Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Tyler Britt was convicted in the county court of first-offense driving under the influence with a concentration of more than .15 of one gram alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The district court affirmed the conviction. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that the admission of a certificate containing a chemical analysis certification of the alcohol breath simulator solution used to test the machine that was used to test Britt's breath did not violate the confrontation clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it concluded that the certificate was not testimonial, and therefore not subject to confrontation analysis; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion when it did not note plain error with regard to Britt's hearsay objections.

The juvenile court signed written orders committing and transferring a juvenile to the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC). The orders were made in error and did not reflect the court's orally pronounced intention to pursue foster placement for the juvenile. In a subsequent written order, the court vacated and corrected the erroneous orders, but the juvenile had already been transferred to the YRTC. Despite the court's insistence that the juvenile be returned, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) refused to do so and appealed the juvenile court's order. While the appeal was pending, DHHS obtained an order from the court of appeals staying the juvenile court's corrected order. This left the juvenile in the YRTC, where she completed her program, was paroled, and was subsequently discharged from parole. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals as moot, as there was no longer an actual case or controversy requiring judicial resolution.

After a bench trial, Benjamin Sprunger was convicted of four counts of possessing child pornography. Sprunger appealed, challenging the search that uncovered the images and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the search, as (1) probable cause did not support the warrant to search Sprunger's computers for child pornography; and (2) the warrant was lacking probable cause to such a degree that the officers' reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable and thus did not bring it within the U.S. v. Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

A jury found William Kinser guilty of felony flight to avoid arrest and found Kinser to be a habitual criminal. Kinser appealed, contending that the habitual criminal determination was erroneous because the flight to avoid arrest conviction was enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony based upon Kinser's willful reckless operation of a motor vehicle and that any further enhancement under the habitual criminal statute would result in an improper double enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Kinser was properly sentenced as a habitual criminal; and (2) the district court did not impose an erroneous sentence for Kinser's flight to avoid arrest conviction.

Dwight Trumble owned property in Sarpy County and paid two levies for the support of school districts in the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties (Learning Community). Trumble subsequently brought suit under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1735 against the school districts in the Learning Community, claiming the levies were unconstitutional. The district court determined it did not have jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a suit to recover unconstitutional taxes cannot be brought under section 77-1735; (2) Trumble filed suit outside the tax year in which the challenged taxes were levied or assessed, so the district court did not have jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-21,149; and (3) since the district court lacked jurisdiction, it properly dismissed the action.

The Douglas County attorney filed a petition with the Mental Health Board alleging that S.J. was a dangerous sex offender within the meaning of Nebraska's Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA). The Board concluded that S.J. was a dangerous sex offender. The Board then held a hearing in which it concluded that inpatient treatment at Norfolk Regional Center was the least restrictive alternative presently available and ordered inpatient commitment. S.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) clear and convincing evidence supported the district court's findings that S.J. was substantially unable to control his behavior; (2) clear and convincing evidence supported the court's finding that inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative; and (3) SOCA's provision regarding the composition of the Board was consistent with due process requirements.

Big John's Billiards filed this action against the State and others seeking a declaration that the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was special legislation, violated Nebraska's equal protection clause, and constituted a regulatory taking. The district court sustained in part and in part overruled Big John's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of special legislation but did not direct entry of a final judgment or dismiss Big John's other constitutional claims. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because the district court did not enter a final order, the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over the appeal.

Because of Defendant Oscar Hernandez's third conviction for driving under the influence, the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles revoked his license. Defendant received an ignition interlock permit from the Department. Before the revocation expired, Defendant was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle that did not have an ignition interlock device. The State charged Defendant with driving during revocation under Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,197.06. The district court concluded that section 60-6,197.06 did not apply to Defendant's conduct and that Neb. Rev. Stat. 60-6,211.05(5) did. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) section 60-6,197.06 does not provide the penalty for a driver who has a valid ignition interlock permit but operates a vehicle not equipped with such a device; and (2) rather, that conduct is a Class II misdemeanor under section 60-6,211.05(5).

Servio Diaz, a Honduran disaster refugee with authorization to reside in the U.S., pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to misdemeanor charges of attempted possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, and driving while intoxicated. Diaz subsequently filed a motion for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief on the basis that his counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to advise Diaz of potential deportation consequences he would face when he entered his guilty plea. The district court determined that Diaz had not established entitlement to relief and denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, concluding that the error asserted by Diaz was not an appropriate basis for relief by a writ of error coram nobis.

Appellees, three Nebraska non-profit organizations and a resident taxpayer, brought an action against the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission and its director, seeking a declaration that the Commissioner's regulations were illegal and void because the Commission had exceeded its authority under the Nebraska Liquor Control Act by classifying flavored malt beverages as beer rather than spirits, which were taxed at a much higher rate under the Act. The district court concluded (1) Appellees had standing to challenge the Commission's regulation, and (2) the flavored malt beverages were spirits under the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court correctly concluded that the taxpayer had taxpayer standing to assert this claim, and therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the nonprofits also had standing; and (2) the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by classifying and taxing flavored malt beverages as beer, as the Act unambiguously required flavored malt beverages to be classified as spirits.