welfare offense, which doesn't require proof of mens rea. View "State v. Merchant" on Justia Law

Butler County Diary, LLC (BCD) requested a permit to install a liquid livestock manure pipeline under a public road. Read Township and Butler County cited two regulations it had adopted governing livestock confinement facilities in denying BCD's request. BCD challenged the regulations, alleging that the regulations were invalid and unenforceable. The district court ruled that the Township had the statutory authority to enact the regulations and that they were not preempted by the Livestock Waste Management Act or Nebraska's Department of Environmental Quality livestock waste control regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Township had the statutory authority to enact the pertinent regulations and the regulations were not preempted by state statute or regulation. View "Butler County Dairy, LLC v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for the Class II felony offense of attempted kidnapping. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that his trial and appellate counsels were ineffective for failing to challenge the classification of the felony. At the time Defendant was sentenced, criminal attempt was a Class II felony when the crime attempted was a Class IA felony offense and was a Class III felony when the crime attempted was a Class II felony offense. The postconviction court denied Defendant's petition. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding that Defendant's counsel was ineffective for not challenging the classification at sentencing. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the decision of the postconviction court, holding that Defendant failed to establish the trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise at sentencing or on direct appeal that Defendant should have been sentenced for attempted kidnapping as a Class III felony. View "State v. Pittman" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor child abuse in the county court as the result of an incident in which she left her three minor children, including a six-week-old infant, unattended in her home. Sitting as an intermediate appellate court, the district court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, reasoning the evidence was sufficient to establish Defendant acted negligently because she left the children home alone for more than one hour while she went drinking with friends. The court also found that evidence was sufficient to support a finding Defendant denied her infant necessary care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction, and the district court did not err in so finding. View "State v. Eagle Bull" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance creating an offstreet parking district adjoining a Cabela's store. Plaintiff, a resident of the City, filed a complaint against the City and its mayor and city council members, seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The district court found the action was barred by the general four-year statute of limitations because it was commenced more than four years after the ordinance was adopted. At issue on appeal was when the statute of limitations began to run. The Supreme Court reversed without reaching the constitutionality of the ordinance because the Court could not tell from the face of Plaintiff's complaint when Plaintiff's cause of action accrued for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations. Remanded. View "Lindner v. Kindig" on Justia Law

Appellees brought this negligence action in the district court against Appellant, the County of Madison, under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act after two of Appellees were injured in a single-vehicle accident after they drove into a washout on a vacated county road. Appellees claimed the County should have maintained a "Road Closed" warning sign at the entrance to the road. The district court found the County liable for negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it based its negligence determination in favor of Appellees on its erroneous determination that the County breached its duty to maintain the road, as the central issue in this case was whether the County had met its obligations relative to the warning sign it had chosen to erect. Remanded with directions to find whether the County had actual or constructive notice that its warning sign was down on the date of the accident and whether the County had reasonable time to correct the problem. View "Blaser v. County of Madison" on Justia Law