Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Roland Dow appealed after a jury convicted him on two counts of first degree assault, one count of second degree assault, five counts of endangering the welfare of a child, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of unlawful interception and disclosure of oral communications or telecommunications. Dow argued the Superior Court erred by: (1) admitting detailed evidence that he physically abused his former girlfriend, Jessica Linscott; and (2) allowing the State’s expert witness to testify regarding the effects of domestic violence on a victim. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Dow" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Oscar Grande of armed robbery. On appeal, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to contest the admission of evidence concerning an uncharged robbery. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Grande" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, petitioners Deere & Company, CNH America LLC (CNH), AGCO Corporation (AGCO), Kubota Tractor Corporation (Kubota), and Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc. (Husqvarna), all appealed superior court orders that granted summary judgment to the State on their constitutional challenges to Senate Bill (SB) 126. SB 126 was enacted in 2013, amending RSA chapter 357-C to define "motor vehicle" as including "equipment," which "means farm and utility tractors, forestry equipment, industrial equipment, construction equipment, farm implements, farm machinery, yard and garden equipment, attachments, accessories, and repair parts." Like its federal counterpart and similar state statutes, RSA chapter 357-C, "the so-called ‘dealer bill of rights,''" was enacted "to protect retail car dealers from perceived abusive and oppressive acts by the manufacturers." RSA chapter 357-C regulated, among other things, a manufacturer's delivery and warranty obligations and termination of dealership agreements. RSA chapter 357-C also defines unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices. Violation of any provision of RSA chapter 357-C constitutes a misdemeanor. Petitioners manufactured agricultural, construction, forestry, industrial, lawn, and garden equipment, including commercial mowers, wheel loaders, backhoes, and agricultural tractors. Their complaint alleged that: (1) retroactive application of SB 126 substantially impaired their existing dealership agreements in violation of the State and Federal Contract Clauses; and (2) SB 126 violated the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution because it voided or otherwise rendered unenforceable mandatory binding arbitration clauses in existing dealership agreements, thereby conflicting with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In sum, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld SB 126 against petitioners' claims that it violated the State and Federal Contract Clauses. The Court agreed with the trial court that the preempted provisions were severable from the remaining provisions of RSA chapter 357-C as applied to petitioners. The Court rejected Husqvarna's argument that SB 126 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Court also rejected Husqvarna's contention that SB 126 had either a discriminatory purpose or effect within the meaning of the dormant Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, the Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the State on Husqvarna's dormant Commerce Clause claim and remanded for the trial court to consider, in the first instance, whether SB 126 was unconstitutional under the "Pike" balancing test. View "Deere & Co. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Craig Sanborn on two counts each of manslaughter and negligent homicide as the result of an explosion that killed two employees at his gunpowder factory. The court sentenced him to consecutive terms in the state prison on the manslaughter convictions only. On appeal, defendant challenged, among other things, the manner in which the jury was selected, the sufficiency of the evidence, the verdict, and the sentences. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Sanborn" on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Christopher Palermo on one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault, one count of criminal trespass, and two counts of simple assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) ruling that the State sufficiently authenticated certain Facebook messages; (2) admitting evidence of his prior incarceration, parole status, and civil lawsuit against the New Hampshire State Prison; and (3) allowing the State to introduce a photograph of him. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Palermo" on Justia Law

Defendant Marianne King was convicted by jury on one count of theft by unauthorized taking. At trial, defendant argued that it was error to instruct the jury that “if there is a conflict between witnesses who offer direct evidence concerning certain facts, you must decide which witness to believe.” She argued that this instruction, which, for the purposes of this appeal (“the Germain direct-evidence instruction”), was “misleading” because it conflicted with the State’s burden to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court overruled defendant’s objection to the instruction. After review, the Supreme Court made a slight adjustment to the wording of the instruction that the trial court repeated verbatim, but otherwise affirmed the judgment and conviction. View "New Hampshire v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Lisa Tagalakis Fedor was convicted by jury of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant lived in Manchester with her boyfriend and her two children. In January 2013, the boyfriend approached defendant about allowing Robert Doane to move in with them. Doane was an acquaintance of the boyfriend’s from whom the boyfriend had purchased heroin. Defendant agreed to allow Doane to move into a spare bedroom. Defendant knew that Doane sold drugs and allowed him to continue to do so after he moved in, but asked him not to sell drugs inside the house. After moving in, Doane began selling heroin on the street outside of the residence. Inside the residence, Doane installed a padlock on his bedroom door, but defendant had witnessed Doane in his bedroom, packaging heroin into “individual baggies.” Doane, despite being a convicted felon, also obtained a stolen firearm that he kept in the house. Defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit the sale of a controlled drug and one count of knowingly keeping or maintaining a common nuisance. Defendant moved for JNOV, or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied her requests for relief, and this appeal followed. Defendant argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion for JNOV, specifically, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that her residence was “used for the selling of the controlled drug heroin” because “drugs were not sold from inside the residence”; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she “maintained a common nuisance under RSA 318-B:16” because she “did not control or ‘maintain’ Doane’s padlocked room.” The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict was supported by the evidence at trial, and did not constitute an unsustainable exercise of discretion. View "New Hampshire v. Fedor" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendant Samuel Pennock, appealed his conviction by a jury of felony simple assault, and the superior court’s denial of his post-conviction motion to vacate his sentence and for a new trial. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by: (1) substantively admitting the victim’s pretrial oral and written statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule (N.H. R. Ev. 803(2)); (2) denying his motion to dismiss the simple assault charge; (3) denying his post-conviction motion to reduce that charge to a class B misdemeanor and to resentence him accordingly; and (4) denying his post-conviction motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Pennock" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, defendant James Houghton was convicted on 23 charges of possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) 15 of the charges involved depictions of individuals under the age of 18; and (2) one of the charges involved a depiction of “sexually explicit conduct.” After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, as to nine of the charges, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individuals depicted in the photographs were under the age of 18. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. View "New Hampshire v. Houghton" on Justia Law

Defendant James Perry was indicted on one count of attempted kidnapping and one count of criminal restraint arising out of a single course of conduct in late 2011. A jury convicted defendant on both counts, but, because the offenses arose out of the same uninterrupted course of conduct, the trial court sentenced defendant only on the attempted kidnapping conviction, while holding the criminal restraint conviction in abeyance pending the outcome of any appeal. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by: (1) admitting the victim’s in-court identification of the defendant when she had not made a prior out-of-court identification; and (2) sentencing him for a class A felony when the indictment failed to allege, and the jury was not instructed to find, a fact necessary for that level offense; namely, that he did not “voluntarily release[] the victim without serious bodily injury and in a safe place prior to trial.” Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s kidnapping conviction, but vacated his sentence, and remanded for sentencing consistent with class B felony standards. View "New Hampshire v. Perry" on Justia Law