Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Petitioner for two counts of child abuse and neglect stemming from incidents in which Petitioner slapped and hit his pregnant sixteen-year-old girlfriend. Petitioner filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the indictment, contending (1) the State failed to prove that abuse or neglect occurred, and (2) the State failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.095(2) by not instructing the jury on the definition of "physical injury" as used in the child-abuse-and-neglect statute. The district court denied the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the district court's petition. The Supreme Court granted the petition as to one of the two counts of child abuse, concluding (1) when alleged "abuse or neglect" is based on a nonaccidental physical injury, the district attorney must inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury"; and (2) the State's failure to inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury" likely caused the grand jury to return an indictment on less than probable cause for one of the two counts of child abuse. View "Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking, possession for sale, and possession of controlled substances. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of contraband seized during a traffic stop. The police officer stopped Defendant for speeding, issued a warning, and then ordered Defendant to remain until a drug-sniffing dog and handler team could arrive. Defendant contended that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, unlawfully seizing him, and that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless search. The district court suppressed the evidence based on the warrantless search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a traffic stop that is legitimate when initiated becomes illegitimate when the officer detains the driver beyond the time required to process the traffic offense unless the extended detention is de minimis, consensual, or justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (2) the prolonged stop in this case met none of these exceptions and was therefore unconstitutional. View " State v. Beckman" on Justia Law

The State sought an indictment against Petitioner on charges of sexual assault and lewdness involving a child. During the grand jury proceedings, the State presented the child-victim's out-of-court statements describing the alleged sexual conduct. The grand jury ultimately returned a true bill. Petitioner subsequently filed a pretrial motion for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the indictment was based on hearsay in violation of Nevada law. After a hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that the victim's statements were not hearsay because they were prior inconsistent statements, and if they were hearsay, they were admissible under Nev. Rev. Stat. 51.385, which excepts from the hearsay rule trustworthy statements by a child-victim of sexual assault. Petitioner then filed this original petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the grand jury could not consider the disputed statements, as (1) the statements were hearsay, and (2) the exception in section 51.385 does not apply to grand jury proceedings. Consequently, there was not sufficient legal evidence to support a finding of probable cause and the indictment could not stand. View "Rugamas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Respondent owned a three-acre parcel, the northernmost twenty feet of which was in a county setback within which Power Company had an existing ten-foot-wide utility easement. Power Company later sought to exercise two easements on the property for installation of high-voltage transmission lines. Respondent rejected Power Company's offer for the easements, and the issue of just compensation went to trial. During the reading of the jury instructions, Power Company objected a jury instruction telling the jury to disregard the setback in its valuation of the property on the grounds that Respondent's use of the area was limited to parking and landscaping. The district court included the instruction. The jury ultimately awarded Respondent $1.7 million in just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instruction at issue provided an overbroad reading of the Court's decision in City of North Las Vegas v. Robinson, but Power Company did not suffer prejudice because a separate jury instruction remedied the error; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Respondent's expert to testify regarding her paired sales analysis. View "Nev. Power Co. v. 3 Kids, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an employment action against her former employer. Appellant initially authorized her attorney to settle with Respondent, but Appellant refused to sign the settlement agreement. Respondent filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court granted the motion and entered an order setting forth the terms of the parties' settlement. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding the order was not a final judgment because it did not dismiss or formally resolve Appellant's complaint. Respondent subsequently issued a check to Appellant for the settlement amount, which Appellant refused to accept. The district court then granted Respondent's motion to deposit the settlement proceeds with the district court. The order, however, failed to enter judgment in favor of either party or otherwise resolve the case. The district court then entered an order statistically closing the case on the basis that there had been a stipulated judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the district court's order was not substantively appealable because no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an order statistically closing a case, and the order did not constitute a final, appealable judgment, as none was entered. View "Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Sparks traditionally made most personnel and budget decisions for the Sparks Municipal Court. The City and Municipal Court later entered into a dispute over the City's exercise of this authority. The district court subsequently enjoined the City from making such decisions in the future based on the Municipal Court's broad authority to manage its own affairs. The City appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the district court's order enjoining the City from interfering with the Municipal Court's ability to make personnel decisions, holding that the separation of powers doctrine and the Municipal Court's inherent authority barred the City from interfering with the Municipal Court's control over such decisions; and (2) reversed the district court's order as to the parties' budgetary dispute, holding (i) the Municipal Court's inherent power over its budget must be weighed against the City's authority over government finances, but (ii) the parties failed to develop the record sufficiently for the Court to determine whether the Municipal Court properly invoked its inherent powers on this point. Remanded. View " City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Court" on Justia Law

Homeowner attended a first Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) mediation with Citimortgage, after which Defendant was denied a loan modification. The district court subsequently ordered a second mediation. PennyMac Corp. later obtained beneficial interest in the deed of trust and promissory note and attended the second mediation. The mediator determined that PennyMac failed to bring the promissory note, deed of trust, and other documents to the mediation and that PennyMac's representative lacked authority to negotiate. Homeowner filed a petition for judicial review, requesting sanctions, attorney fees, and a judicially imposed loan modification. The district court imposed sanctions against PennyMac but declined to impose a loan modification or monetary sanctions beyond the amount of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Homeowner had standing to challenge the district court's order on appeal; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in denying an FMP certificate and in determining sanctions. View " Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp." on Justia Law

The State charged Respondent with misdemeanor and felony crimes stemming from a domestic violence incident. A justice of the peace, who was sitting as a district court hearing master pursuant to Eighth Judicial District Court Rule (EDCR) 1.48, which allows justices of the peace to serve as district court hearing masters, presided over Defendant's preliminary hearing. Respondent pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of battery, and the judge sentenced him on that charge. The judge then accepted Respondent's plea to the felony charge. Respondent subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his felony plea on the ground that it was accepted by a justice of the peace, who lacks jurisdiction to accept a felony plea. The district court granted Respondent's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a justice of the peace who has been appointed as a hearing master performs the duties set forth in EDCR 1.48(k), she is acting pursuant to her authority under EDCR 1.48, not as part of her jurisdiction as a justice of the peace. View " State v. Frederick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted burglary while in possession of a firearm, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and coercion. Defendant moved to suppress the confession he made while at the police station, claiming that interrogation began after he invoked his right to counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Defendant asked "Can I get an attorney?" but denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's statement was ambiguous and that there was no substantive questioning until after Defendant was given a second set of Miranda warnings at the police station and waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the question "Can I get an attorney?" is an unequivocal request for the aid of counsel, triggering the requirement that all interrogation immediately cease; (2) once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, there may be no further interrogation unless the suspect reinitiates contact with the police, there is a sufficient break in custody, or the suspect is provided the aid of the counsel that he requested; and (3) Appellant's confession was inadmissible, and the error in admitting the confession was not harmless. Remanded. View " Carter v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. The district court determined that restitution should be imposed as part of the sentence but did not set an amount of restitution. Instead the court ordered Appellant to appear within sixty days after his release from prison to have the court determine the restitution at that time. Appellant appealed, arguing that Nevada law requires that the district court set an amount of restitution when it determines that restitution is appropriate as part of a sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because the judgment of conviction contemplated restitution in an uncertain amount, it was not final and therefore was not appealable. View " Slaatte v. State" on Justia Law