Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant Paul Costella on two counts of criminal threatening, and one count of disorderly conduct. Defendant brought his car to Wal-Mart for an oil change. Jane Sylvestre, an employee in the automobile department, drove the defendant’s car into the service bay. While in the defendant’s car, Sylvestre saw a photograph of the defendant and his daughter in front of a red flag with a swastika on it. Sylvestre took offense because the Nazis had killed her uncle, who had been a member of the French resistance. After parking the car in the service bay, Sylvestre returned to the service area, where she told the defendant that she had the right to refuse service to customers with whom she was uncomfortable. In response, the defendant asked Sylvestre if she was a Jew. After the oil change had been completed, a second employee handed the car keys to the defendant. As Sylvestre started to process the invoice, the defendant asked her if she had seen his gun, saying, "It’s a Jew killing killer." He also accused Sylvestre of "wreck[ing]" his car because she was "a stupid Jew that doesn’t know how to drive a car." The defendant then paid his bill. As he was leaving, the defendant declared (to no one in particular, but audibly, and within earshot of Sylvestre) that he was "getting his gun to kill the Jew b***h behind the counter." Defendant was indicted for disorderly conduct and charged with two counts of criminal threatening, one count for his statements to Sylvestre, and the other for his statements to other store employees. Prior to trial, the State notified defendant that pursuant to the hate crime statute it would seek enhanced penalties on the criminal threatening charges. On appeal, defendant argued that the superior court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to dismiss the hate crime enhancement; and (2) excluded the testimony of his daughter that he was not motivated by hostility towards Judaism. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Costella" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in Superior Court defendant, Timothy McKenna was convicted of six counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police on the ground that he was subject to a custodial interrogation without being informed of his Miranda rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court found no evidence in that before or during his interrogation defendant was told that he was free to leave the property or informed of his Miranda rights. Nor was there evidence that the officers informed him that he was free to ask them to leave the property, or that he was not required to answer their questions. As such, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. McKenna" on Justia Law

The respondents were convicted of first degree murder for offenses committed when they were seventeen years old. Accordingly, they each received a statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On June 25, 2012, after all of the respondents’ convictions had become final, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). In this Rule 11 petition, the State appealed the superior court's determination that the rule announced in "Miller" applied retroactively to the respondents. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decisions. View "Petition of New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Respondent, the City of Concord (City) appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications - NNE (FairPoint), in its equal protection challenge to the City’s taxation of FairPoint’s use and occupation of public property, and striking the tax levied against FairPoint. In order to provide telecommunications services throughout the City, FairPoint maintained poles, wires, cables, and other equipment within the City’s public rights-of-way. For the 2000 to 2010 tax years, the City imposed a real estate tax upon FairPoint for its use and occupation of this public property. Prior to 2010, the City did not impose a right-of-way tax upon Comcast, which used the City’s rights-of-way to provide cable services pursuant to a franchise agreement. The City began imposing the tax upon Comcast in 2010 in response to a ruling by the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) that, notwithstanding the franchise agreement, Comcast was subject to the tax. Prior to 2008, the City did not impose the same tax upon Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) because it was unaware that PSNH had used and occupied the rights-of-way. Similarly, the City did not tax certain other users of its rights-of-way for their use and occupation of public property during the relevant tax years because it was not aware of their usage. FairPoint brought an action challenging, in relevant part, the constitutionality of the City’s right-of-way tax assessments against it for the 2000 through 2010 tax years. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In granting FairPoint’s motion, and denying the City’s motion, the trial court ruled, as an initial matter, that "intentionality" was not a required element of FairPoint’s equal protection claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that FairPoint’s equal protection claim was one of "selective enforcement," and not an equal protection challenge to the tax scheme itself. Thus, because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in ruling that the City selectively imposed the tax upon FairPoint, the Court vacated the trial court’s rulings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

