Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants in this case operated restaurants in the City of Omaha subject to a municipal ordinance which became effective on October 1, 2010. The ordinance declared itself to be an "occupation tax" on restaurants and drinking places in the City in the amount of 2.5 percent of gross receipts. Appellants filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the City, asking the district court to declare the ordinance unconstitutional, invalid, illegal, and unenforceable. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the legal incidence of the tax fell on the business and not the customer, the restaurant tax was an occupation tax, not an illegal sales tax; (2) the ordinance did not violate limitations in the Nebraska Liquor Control Act on the amount of occupation tax for liquor licensees; and (3) the ordinance did not violate the constitutional prohibition against special legislation.

At issue in this appeal was whether an alleged victim of child sexual abuse may claim a privilege against testifying in the criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrator pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1210, which provides, "When the matter sought to be elicited would tend to render the witness criminally liable or to expose him or her to public ignominy, the witness is not compelled to answer...." The district court found the privilege against exposure to public ignominy did not apply to the victim because her testimony was highly material to the crimes charged. The victim appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds after noting that section 25-1210 does not include a materiality exception, holding that public ignominy privilege cannot be asserted by a witness in a criminal case, regardless of the materiality of the testimony.

Thunder Collins was tried and convicted for numerous crimes, including first degree murder. On Collins' first appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the cause for a hearing to determine whether Collins was prejudiced by the jury's weekend separation during its deliberation. At that hearing, Collins moved for the judge's recusal and to conduct discovery. Both motions were denied. Following the hearing, the district court determined that Collins suffered no prejudice from the jury's separation and overruled his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed Collins' convictions and sentences, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Collins' motions.

Jamin Stoddard and Brian Shipley were injured in a collision with a train owned by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) at a grade crossing in Cass County. Stoddard's guardians and Shipley brought actions against the Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) and Cass County under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) and the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), alleging that the governmental entities negligently designed the grade crossing and negligently failed to install various warning devices. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State and the County. At issue on appeal was whether the negligence claims fell within the discretionary function exceptions to the limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the PSTCA and the STCA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that all of the claims which were the subject of these appeals fell within the discretionary function exceptions of the PSTCA and the STCA.

Volunteers of America, Dakotas (VOA) proposed to build an apartment-style building for veterans in Omaha. To construct the building as planned, VOA applied for variances from area and use restrictions under the Omaha Municipal Code (Code). VOA applied to the zoning board of appeals of Omaha (Board) for the variances. Appellants, Field Club Home Owners League and Thornburg Place Neighborhood Association, opposed the application. The Board granted the variances, concluding that the Code created an unnecessary hardship because it did not contemplate a project like VOA's. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, holding (1) the record failed to show that VOA had standing to seek the variances; but (2) because Appellants raised standing for the first time on appeal to the Court, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Remanded.

David Kofoed, the supervisor of the Crime Scene Investigation Division for the sheriff's office was charged with tampering with evidence during the investigation of two suspects in two 2006 murders. After a Neb. R. Evid. 404 hearing, the trial court admitted evidence of an uncharged extrinsic crime during the 2003 investigation of a child's murder. The trial court subsequently found Kofoed guilty of evidence tampering during the 2006 murder investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) the trial court did not err in sustaining the State's motion to admit evidence of Kofoed's alleged act of evidence tampering in 2003 during the Rule 404 hearing; (2) the court did not err in overruling Kofoed's motion for a directed verdict and in finding him guilty of tampering with evidence; and (3) the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself from the proceeding and in overruling Kofoed's motion for a new trial.

Michael Ross was convicted by a jury of discharge of a firearm at a person, building, or occupied motor vehicle while in the proximity of a motor vehicle he had just exited, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a felon. On direct appeal, the court of appeals determined the evidence was insufficient to support Ross' convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in reversing the convictions, as the evidence, when considered under the deferential standard of appellate review, was sufficient to support the three felony convictions challenged in this appeal.

The State appealed from a district court order sentencing William Parminter to twelve to eighteen months in prison for aggravated driving under the influence (DUI), third offense, and twelve to fourteen months in prison for DUI, fourth offense. The court ordered that Parminter serve the sentences concurrently. The State appealed, arguing that the sentences were excessively lenient. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the sentences on Parminter because the sentences failed to adequately protect the public from Parminter and thus were excessively lenient. Remanded with directions to resentence Parminter to consecutive terms of five to five years and to revoke Parminter's license according to the applicable statutes.

Brandon Reinhart was convicted of using a minor to distribute a controlled substance and conspiracy to use a minor to distribute a controlled substance, specifically marijuana. Reinhart was sentenced to three to five years' imprisonment on each conviction with the sentences to run concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Reinhart's convictions on both counts; (2) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony, but the admission of the hearsay statement was harmless error; and (3) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make certain hearsay objections because the challenged statements were either admissible or their admission was, at most, harmless error.

After a jury trial Patrick Bauldwin was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Bauldwin appealed. The primary issue on appeal was whether the police violated Bauldwin's Miranda rights. The Supreme Court affirmed Bauldwin's conviction and sentence, holding (1) a Miranda violation occurred because Bauldwin clearly invoked his right to remain silent during his interrogation, and the police did not scrupulously honor that right; (2) based on the record, the trial court's admission of the statement was harmless because, when viewed relative to the properly admitted, overwhelming evidence of Bauldwin's guilt, there was no reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was attributable to he court's erroneous admission of Bauldwin's statement; and (3) Bauldwin's other assigned errors were without merit.