Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants Catherine Bailey, Rhylan Bruss, Benjamin DiZoglio, Elizabeth Edwards, Elizabeth Grunewald, Charlene Higgins, William Hopkins, Michael Joseph, Brian Kelly, Matthew Lawrence, Keith Martin, Christian Pannapacker, Tara Powell, Matthew Richards, Katheryn Talbert, and Leah Wolczko, appealed a circuit court ruling that they violated a City of Manchester ordinance establishing a park curfew of 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. In October 2011, defendants were participating in a movement known nationally as "Occupy Wall Street." One defendant explained that "[o]ccupy is a tactic. Occupy means staying in one place until your grievances are addressed." On October 19, shortly after 11 p.m., the Manchester police told the people present in the park that the police would enforce the park curfew ordinance and asked those present to leave. The defendants declined to do so and received summonses for violating Manchester City Ordinance 96.04. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges against them, arguing, in part, that the "application of the criminal law to their protected rights to free speech" violated the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions. The court denied defendants' motion after a hearing, and found the defendants guilty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling. View "New Hampshire v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Following his conviction on four counts of sale of a narcotic drug and the Supreme Court's affirmance of his conviction on appeal, defendant Sean Brown filed a motion for new trial in superior court alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. He appealed the Superior Court's decision concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his claim and, therefore, denying his motion for new trial. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was one of first impression: the proper forum in which a defendant should raise a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial, the State contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the claim and, therefore, should refrain from deciding it. In response, defendant argued that his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim should be treated in the same manner as ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, which are routinely resolved in superior court. The trial court agreed with the State, adopting the view of a number of courts that such a claim “must be presented to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal.” On appeal, the State’s position was different: it argued that claims should be brought in the original trial court. Thus, both parties urged the Court to adopt the same procedure. Because the Supreme Court agreed that “appellate courts have an interest in avoiding cases which require the Court to perform the unfamiliar task of fact finding,” the Court concluded that such claims should be heard in the trial court. "Because the trial court is better equipped to resolve the factual disputes that frequently underlie assertions of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we conclude that the proper forum for raising such claims is the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse and remand." View "New Hampshire v. Brown " on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Tsopas faced multiple felony and misdemeanor charges arising out of a single alleged drunk driving incident. The district division set bail initially at $250,000 cash with conditions, but subsequently reduced it to $75,000 cash with conditions. The State asserted, and the defendant did not contest, that this reduction was in response to the defendant's request and over the State’s objection. Defendant thereafter appealed the Superior Court's order denying his third motion to modify bail. He contended on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to conduct a hearing on the motion or issue written findings of fact pursuant to RSA 597:6-e, II; and (2) unsustainably exercising its discretion by setting an "unreasonably high cash only bail." Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Tsopas " on Justia Law

Defendant Heidi Brouillette was charged with one count each of: burglary, second degree assault, and criminal mischief. At the time of her arraignment, defendant applied for appointed counsel. Based upon her financial affidavit, the trial court determined that she was indigent and qualified for appointed counsel. However, prior to February 2013 defendant retained private counsel and appointed counsel withdrew from the case. In that month, defendant stated her intent to plead not guilty by reason of insanity, and filed a motion for services other than counsel requesting funds for an expert psychological evaluation. She attached a financial affidavit to her motion to support her claim of indigence. In denying the defendant's motion, the trial court noted that defendant retained private counsel: "the appearance of current counsel, an ability to pay is presumed." The record did not show that the trial court reviewed the defendant's attached financial affidavit in reaching its conclusion. Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. With the trial court’s approval, defendant then sought interlocutory review of the court's ruling, and the Supreme Court granted her request to answer the question of whether RSA 604-A:6 (Supp. 2013) violated the State and Federal Constitutions' right to assistance of counsel, due process of law and equal protection if an indigent defendant not represented by appointed counsel was not provided with funding for necessary services other than counsel. The Supreme Court concluded that RSA 604-A:6 could not be read as prohibiting a court from authorizing necessary services to indigent criminal defendants who are self-represented, or who have pro bono, reduced fee, or retained counsel. With this conclusion, the Court did not reach whether the statute violated defendant's rights under the State or Federal Constitutions. View "New Hampshire v. Brouillette" on Justia Law