Respondent City of Manchester appealed a Superior Court order denying the City’s motion to dismiss and granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the petitioner, Prolerized New England Company (Prolerized). The City argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously ruled that RSA chapter 322 preempted the City’s ordinances regulating junk and scrap metal dealers. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Prolerized New England Company v. City of Manchester" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court in this case was appeal and cross-appeal of a Superior Court's order ruling in favor of the petitioners, eight individual New Hampshire residents and taxpayers and LRS Technology Services, LLC (LRS), on their petition for a declaratory judgment that the Education Tax Credit program. The State and several intervenors defended the program. The intervenors were three New Hampshire citizens, who wanted their children to receive scholarship funds under the program, and the Network for Educational Opportunity, a non-profit organization involved with the program. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had standing. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the petitioners’ declaratory judgment petition because it concluded that: (1) the 2012 amendment to RSA 491:22, I, which allowed taxpayers to establish standing without showing that their personal rights have been impaired or prejudiced, was unconstitutional; and (2) absent that amendment, the petitioners had no standing to bring their constitutional claim. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "Duncan v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Bulcroft was charged with kidnapping and rape. The trial court accepted his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to New Hampshire Hospital for life, unless or until earlier discharged by court order. Defendant was discharged from the hospital in 1979. In late 2012, defendant filed a petition seeking to have his arrest and indictment record annulled because he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is not the same as a finding of "not guilty" for purposes of RSA 651:5, II, and, therefore, the defendant is not entitled to have his record annulled. This presented an issue of first impression to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Agreeing with the trial court's reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Bulcroft" on Justia Law

Defendants Catherine Bailey, Rhylan Bruss, Benjamin DiZoglio, Elizabeth Edwards, Elizabeth Grunewald, Charlene Higgins, William Hopkins, Michael Joseph, Brian Kelly, Matthew Lawrence, Keith Martin, Christian Pannapacker, Tara Powell, Matthew Richards, Katheryn Talbert, and Leah Wolczko, appealed a circuit court ruling that they violated a City of Manchester ordinance establishing a park curfew of 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. In October 2011, defendants were participating in a movement known nationally as "Occupy Wall Street." One defendant explained that "[o]ccupy is a tactic. Occupy means staying in one place until your grievances are addressed." On October 19, shortly after 11 p.m., the Manchester police told the people present in the park that the police would enforce the park curfew ordinance and asked those present to leave. The defendants declined to do so and received summonses for violating Manchester City Ordinance 96.04. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges against them, arguing, in part, that the "application of the criminal law to their protected rights to free speech" violated the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions. The court denied defendants' motion after a hearing, and found the defendants guilty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling. View "New Hampshire v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Following his conviction on four counts of sale of a narcotic drug and the Supreme Court's affirmance of his conviction on appeal, defendant Sean Brown filed a motion for new trial in superior court alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. He appealed the Superior Court's decision concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his claim and, therefore, denying his motion for new trial. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was one of first impression: the proper forum in which a defendant should raise a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the State contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the claim and, therefore, should refrain from deciding it. In response, defendant argued that his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim should be treated in the same manner as ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, which are routinely resolved in superior court. The trial court agreed with the State, adopting the view of a number of courts that such a claim “must be presented to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal.” On appeal, the State’s position was different: it argued that claims should be brought in the original trial court. Thus, both parties urged the Court to adopt the same procedure. Because the Supreme Court agreed that “appellate courts have an interest in avoiding cases which require the Court to perform the unfamiliar task of fact finding,” the Court concluded that such claims should be heard in the trial court. "Because the trial court is better equipped to resolve the factual disputes that frequently underlie assertions of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we conclude that the proper forum for raising such claims is the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse and remand." View "New Hampshire v. Brown " on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Tsopas faced multiple felony and misdemeanor charges arising out of a single alleged drunk driving incident. The district division set bail initially at $250,000 cash with conditions, but subsequently reduced it to $75,000 cash with conditions. The State asserted, and the defendant did not contest, that this reduction was in response to the defendant's request and over the State’s objection. Defendant thereafter appealed the Superior Court's order denying his third motion to modify bail. He contended on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to conduct a hearing on the motion or issue written findings of fact pursuant to RSA 597:6-e, II; and (2) unsustainably exercising its discretion by setting an "unreasonably high cash only bail." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Tsopas " on Justia Law