Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, defendant Thomas Jur, was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while certified as a habitual offender. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by denying his pretrial request for an interpreter, thus violating his right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel under both the State and Federal Constitutions. In the alternative, defendant argued that the trial court’s failure to appoint an interpreter at trial sua sponte was error. Defendant was from Sudan, and his primary language is Dinka. He stated he had difficulty understanding the English language. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the record showed defendant did have a sufficient command of English. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in failing to appoint an interpreter during the trial. View "New Hampshire v. Jur" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Montenegro appealed a superior court order dismissing his petition for injunctive relief seeking to compel the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), to issue him a personalized vanity motor vehicle registration plate reading "COPSLIE." He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the DMV’s denial of his request violated his right to free speech. Because the Court found that the regulation relied upon by the DMV in denying petitioner’s request was unconstitutionally vague, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Montenegro v. New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles " on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Collins appealed a superior court order that denied his motion for a new trial on three counts of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), four counts of AFSA by individual acts, and one count of misdemeanor sexual assault, based upon the court's conclusion that his trial attorney's performance was not constitutionally deficient. Defendant challenged his counsel's failure to object to improper expert witness opinion testimony by the complainant's therapist, Robert Fusco. On direct examination, without objection, Fusco testified that the complainant's behaviors "fit perfectly into the same kind of behavioral symptoms that we would see for a child who had been sexually abused." Fusco testified that, as a result of the complainant's January 2008 disclosure to him about the 2007 sexual assaults, he realized that "we were no longer dealing with . . . a major depressive disorder," but rather "a post[-]traumatic stress disorder on a child who had – who – who allegedly had been sexually abused." The trial court stated that it could not conclude that it was objectively reasonable to allow Fusco to so opine. The trial court explained that "Fusco's testimony is the type of expert testimony that the Supreme Court has held may not be offered to prove that a particular child has been sexually abused." The trial court was correct. Defense counsel failed to object to Fusco's testimony that the fact that the complainant's disclosure "came out of the blue . . . added to its credibility." Such testimony "cross[ed] the line into the impermissible realm of vouching for the [alleged] victim's credibility." Counsel's failures to object, in the Supreme Court's view, "were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." View "New Hampshire v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant Hillman Blesdell-Moore appealed his convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana and psilocybin (mushrooms), arguing that the Superior Court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence seized during a stop for a motor vehicle violation. Enfield police stopped defendant's truck for defective taillights. The officer did not observe an erratic behavior to suggest that defendant was driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The officer allowed defendant to step out of his truck to attempt to fix the taillights while he conducted a license check in his cruiser. Upon returning to defendant's truck, the officer asked to see defendant's tongue to see if it was coated consistent with marijuana use. While defendant initially denied smoking marijuana that day, he admitted he had smoked the day before. Concerned that defendant was becoming agitated, the officer obtained consent to perform a pat-down search. That search netted two wads of cash in defendant's pockets. The officer was about to conclude the stop when he hesitated and asked defendant one last question: whether defendant had marijuana in his truck. Defendant denied that he did, and the officer's subsequent request to search the vehicle. The officer stated that defendant was free to leave, but then asked whether a drug canine would indicate whether there were drugs in the vehicle. At this point, defendant looked to the ground and replied that he did not think so. The officer dispatched a canine unit to search defendant's truck. Ultimately the canine discovered drugs in defendant's vehicle. Defendant was arrested for possession with intent to distribute. He moved to suppress evidence of drugs the canine found, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Asking to examine defendant's tongue impermissibly expanded the scope of the initial traffic stop. Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied suppression of all evidence obtained following the unlawful expansion of the stop. View "New Hampshire v. Blesdell-Moore" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire certified a question to the New Hampshire Supreme Court: Whether RSA 507-B:2 and RSA 507-B:5 were constitutional under Part I, Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution, to the extent they prevented recovery for Plaintiff's claim for civil battery and damages against the Town of Sanbornton under a theory of respondeat superior. This case arose from a municipal police officer's use of a stun gun during a field sobriety test. Plaintiff Dennis Huckins alleged that the police officer, defendant Mark McSweeney, used his stun gun on him "multiple times." McSweeney claimed he used it only once when plaintiff began to run away before completing the field sobriety test. Plaintiff sued McSweeney and his employer, defendant Town of Sanbornton for damages, alleging, among other claims, a battery claim against McSweeney for his use of the stun gun and a claim that the Town was liable for battery under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The defendants sought summary judgment on both claims. The court denied McSweeney’s motion because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, did not establish that McSweeney fired only once, and because "[n]o reasonable police officer could have believed that the encounter . . . justified firing the [stun gun] a second time." Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case and the implicated statutes, the New Hampshire Court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "Huckins v. McSweeney" on Justia Law

