Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees, three Nebraska non-profit organizations and a resident taxpayer, brought an action against the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission and its director, seeking a declaration that the Commissioner's regulations were illegal and void because the Commission had exceeded its authority under the Nebraska Liquor Control Act by classifying flavored malt beverages as beer rather than spirits, which were taxed at a much higher rate under the Act. The district court concluded (1) Appellees had standing to challenge the Commission's regulation, and (2) the flavored malt beverages were spirits under the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court correctly concluded that the taxpayer had taxpayer standing to assert this claim, and therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the nonprofits also had standing; and (2) the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by classifying and taxing flavored malt beverages as beer, as the Act unambiguously required flavored malt beverages to be classified as spirits.

A jury convicted LeRoy Parmar of first degree murder for the 1987 killing of Frederick Cox, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment. In 2005, Parmar moved to have the DNA testing performed on evidence used at trial. The laboratory's analysis of the DNA samples from Cox's bedsheet excluded Parmar as a contributor to the DNA found in those samples. Parmar subsequently filed a motion requesting the court to vacate his conviction or grant him a new trial. The district court overruled Parmar's motion, concluding (1) Parmar was not entitled to have his conviction vacated because the DNA testing did not conclusively establish his innocence; and (2) Parmar was not entitled to a new trial because the evidence would not have produced a substantially different result. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DNA evidence did not exonerate Parmar of guilt, but the evidence excluded Parmar's DNA from a crucial piece of evidence and contradicted the eyewitness testimony crucial to the State's conviction; and (2) thus, the DNA evidence probably would have produced a substantially different result if it had been available at trial. Remanded with direction to grant Parmar a new trial.

S.C. was convicted of sexual assault of a child. The mental health board subsequently found S.C. to be a dangerous sex offender under the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) and ordered him to undergo secure inpatient treatment. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) S.C.'s due process rights were not violated when the State did not allow him to undergo sex offender treatment while still incarcerated, as obtaining treatment was not necessary to affect S.C.'s release from prison, no statutory language existed to create a substantive right to treatment, and SOCA was civil and nonpunitive in nature; and (2) The State presented clear and convincing evidence that S.C. was a dangerous sex offender and that secure inpatient treatment was the least restrictive alternative.

Marco Torres was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree murder, one count of robbery, three counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of unauthorized use of a financial transaction device. Torres was sentenced to death on each count of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Torres' conviction and death sentence, holding (1) the district court (i) did not err in making certain evidentiary rulings, and where it did err in admitting certain evidence, the error was harmless, and (ii) did not err in overruling Torres' motion to suppress; and (2) the sentencing panel, among other things, (i) did not err by receiving for purposes of the State's proof of aggravating circumstances the trial court's bill of exceptions over Torres' objections, (ii) did not err in finding certain statutes challenged by Torres to be constitutional, (iii) incorrectly considered the mental suffering of one of Torres' victims in determining whether an aggravating circumstance was in existence, but the failure of this one finding did not affect the existence of the aggravator, and (iv) did not err in concluding that no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factors existed.

In 2010, the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties established a common levy for the general fund budgets of its eleven member school districts. After Sarpy County levied this tax on real property, three taxpayers brought an action in the district court seeking a declaration that the tax was unconstitutional. The Learning Community, each of its member school districts, and the Sarpy County treasurer were named defendants in the action. The district court declared the Learning Community's common levy was unconstitutional as a property tax for state purposes. The Learning Community and two of its member school districts appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-34442(2)(b), which provides that a learning community may establish a levy for general fund budgets of its member school districts, serves a predominantly local purpose, not a state purpose; and (2) because all members of the learning community received benefits from taxes levied and the levy was uniform throughout the community, there was no violation of either the Nebraska Constitution's prohibition of commutation or the uniformity clause. Remanded with directions to dismiss.

After a jury trial, Appellant Jorge Vigil was found guilty of sexual assault of a child. Vigil appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in overruling his motion in limine and allowing a video-recorded interview of the victim to be heard by the jury after finding that the interview was admissible under Neb. R. Evid. 803(3), a hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. At issue was whether the statements were admissible when some time had passed since the sexual assaults and the victim did not see the physician the day of the interview. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that the elements of the medical purpose exception found in Rule 803(3) were met.

Appellant Joshua Nolan was charged with first degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony in connection with the killing of Justin Gaines. Nolan, relying primarily on inconsistencies among the statements and testimony of the State's witnesses, argued that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Nolan had shot and killed Gaines. A jury convicted Nolan of both charges. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself; (2) the step instruction used in this case was not constitutionally infirm; (3) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict; and (4) trial counsel did not perform in a deficient manner.

Timothy Jimenez pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Jimenez was arrested in Colorado. He failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and the county attorney obtained a warrant for his arrest. Thereafter, a detainer was placed on Jiminez in Nebraska. Jimenez then requested a final disposition or an order directing the State to release the detainer. The district court denied Jimenez's request, determining that the interstate Agreement on Detainers, which allows a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged to demand a speedy disposition of outstanding charges, did not apply because Jimenez had no untried matters pending in Nebraska. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding Jimenez was not eligible to invoke the Agreement, as a detainer for a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense but not sentenced does not relate to an "untried indictment, information or complaint" under the Agreement and thus does not trigger the procedural requirements of the Agreement.

Lucky Iromuanya was convicted of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and two related counts of use of a weapon. The Supreme Court modified his sentence. Iromuanya subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel directed at his trial and appellate counsel. The district court overruled the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Iromuanya's motion without a hearing where, for all of his claims, Iromuanya either failed to allege facts that showed his counsel's deficient performance or failed to allege facts that showed he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficiencies.

Timmy Timmens was convicted of second degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Timmens subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in several particulars and that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims without a hearing and denied the remaining claim following an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Timmens' appeal of the order denying all but one of his postconviction claims without a hearing was untimely; (2) trial counsel's performance with respect to Timmens' remaining claim was not deficient under the Strickland v. Washington standard, and therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective in not raising the issue of trial counsel's performance on direct appeal; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Timmens' motion to alter or amend the judgment.