Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree sexual assault in 1995. The Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) had not been enacted at the time of Defendant's conviction, but because he was still on probation on January 1, 1997, he became subject to then newly enacted SORA. Defendant was released from probation in April 1997. In 2009, Defendant was notified that he would be subject to life-time registration under SORA. Defendant was later found guilty of violating SORA. Defendant appealed, asserting that SORA as amended violated the ex post facto and due process clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions on its face and as applied to him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it rejected the constitutional challenges that were raised by Defendant in his criminal proceeding.

Following a trial by jury, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of eighty to ninety years' imprisonment. At trial, two witnesses testified that sometime before the murder of the victim, they had seen Defendant with a gun, and that he carried his gun in his backpack. Defendant argued (1) this testimony was evidence of a prior crime - possession of a firearm by a felon - and fell under Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-404(2); and (2) as such, the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the incident occurred pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-404(3). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the testimony fell under section 27-404(2); (2) the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing outside the presence pursuant to section 27-404(3); but (3) viewed in context of the whole record, this error was harmless.

The two minor daughters (Daughters) of Parents were injured in a park in Omaha City when their plastic sled collided with a tree. Parents brought an action against the City to recover medical expenses and loss of services based on Daughters' injuries. Daughters also brought an action, by and through their parents, against the City for injuries incurred in the accident. Both actions were brought under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. The district court found the accident and resulting injuries were proximately caused by the City and awarded damages in both actions. On appeal, the City argued that the district court erred in its assessment of both liability and damages. In her cross-appeal, one of the daughters contended that the damage cap set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 13-926, as applied in this case, violated her right to due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in Daughters' action and affirmed as modified the judgment in Parents' action, reducing the total award payable to Parents jointly.

Defendant Francis Seberger was convicted of first degree murder. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, raising Sixth Amendment concerns regarding his trial and appellate court representation. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the decision of the district court to deny Defendant an evidentiary hearing on his allegation that he was not properly advised of his right to testify and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on this single allegation; and (2) affirmed the decision of the district court in all other respects.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault and felony child abuse. At issue on appeal was the admission of evidence of Defendant's prior sexual contacts with minors, which Defendant claimed violated Nebraska rules of evidence and the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 27-414 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions; and (2) the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence of prior acts.

Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder, use of a weapon to commit a felony, criminal conspiracy, and tampering with a witness. On appeal, the Supreme Court first rejected Defendant's claim that the district court was divested of jurisdiction when Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari part way through the proceedings. The Court then reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial, holding (1) the district court erred when it gave the jury a written instruction stating that the jury must consider Defendant's refusal to testify as an admission of guilt, and (2) the error was not harmless.

The State of Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission issued an advisory opinion answering the question of whether Omaha firefighters can engage in a campaign to raise funds for the Muscular Dystrophy Association (MDA) during on-duty time paid for with taxpayer funds or using city-owned uniforms and equipment. The Commission stated that such activities violated the Nebraska Political Accountability and Disclosure Act (NPADA). Appellants, the Nebraska Professional Firefighters Association, its president, and the MDA, filed an action against the Commission, asking the district court to declare the advisory opinion invalid. The district court dismissed the case, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review a Commission advisory opinion. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and the court of appeals correctly dismissed the appeal.

This case involved a civil administrative operator's license revocation for refusal to submit to a chemical test. The Department of Motor Vehicles revoked the operator's license of Ronald Sherman for one year, and the district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the sworn report in this case failed to confer jurisdiction on the Department because it did not sufficiently establish that Sherman was on a public road or private property open to public access at the time of his arrest. Prior to oral argument before the Supreme Court, Sherman died. The Court reversed, holding that because this license revocation proceeding involved a right that was purely personal to Sherman, the action abated on Sherman's death, and there was no longer a party with an interest in the resolution of the appeal. Remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate its order.

The East Butler and Prague public school districts filed a petition for dissolution and merger with the Committee for the Reorganization of School Districts. Afterwards, Appellees, property owners, filed freeholder petitions with the Saunders County Freeholder Board to remove property owned by them from the Prague District into the Wahoo District. The Committee then approved the dissolution of merger. Before it became effective, the Board granted Appellees' petitions to move their property. East Butler subsequently appealed, alleging that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter or that the Committee had prior jurisdiction to act. The district court dismissed the appeal, concluding that under Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-458(5) the appeal was untimely and that East Butler lacked standing to challenge the Board's order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because East Butler had a valid merger petition that involved the same property pending at the time of Appellees' freeholder petitions, it had sufficient interest in the matter to invoke the court's jurisdiction; and (2) the appeal was timely. Remanded.

Chad Sorensen was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), second offense, with a blood alcohol content over .15. Sorensen was sentenced to probation, and his license was revoked for one year. Sorenson appealed, contending that his confrontation rights were violated when the county court admitted into evidence the affidavit of the nurse who performed Sorensen's blood draw without also requiring that nurse to testify at trial. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed Sorensen's convictions, holding that Sorensen's right to confrontation was violated when the State was not required to call the nurse as a witness at trial. Remanded for a new trial.