Defendant david Pyles was convicted by jury on three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements allegedly obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Pyles" on Justia Law

Defendant Dennis Sulloway appealed his conviction by jury of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the thirteen-year-old victim's examining doctor and the victim's stepfather. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Sulloway " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth Lahm appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendants, Detective Michael Farrington and the Town of Tilton. Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence. Farrington interviewed an alleged victim who was recovering from severe burns and bruises at Concord Hospital, and who stated that she believed she had been sexually assaulted. The alleged victim claimed that, three days earlier, she had gone home with plaintiff after drinking approximately four beers at a bar. She claimed that, upon arriving at plaintiff's house, plaintiff gave her two drinks containing Red Bull, after which she "passed out" and did not remember anything until waking three days later in plaintiff's bed, without any clothes, and discovering severe burns and bruises on her body. Following plaintiff's arrest and the search of his house, an evidentiary probable cause hearing was held, at which a judge found probable cause that plaintiff had committed second-degree assault. Plaintiff hired private investigators, who interviewed, among other people, neighbors who recalled seeing the alleged victim outside plaintiff's house during the time she claimed to have been passed out. The investigators also interviewed a friend of plaintiff, a medical doctor who said that he spoke to the alleged victim by phone about her injuries, and that she told him they had been caused by her having accidentally fallen onto a wood stove. Plaintiff claimed that, once the prosecution received this and other "exculpatory information," which he provided to the court, it dropped the pending charge against him. Plaintiff sued Farrington and the Town, alleging that Farrington had conducted a negligent investigation prior to his arrest, and that the Town was vicariously liable. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis, among other grounds, that Farrington "did not have a legal duty to investigate beyond establishing probable cause before arresting and bringing a criminal charge against [Lahm]." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that immunizing police officers from "extended liability" was an interest that outweighs plaintiff's claimed interest in requiring a "reasonable investigation beyond just finding probable cause" prior to arrest. Because Farrington owed no duty to plaintiff, he could not be found liable for negligence on these facts. Absent tortious conduct by Farrington, the Town could not be vicariously liable for his conduct. View "Lahm v. Farrington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William O'Brien appealed a Superior Court order that granted summary judgment in favor of the New Hampshire Democratic Party and Raymond Buckley, Chairman of the New Hampshire Democratic Party, and denied plaintiff’s motion. The trial court ruled that plaintiff, who was a Republican candidate for re-election to the New Hampshire House of Representatives, did not have standing to file an action for damages under RSA 664:14-a (2008), the "Robocall Statute." In light of the fact that the Democratic party had fewer candidates than it had spaces on the November ballot, plaintiff sought "Democratic write-in votes in the September 14, 2010, primary so that he could appear on the ballot in the November cycle for elections as both (R)epublican and (D)emocrat." The day before the primary, defendants called 394 households with a prerecorded political message. Plaintiff received the highest number of votes in the Republican primary, winning a place on the general election ballot as a Republican. He did not secure enough votes in the Democratic Primary to also appear on the November ballot as a Democrat. In the general election, plaintiff won a seat in the House of Representatives. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the office of the Attorney General, alleging that defendants violated the Robocall Statute, because they were "responsible for calls containing a prerecorded political message that lacked the statutorily required disclosures." In August 2011, the Democratic Party entered into a consent agreement with the attorney general to resolve claims for the alleged violation of the statute; the agreement was not an admission that defendants violated the statute. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit and denying his motion for summary judgment. He contended that the plain language of the statute was broad and intended to include candidates who are the subject of a prerecorded political message. Alternatively, he claimed that, even if the statute was deemed to be ambiguous, the legislative history did not support the trial court’s interpretation. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that plaintiff did not allege an injury flowing from the alleged statutory violation. Therefore, he did not have standing. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "O'Brien v. New Hampshire Democratic Party " on Justia Law

Defendant Tariq Zubhuza was convicted by jury of criminal restraint, and criminal threatening with a firearm all connected with his involvement with a home invasion. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss those charges. Finding the evidence sufficient to support those convictions, and finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Zubhuza" on Justia Law