Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Rodric Reinholz was convicted by jury on two counts of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), two counts of ASFA by individual acts, and one count of felonious sexual assault (FSA). On appeal, defendant argued the superior court erred when it admitted into evidence an "affidavit" written by the victim. He also argued that his convictions on the two pattern AFSA charges should have been vacated under the rule of mandatory joinder that the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted in "New Hampshire v. Locke," (166 N.H. 344 (2014)). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Reinholz" on Justia Law

Defendant City of Concord (City) appealed a Superior Court order requiring it to issue demolition permits to plaintiff Everett Ashton, Inc. so that Everett Ashton could remove three abandoned, valueless manufactured homes from its manufactured housing park. The court also ruled that the City could not place a lien on Everett Ashton’s park for the unpaid water bills of the former residents of the abandoned homes, and that, by withholding demolition permits, the City engaged in a regulatory taking, entitling Everett Ashton to compensation and attorney’s fees. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the court’s ruling that the City had to issue the demolition permits, reversed its rulings concerning the unpaid bills and the regulatory taking, vacated the award of attorney’s fees, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Everett Ashton, Inc. v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Kuchman appealed decisions related to his conviction by a jury on one count of first degree assault. Defendant and his friend, Joshua Texeira, were at a Rochester bar. While there, defendant and Texeira became loud and eventually asked to leave. Following an argument with the victim and the manager of the bar, defendant and Texeira were escorted outside, where defendant threatened the victim and stated that he was going to come back for him. Eventually, the defendant and Texeira walked away. A few minutes later, the victim went out of the back door of the bar to take out the trash and to smoke. The victim saw defendant and Texeira standing near one of the dumpsters, and said something to them. Neither responded, but both defendant and Texeira approached the victim. Texeira then took out an expandable baton that had been in his truck, and hit the victim with it. The victim fell down, and was kicked several times. The victim later identified, by way of photographic lineups, both defendant and Texeira as his attackers. Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a bill of particulars, denied his multiple motions for a mistrial, and admitted evidence of a telephone conversation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Kuchman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Donna Green appealed a superior court decision to enter judgment in favor of defendants School Administrative Unit #55 (SAU), Timberlane Regional School District, Nancy Steenson, and Earl F. Metzler, II. This matter arose out of Green's request for documents under the Right to Know law; the trial court concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to receive electronic copies of documents that she had requested from defendants. Responding to her request for documents, Steenson, the chair of the school board, told plaintiff could make an appointment to “see the documents” that she had requested. Plaintiff replied, “in that case, give me the file electronically and we will all save money and time”; in response to this communication, the SAU stated that it had already responded to plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff noted that her “request is for an electronic file . . . or a paper report, whichever suits the district,” and she declined to make an appointment to view the documents. Plaintiff explained that “[a]ll of the documents requested could have been emailed or copied in the time it has taken to answer these excuses for not providing [them]. . . . This isn’t that difficult.” In response, the SAU stated that the documents that she requested were immediately “available for public inspection.” After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court found that both proffered interpretations of RSA 91-A:4, V were reasonable. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Right-to-Know statute was ambiguous. "In light of the purpose of the Right-to-Know Law, and our broad construction of it, we conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. Although the SAU notified the plaintiff that the documents that she requested were available for inspection, there is no evidence in the record that the paper documents made available constituted 'original records' as contemplated by RSA 91-A:4, V." Accordingly, the Court concluded plaintiff was entitled to the requested documents in electronic format. View "Green v. School Administrative Unit #55" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Bobola appealed a superior court decision denying his petition to annul a criminal conviction for second degree assault and a second degree assault charge that did not result in a conviction. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by denying his petition to annul on the basis that he had a conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) on his record that was ineligible for annulment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Bobola" on Justia Law

