Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Arthur Perina was charged with, among other things, motor vehicle homicide under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-306. Perina filed a motion to quash the motor vehicle homicide charge, asserting that section 28-306 was unconstitutional on the ground that it criminalized negligent acts. The county court overruled Perina's motion. Perina pled guilty to both charges, after which he renewed his constitutional challenge. It was again overruled. The district court affirmed Perina's convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in rejecting Perina's constitutional arguments or affirming the county court's decision to convict him of motor vehicle homicide without proof of mens rea because motor vehicle homicide is a public welfare offense that does not require proof of mens rea.

Joshua Alfredson was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault and second degree false imprisonment. The trial court subsequently determined that an aggravated offense had been established and, as a result, subjected Alfredson to lifetime community supervision as part of his sentence. The court of appeals affirmed Alfredson's convictions and sentences, concluding (1) the trial court erred by failing to submit to the jury the aggravated offense determination regarding whether the offense included the use of force or the threat of serious violence pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 83-174.03, but (2) the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the trial court's error was not harmless because the Court could not say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have found that Alfredson used force or the threat of serious violence in compelling the victim to have sexual intercourse with him. Remanded.

Jerad Parks was charged with first degree sexual assault on a child. Although Parks was twenty-four years old at the time he was charged, he filed a motion to transfer to the juvenile court because he was a juvenile at the time of the offenses. The district court denied the motion. Parks then pled no contest to attempted second degree sexual assault and felony child abuse. The district court ordered Parks to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Parks' motion to transfer because under the plain language of the juvenile code, the juvenile court's jurisdiction ends when the juvenile reaches the age of majority; and (2) because Parks pled no contest to a registrable offense under SORA, the plain language of the statute required Parks to register as a sex offender.

Jeffrey Glazebrook was convicted for first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Glazebrook contended (1) that the State's delay in charging him with the offense violated his constitutional rights, and (2) that the trial court erred in receiving certain evidence over his objections. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding (1) the district court's determination that Glazebrook failed to establish a denial of due process resulting from preindictment delay was not clearly erroneous, but (2) the district court abused its discretion in receiving evidence of Glazebrook's criminal history, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial.

Jonathan Becker pleaded guilty to motor vehicle homicide and was sentenced to five years of probation, which included a requirement that Becker participate in a work ethic camp. The court also revoked Becker's driver's license for five years as a condition of probation. Becker later violated his probation, and the court revoked it. The court then sentenced Becker to five years in prison and again revoked Becker's license, this time for fifteen years. The court did not give Becker credit for the time he served in the work ethic camp or for his previous driver's license revocation. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence, holding (1) Becker should receive credit for the time served at the work ethic camp, but (2) Becker should not receive credit for the time his license was revoked while he was on probation. Remanded for resentencing.

A state patrol officer stopped for speeding a vehicle driven by Anthony Laws in which Stuart Howard and Sarah McGee were passengers. When consent to search was denied, a trained drug detection canine unit was brought to the scene. The canine alerted, and a subsequent search disclosed over 700 pounds of marijuana being towed behind the car. Laws, Howard, and McGee were all charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. After their motions to suppress were denied, each was convicted. This appeal addressed McGee's challenge to the denial of her motion to suppress and to the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed McGee's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the district court correctly denied McGee's motion to suppress for the reasons articulated in its opinion related to Laws and Howard, and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support McGee's conviction.

A state patrol officer stopped for speeding a vehicle driven by Anthony Laws in which Stuart Howard was a passenger. When consent to search was denied, a trained drug detection canine unit was brought to the scene. The canine alerted, and a subsequent search disclosed over 700 pounds of marijuana. Laws and Howard were both charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Each filed a motion to suppress. The motions were denied, and Laws and Howard were convicted of the charge. Both filed notices of appeal, assigning separate but related errors. In a consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle after the traffic stop, and the length of the continued detention was not unreasonable; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's factual finding that the results of the canine sniff were admissible; and (3) the reasonable suspicion factors combined with the canine alert constituted probable cause to search the vehicles.

Jesse Britton was shot by a city police officer and a conservation officer with the state game and parks commission after Jesse failed to comply with the officers' commands to drop his gun. Jesse died. Pat Britton, as personal representative of Jesse's estate, filed an action against the City of Crawford under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) on common-law negligence claims. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, determining that the claim was barred by an intentional torts exception to the PSTCA providing that the PSTCA shall not apply to any claim arising out of a battery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the alleged negligence was inextricably linked to a battery, Britton's suit was barred by the PSTCA.

Trevelle Taylor was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. On appeal, Taylor contended that the district court erred in giving certain jury instructions, receiving expert opinion testimony regarding the presence of gunshot residue on Taylor's hands, and admitting cellular telephone records purporting to prove contacts between Taylor and his codefendant on the basis of insufficient foundation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court committed reversible error in giving a jury instruction that allowed the jury to presume that Taylor was guilty of the crimes charged but failing to specify that the jury that was not required to draw the inference of guilt in violation of Neb. R. Evid. 303(3); (2) Taylor was not unfairly prejudiced by the other jury instructions given; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of gunshot residue; and (4) there was sufficient authentication to support the admission of the cellular telephone records. Remanded for a new trial.

This case involved a constitutional challenge to an occupation tax levied pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 2-3226.05. Appellant landowners, who were residents and taxpayers of natural resources districts in the Republican River basin, brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to have the occupation tax declared unconstitutional and its levy and collection enjoined. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the occupation tax, determining that it did not violate the Nebraska Constitution as (1) the occupation tax was not a property tax but, rather, an excise tax levied upon the activity of irrigation; (2) the occupation tax did not result in a commutation of taxes; and (3) section 2-3226.05 was not special legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the judgment in Garey v. Nebraska Department of Natural Resources did not bar this action under the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) the landowners did not meet their burden of establishing that the occupation tax was unconstitutional.