Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Donald Bigpond was charged with battery constituting domestic violence. Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence involving Bigpond and the victim. The district court reserved judgment on the State's motion until trial. During direct examination, the victim recanted her previous statements. The district court decided to admit the victim's prior allegations of domestic violence against Bigpond, determining that they were relevant to explain the relationship between the victim and Bigpond and provide a possible explanation for her recantation. Bigpond was convicted as charged. At issue on appeal was whether evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" may be admitted for a nonpropensity purpose other than those listed in Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed evidence, as the victim's pretrial accusations against Bigpond placed their relationship in context and provided a possible explanation for the recantation, which assisted the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility.

Michael Pohlabel pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360. In doing so, he reserved the right to argue on appeal, as he did unsuccessfully in the district court, that his conviction violated the right to keep and bear arms secured by the state and federal constitutions. At issue on appeal was whether Pohlabel, despite his felon status, had a constitutional right to possess a black powder rifle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 202.360(1)(a) does not violate either the state or federal constitutions; (2) while federal law currently permits felons to possess black powder rifles, that does not mandate that Nevada follow suit; and (3) the Legislature used the word "citizen" in Nev. Const. art. I, 11(1) to refer to those persons who are members of the political community, and thus, unpardoned felons are not included among those to whom the Nevada Constitution guarantees the right to keep and bear arms.

Paul Choy filed a complaint in district court alleging various tort claims against respondent Ameristar Casinos. According to the complaint, Choy was gambling at the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City when he was handcuffed by casino security guards and his belongings were searched. Ameristar subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was not properly named as a party because Ameristar did not own or operate the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City. In his opposition to Ameristar's motion, Appellant sought a continuance under Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to allow discovery before granting Ameristar's motion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ameristar and denied Choy's request for a continuance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Choy did not comply with rule 56(f) because he did not attach an affidavit explaining why he sought a continuance of the summary judgment motion to conduct further discovery, and therefore, the district court properly denied Choy's request for a continuance; and (2) the district court properly granted Ameristar's motion for summary judgment because Choy failed to present any evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue regarding Ameristar's ownership or operation or Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City.

Appellant Stuard Stephans and a companion stole six bottles of men's cologne from a retail department store. At trial, the State relied on the store's loss prevention officer to prove both theft and value. The officer testified, over the defense's foundation, hearsay, and best evidence objections, that the stolen goods he recovered bore price tags adding up to $477. Neither the price tags nor duplicates of them were offered or admitted. In order to establish grand larceny, the State needed to prove that the stolen goods had a value of $250 or more. A jury convicted Stephans of grand larceny and burglary, both felonies, and conspiracy to commit larceny, a gross misdemeanor. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grand larceny charge, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the officer's testimony, and the defense objections to the testimony should have been sustained; and (2) affirmed the judgment of conviction as to conspiracy and burglary.

Appellant Joseph Francis incurred a $2 million debt at Wynn Las Vegas, a casino. When unable to collect on the debt, Wynn sued Francis for, among other things, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. When Wynn deposed Francis during discovery, Wynn invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every question. Wynn eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted after refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation and denying his request to reopen discovery. At issue on appeal was how, in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being unfairly disadvantaged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his privilege, the district court should balance the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment; and (2) after reviewing the particular considerations in the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to withdraw his invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery.

Respondent Aaron Hughes faced several criminal charges for allegedly creating three digital videos of himself engaging in sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old. The district court granted Hughes' motion to dismiss one of the charges against him for child pornography, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.710, after finding that the statute was vague and that it only applied to production of pornography involving individuals under sixteen years of age. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "minor" in the statute is not constitutionally vague because it has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning as an individual under eighteen years of age; and (2) under section 200.710, it is unlawful to use a person under eighteen years of age in producing a pornographic performance. Remanded.

Jerome Ford was convicted of pandering of prostitution pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.300(1)(a), which criminalizes the act of soliciting another person with the specific intent that, in response to the solicitation, she become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution. Ford appealed, contending that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute does not criminalize such a substantial amount of protected expressive activity as to be unconstitutionally overbroad, and statute is not impermissibly vague; (2) the statute applies even when the target is an undercover police officer who disavows having been or intending to become a prostitute; but (3) the jury instructions in this case did not adequately describe the specific intent required for pandering, and the error affected Ford's substantial rights. Remanded for a new trial.

After a jury trial, Appellant Ramon Adam was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. During trial, Appellant sought a jury instruction on the procuring agent defense, which generally provides that if a defendant is an agent of the purchaser, then the defendant should only be held as culpable as the purchaser. The district court rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the trafficking statute and prior caselaw, holding that the district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense. The Court further held (1) the procuring agent defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges, regardless of the theory the defendant is charged under, whether sale, manufacture, delivery, or actual constructive possession; and (2) any prior precedent inconsistent with this opinion was overruled.

In 2006, appellantâs vehicle was stolen from respondent hotelâs valet parking lot. Appellantâs insurer issued a check to appellant for the cost of the vehicle but not including the cost of customizations. Appellant filed a lawsuit in district court against respondent, alleging negligence and breach of a bailment contract and seeking damages exceeding $10,000. The district court determined that Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.101(1) shielded respondent from liability and entered summary judgment in favor of respondent. Appellant appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found as a threshold matter appellant to be a real party in interest with standing to sue because appellant was not fully compensated by his insurer for his losses and thus the principle of total subrogation did not apply. The Court also held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.101(1) did not protect respondent against liability arising out of the theft of appellantâs vehicle because the statute, which limits the liability of hotels for the theft or destruction of any property brought by a patron upon the premises or "left in a motor vehicle upon the premises," unambiguously places motor vehicles outside of its scope.

Appellant was charged with a felony DUI, pleaded not guilty and went to trial where a jury convicted him. At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340, which allows a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a first felony DUI to undergo treatment. The appellant argued that Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340 is unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens exercise of the right to a trial and treats defendants differently based on their exercise of that right in violation of due process and equal protection. The district court determined that while there is a fundamental right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, there is no fundamental right to participate in an alcohol treatment diversion program. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the possibility of entering an alcohol treatment program is a form of leniency available in exchange for a guilty plea and does not penalize a defendant for exercising the fundamental right to a jury trial; and (2) all defendants charged with felony DUI are given the same protection of the law enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances, and therefore the statute does not violate equal protection.