Defendant Stephen Socci appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to suppress evidence that lead to his convictions for manufacturing a controlled drug (marijuana) and possession of a controlled drug with intent to sell. He argued that the trial court erred because the evidence resulted from: (1) an unlawful search of his property; and (2) a subsequent search involuntarily given or tainted by the prior unlawful search. Contrary to the State’s assertions, however, the trial court made no finding that the officers confronted the defendant solely with the odor of marijuana detected in this manner. Although the trial court found that one of the arresting officers "told the defendant that one of the officers could smell marijuana and asked [him] for consent," this statement did not indicate that defendant was also not confronted with other evidence. Because its findings were unclear, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the trial court to determine whether, prior to his consent, defendant was confronted with evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search of the area surrounding his garage, and whether the evidence obtained following defendant’s consent "has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court failed to make particularized factual findings with regard to several critical allegations underlying defendant’s voluntariness argument. The trial court's order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Socci" on Justia Law

Defendant William Gaudet appealed his convictions on one count of felonious sexual assault, two counts of misdemeanor sexual assault, one count of attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault, and one count of attempted incest. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erroneously: (1) determined that he "opened the door" to certain otherwise inadmissible evidence; (2) denied his motion for a mistrial during the State’s opening statement; (3) denied his two motions for a mistrial during the State’s closing argument; and (4) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry after excusing one of the deliberating jurors. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Gaudet" on Justia Law

Defendant Stephen Stangle was convicted by jury on one count of theft by deception. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in admitting a surveillance video without proper authentication. Finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Stangle" on Justia Law

Defendant Jamie Locke appealed her conviction by jury for second degree assault. She argued on appeal that because in her first trial the jury acquitted her of first degree assault, retrying her for second degree assault violated her State and Federal constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. Alternatively, she argued that the State should have been required to join in one trial all charges arising from the same criminal episode. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to adopt such a rule of compulsory joinder of criminal charges and reversed. View "New Hampshire v. Locke" on Justia Law

Petitioner New Hampshire Right to Life (NHRTL) appealed the New Hampshire Board of Pharmacy’s decision that NHRTL did not have standing to participate in administrative actions involving the renewal of Planned Parenthood of Northern New England’s (PPNNE) limited retail drug distributor license. NHRTL sent a written complaint to the Board, alleging that PPNNE did not have a state contract in place with DHHS and was therefore illegally dispensing prescription drugs at its clinics. In its letter, NHRTL claimed that PPNNE’s contract with DHHS had expired on June 30, 2011, and had not been renewed. On June 18, 2012, PPNNE sent renewal applications for its six clinics to the Board, and on July 2, 2012, the Board sent letters to each clinic acknowledging receipt of the application. Each letter stated that the Board would not review the renewal application until August 15, 2012, but notified the clinics that it had “ministerially” renewed its licenses through September 1, 2012. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board, finding that none of NHRTL's generalized claims alleged NHRTL suffered an injury in fact, or that its own rights have been, or would have been specifically or directly affected. "NHRTL does not claim that any of its individual members has suffered, or will suffer, harm - it refers to deaths caused by the alleged failure to regulate that did not affect NHRTL’s membership. Instead, these concerns merely represent NHRTL’s interest in what it believes to be a public problem. Accordingly, the Board did not err in concluding that NHRTL lacked standing." View "Appeal of New Hampshire Right to Life" on Justia Law

Defendant Barion Perry appealed after a jury convicted him of theft and burglary. He argued that the superior court erred in denying the indictments against him on double jeopardy grounds. Detectives interviewed defendant following his arrest. The interview was recorded. Prior to defendant’s first trial, counsel for defendant and the State agreed that certain statements made by defendant during the interview should be redacted before the recording was played for the jury. Shortly after the State played a redacted version of the recording, defense counsel advised the trial court that three of the statements that should have been redacted were not, in fact, redacted. Defense counsel requested neither a mistrial nor a curative instruction. Because the court was concerned that defense counsel could not effectively advise the defendant about a mistrial as counsel had failed to “mark” two of the statements for redaction prior to trial, it considered assigning independent counsel to speak with the defendant about the mistrial request. The court ultimately concluded, however, that manifest necessity required a mistrial because the jury heard "damaging," "inflammatory" information that a curative instruction would not have been able to address adequately. The court did not assign independent counsel because it concluded that, given the prejudicial nature of the unredacted statements, it "could be ineffective assistance of counsel" for another lawyer to advise the defendant not to seek a mistrial. The trial court declared a mistrial over the defendant’s objection and scheduled a new trial. Prior to the second trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictments with prejudice. He argued that the mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, and, therefore, that the double jeopardy provisions of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions barred retrial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion in finding that manifest necessity required a mistrial. Consequently, the mistrial declaration did not bar the defendant’s retrial on double jeopardy grounds. View "New Hampshire v. Perry" on Justia Law