Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Max Wilson was convicted by jury on four counts of violating RSA 632-A:10 (2016), which prohibited persons convicted of certain offenses from providing child care services. At issue was whether “help[ing the victim] out” and “do[ing] some [Bible] devotions with [the victim] and possibly help him with his schooling” were “child care services” as contemplated by the statute. According to her testimony, the victim’s mother noticed the victim “had an uneasiness that [she] could not put [her] finger on” regarding defendant’s and the victim’s relationship. The victim’s mother shared her concerns with her two older daughters; one of them searched defendant’s background on her computer and discovered that he was a registered sex offender. The victim’s father then terminated defendant’s contact with the victim. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence; (2) denying his motion to dismiss on grounds that “RSA 632-A:10, I, is void for vagueness, either facially or as applied”; and (3) “entering multiple convictions or imposing multiple punishments.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence and on the alternative ground that RSA 632-A:10, I, was unconstitutionally vague, reversed its order on defendant’s double jeopardy motion, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate three of defendant’s convictions and resulting sentences. View "New Hampshire v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Czekalski appealed his convictions on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), and one count of pattern AFSA. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence related to a January 2013 telephone call between the defendant and the victim, recorded by the police with the victim’s consent. He claimed suppression was warranted because the recording was not “done in such way as [would] protect the recording from editing or other alterations.” In a supplemental brief, defendant argued the trial court also erred when it denied his motion to continue the trial, and under the “plain error” rule, the trial court should have dismissed two of his indictments because they were defective and the trial court erred when it allowed a juror to be seated who allegedly failed to complete a juror questionnaire. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Czekalski" on Justia Law

Defendant Jessica Morrill appealed her conviction by jury on three counts of possession of a controlled drug (oxycodone, alprazolam, and lisdexamfetamine), and one count of possession of a controlled drug with intent to sell or distribute (cocaine). On appeal, defendant did not dispute that the arresting police officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for the initial stop of her vehicle. Instead, she argued that the trial court erred in finding that the requirements of "New Hampshire v. McKinnon-Andrews" (151 N.H. 19 (2004)) for permissibly expanding the initial scope of the stop had been met. The Supreme Court agreed with defendant after its review of the trial court record, reversed defendant's convictions and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Morrill" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Santamaria appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for a writ of coram nobis. In 1998, defendant was convicted of first degree assault. His trial counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which the court denied. Subsequently, the court sentenced the defendant to incarceration for twelve months. Defendant’s trial counsel withdrew from the case and, through appellate counsel, defendant appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial and the trial court’s decision to permit a police officer to testify as an expert witness. At that time, the Court affirmed his conviction. On December 30, 2014, defendant filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis seeking to have his conviction vacated for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied defendant’s petition, ruling that he was procedurally barred because he "could have, and should have, raised this claim earlier either on direct appeal, in a motion for a new trial, or in a habeas corpus petition," and because he failed to show "sound reasons" for failing to seek proper relief earlier. A common threshold requirement to bringing a petition for a writ of coram nobis is that "sound reasons exist[] for fail[ing] to seek appropriate earlier relief." Here, the Supreme Court found defendant failed to meet that requirement. Defendant argued he could not have brought his ineffective assistance claim earlier in a direct appeal, a motion for a new trial, or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. "Even if we assume without deciding that the defendant’s claim could not have been brought in a direct appeal, we conclude that he could have brought his claim in a motion for a new trial or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." View "New Hampshire v. Santamaria" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Lynch appealed his conviction, following a jury trial, of misdemeanor simple assault. He argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to police allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. He also argued that the Superior Court erred by permitting hearsay testimony from a pediatrician at trial. The State cross-appealed the trial court’s order dismissing two indictments post-trial on double jeopardy grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Defendants, the City of Dover (City) and its city council, school board, school board superintendent search committee, ethics commission, and city council ethics sub-committee, appealed a Superior Court order requiring them to disclose to plaintiff Jeffrey Clay, the written rubric forms completed by members of the superintendent search committee when evaluating applicants for the superintendent position. On appeal, defendants argued that the trial court erred when it determined that the completed rubrics were not exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law as “[r]ecords pertaining to internal personnel practices.” After review, the Supreme Court reversed: the completed rubric forms pertained to “internal personnel practices” and were exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law. View "Clay v. City of Dover" on Justia Law

In 1973, defendant Robert Breest was convicted for Susan Randall’s murder. Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, defendant has maintained his innocence since his conviction and has instituted numerous collateral proceedings in an effort to secure his freedom. Since 2000, defendant has succeeded in obtaining multiple rounds of DNA testing of fingernail clippings taken from Randall’s body. All of this testing, including the latest round conducted in 2012, showed that defendant could not be excluded as a contributor of DNA material found on the clippings. However, the most recent testing revealed for the first time that the clippings also contained DNA material from another unidentified male contributor. Based upon the latest test results, defendant moved for a new trial. At the hearing on his new trial motion, the State sought to exclude non-DNA evidence that defendant had proffered, but that was not presented at his original trial. The Superior Court granted the State’s motion to exclude the non-DNA evidence and, following a hearing, denied the motion for a new trial. Defendant appeals both rulings. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Breest" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alberto Ramos appealed a Superior Court order dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim, asserting that his trial counsel failed to inform him, prior to pleading guilty to felony charges, that he could be transferred to a prison in another state. In 1998, pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner pleaded guilty to second degree murder and attempted escape. Pursuant to the agreement, he was sentenced to 28 years to life. Fifteen years later, petitioner was transferred from the New Hampshire State Prison to a Florida prison. In June 2013, he filed a habeas corpus petition as a self-represented party. After the appointment of counsel, petitioner supplemented his habeas corpus petition with an IAC claim, alleging that he was “denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel” because his trial attorneys “failed to ensure that he made a knowing waiver of his rights” by not telling him when he pleaded guilty that he could be transferred to a prison outside of New Hampshire. The State moved to dismiss the claim. After a telephonic hearing, the trial court dismissed the petitioner’s IAC claim, ruling that, because “the possibility of being sent out of state is a collateral consequence,” and the “fail[ure] to inform a client of the collateral consequences of his conviction . . . does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,” he could not “demonstrate [that] his trial attorneys were ineffective by failing to warn him that he could serve his time out of state.” Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ramos v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Smith was convicted by jury for possession of heroin. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress; and (2) excluding the testimony of a defense investigator. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Remi Gross-Santos appealed his convictions on two counts of second degree assault and one charge of transportation of alcoholic beverages by a minor. He argued on appeal that the Trial Court erred in: (1) allowing the State to introduce evidence that there was a marijuana grinder in the back seat of his vehicle at the time of the accident (grinder evidence); and (2) ruling that the police had probable cause to arrest him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gross-Santos" on Justia Law