Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Appellant Mauro Yos-Chiguil pled nolo contendere to murder and assault charges. The Court of Appeals dismissed his direct appeal as untimely. Appellant unsuccessfully sought relief under the state's immigration advisement statute. Appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court for post-conviction relief. He argued that the district court denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review most of Appellant's claims because they were included in his "untimely" appeal. The only claim the Court could review pertained to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court believed that claim alleged sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Lancaster County Mental Health Board (Board) determined that D.H. was a âdangerous sex offenderâ within the meaning of the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) and should be committed for inpatient treatment. The determination was affirmed on appeal to the district court. D.H. appealed, arguing that the district court erred in affirming the Boardâs order for multiple reasons. The Supreme Court found that the evidence presented before the Board and the district court sufficient to support D.H.âs commitment. The Court affirmed the order of the Board and decision of the district court.

In the early 1990âs, a jury found A.M. guilty of first-degree sexual assault, and the court sentenced him to prison. Shortly before his release in 2008, the State filed a petition under the Sex Offender Commitment Act (SOCA) to have A.M. declared a dangerous sex offender and committed to inpatient care. The Mental Health Board (Board) found by clear and convincing evidence that A.M. was a dangerous sex offender but that neither voluntary hospitalization nor other treatment alternatives would prevent him from reoffending. A.M. appealed the Boardâs decision to the district court, âasserting a litany of constitutional and evidentiary errors.â The district court rejected A.M.âs claims, and affirmed the Boardâs decision to have A.M. committed. After a thorough review of the Boardâs deliberations and the district courtâs record, the Supreme Court found many of A.M.âs issues raised on appeal meritless. However, the Court remanded the case to the Board for further evidentiary findings for the record.

The Appellant Rex Moats was a former candidate for the thirty ninth district of Nebraska Legislature. During the course of the 2008 election, the Republican Party paid for and distributed publications in opposition to Moatsâ candidacy. Moats filed a complaint in district court, where he identified in eleven separate publications instances of where he claimed the Republican Party defamed him, portrayed him in a false light and violated several consumer protection laws. The Republican Party filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and the court granted it, dismissing Moatsâ case. The Supreme Court noted that context was critical to analyzing whether a statement was defamatory, particularly if the statement expressed a fact or opinion. The Court examined the circumstances in which each statement was made, finding they were political campaign brochures intended to persuade voters to vote against Moats through the use of rhetoric and hyperbole. The Court characterized all of the cited statements as âopinionâ and held they were protected speech under the Constitution. The Court could not find that the statements violated consumer protection laws. Accordingly, it affirmed the district courtâs decision to dismiss Moatsâ case.

In 2006, Appellant-Defendant Anthony Riley was convicted in the district court for manslaughter and attempted second degree murder stemming from the drive-by shooting that ended with one death and three others injured. Prior to trial, the State filed several motions in limine, seeking to prevent Defendant from discussing at voir dire, in his opening statement, or closing argument, a polygraph test police had administered to one of the Stateâs witnesses. Defendantâs defense strategy focused on proving that someone else in the car, not Defendant, had fired the shots. When Defendant cross-examined one of the Stateâs witnesses, the witness mentioned he had taken a polygraph test. Defendant motioned for a mistrial, but the trial court simply struck mention of the test and ordered the jury to disregard it. The jury returned guilty verdicts for manslaughter and attempted second degree murder. Defendant moved for a new trial. The court overruled the motion and sentenced Defendant to twenty years for manslaughter, and eight to fifteen years on each attempted murder count. The Supreme Court found that Defendantâs claim that he was not the shooter, and the inadvertent mention of the polygraph by the Stateâs witness were prejudicial to Defendant, and that the district court should have granted Defendantâs motion for a mistrial. The Court reversed the lower courtâs decisions and remanded the case for a new trial.