Defendant Vic Washington was charged with a number of offenses that arose from his “alleged use and attempted use of fraudulent credit cards, as well as his possession of the allegedly fraudulent credit cards and credit card numbers.” He was indicted on three counts of identity fraud. Each of these indictments charged that he “pose[d] as Eli Watts with the purpose to defraud in order to obtain merchandise” from a specific merchant. He was also indicted on several counts of receiving stolen property. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss all charges, arguing that the State had failed to “provide proof of the validity of the credit card numbers” and proof that Eli Watts was a “bona fide person.” At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State conceded that Eli Watts was “a person that the Defendant fabricated . . . . a fictitious person.” After the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss with the exception of the three identity fraud charges. As to those charges, the court ruled that the plain language of the applicable statute required the State to prove, among other things, that defendant posed as a natural person. Because the State did not dispute that Eli Watts was “a fictitious person,” the court ruled that the indictments charging that defendant “pose[d] as Eli Watts” were insufficient to allege that he posed as another person. The State filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s ruling, arguing, in part, that “the State did not intend to concede that Eli Watts is, in fact, a fictitious person. Rather, the State’s argument has always been that it didn’t matter whether Mr. Watts was a fictitious person or not.” The trial court denied the motion, and the State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Washington" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Eric Cable for negligent homicide - driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). He appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he caused the victim’s death and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of certain evidence and to certain statements by the prosecutor in his opening statement and closing argument. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Cable" on Justia Law

Defendant Albert Boutin, III appealed after a jury convicted him on one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana. At trial, the State did not produce the marijuana seized from defendant’s apartment, but rather relied upon photographs and other documentary evidence, and the testimony of the police and the state laboratory worker who analyzed a sample of the seized marijuana. After the State rested its case, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge for possession of marijuana, arguing that “the state hasn’t proven a prima facie case because there is no marijuana . . . in evidence.” The trial court denied the motion. Defendant again moved to dismiss at the close of his case, and the trial court again denied the motion. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing a laboratory analyst to testify about a substance that was not introduced at trial; and (2) failing to dismiss the marijuana charge for insufficiency of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Boutin" on Justia Law

Defendant Christina Thomas was convicted by jury of first degree assault for knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a person under 13 years of age. In 2002, E.A. moved in with defendant and her family. In August 2003, E.A. gave birth to D.A. and continued living with defendant, who promised to help take care of the child. E.A. and D.A. lived with the defendant until 2010, when D.A. was removed from the home and E.A. left. When E.A. first moved in, she got along well with defendant. Over time, and specifically after D.A. was born, the relationship deteriorated. After giving birth, E.A. weighed close to 400 pounds and was told by a doctor that she needed to lose weight. Defendant promised to help in this endeavor, and the two went on a diet and exercised together. Eventually, defendant stopped being supportive and instead used forced exercise and the denial of food to punish E.A. D.A. was hit or spanked, often with a board or a spatula. E.A. participated in the abuse of her son, often at defendant's direction. If E.A. did not do as she was directed, she was beaten. For the first year of his life, D.A. was fed formula and grew normally. Around the time he turned two years old, D.A. began “ruminating” (he would regurgitate food into his mouth, chew it, and swallow it again). He would also vomit food out of his mouth. These behaviors occurred almost every time he ate, at least several times per day. He also began eating such things as diesel fuel, his own feces, or animal feces. Defendant, who had assumed primary responsibility for feeding D.A., tried feeding him different foods to stop the ruminating and vomiting, but the problem continued. D.A.’s behaviors, particularly his ruminating, disgusted everyone at the house. The defendant believed that the behavior was intentional and began punishing D.A. for it, by hitting him or withholding food, occasionally for days at a time. D.A. was constantly hungry, but would not be fed if he screamed for food or cried about being hungry. D.A. barely grew or gained weight. In April 2010, when he was about six and one half years old, D.A. weighed 23 pounds, six ounces — only four ounces more than he weighed when he was 10 months old. He was also developmentally delayed. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) eventually intervened, leading to charges against defendant. Defendant argued on appeal of her conviction that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting evidence of “other bad acts” committed against the victim and the victim’s mother; and (2) not striking other testimony that she contended was inadmissible and prejudicial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Circuit Court order granting defendant Tyler Boyer's motion to suppress evidence obtained when, without a warrant, the police entered the apartment that he shared with his girlfriend and arrested him. The trial court found that defendant had standing to object to the search despite the fact that, at the time of the search, he was present with his girlfriend in violation of a court order that prohibited him from having contact with her. The State argued that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search because, given his presence in the apartment in violation of the order, he could not have an expectation of privacy in the apartment that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, and, therefore, reversed and remanded. View "New Hampshire v. Boyer" on Justia Law