Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Kenneth Lahm appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendants, Detective Michael Farrington and the Town of Tilton. Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence. Farrington interviewed an alleged victim who was recovering from severe burns and bruises at Concord Hospital, and who stated that she believed she had been sexually assaulted. The alleged victim claimed that, three days earlier, she had gone home with plaintiff after drinking approximately four beers at a bar. She claimed that, upon arriving at plaintiff's house, plaintiff gave her two drinks containing Red Bull, after which she "passed out" and did not remember anything until waking three days later in plaintiff's bed, without any clothes, and discovering severe burns and bruises on her body. Following plaintiff's arrest and the search of his house, an evidentiary probable cause hearing was held, at which a judge found probable cause that plaintiff had committed second-degree assault. Plaintiff hired private investigators, who interviewed, among other people, neighbors who recalled seeing the alleged victim outside plaintiff's house during the time she claimed to have been passed out. The investigators also interviewed a friend of plaintiff, a medical doctor who said that he spoke to the alleged victim by phone about her injuries, and that she told him they had been caused by her having accidentally fallen onto a wood stove. Plaintiff claimed that, once the prosecution received this and other "exculpatory information," which he provided to the court, it dropped the pending charge against him. Plaintiff sued Farrington and the Town, alleging that Farrington had conducted a negligent investigation prior to his arrest, and that the Town was vicariously liable. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis, among other grounds, that Farrington "did not have a legal duty to investigate beyond establishing probable cause before arresting and bringing a criminal charge against [Lahm]." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that immunizing police officers from "extended liability" was an interest that outweighs plaintiff's claimed interest in requiring a "reasonable investigation beyond just finding probable cause" prior to arrest. Because Farrington owed no duty to plaintiff, he could not be found liable for negligence on these facts. Absent tortious conduct by Farrington, the Town could not be vicariously liable for his conduct. View "Lahm v. Farrington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff William O'Brien appealed a Superior Court order that granted summary judgment in favor of the New Hampshire Democratic Party and Raymond Buckley, Chairman of the New Hampshire Democratic Party, and denied plaintiff’s motion. The trial court ruled that plaintiff, who was a Republican candidate for re-election to the New Hampshire House of Representatives, did not have standing to file an action for damages under RSA 664:14-a (2008), the "Robocall Statute." In light of the fact that the Democratic party had fewer candidates than it had spaces on the November ballot, plaintiff sought "Democratic write-in votes in the September 14, 2010, primary so that he could appear on the ballot in the November cycle for elections as both (R)epublican and (D)emocrat." The day before the primary, defendants called 394 households with a prerecorded political message. Plaintiff received the highest number of votes in the Republican primary, winning a place on the general election ballot as a Republican. He did not secure enough votes in the Democratic Primary to also appear on the November ballot as a Democrat. In the general election, plaintiff won a seat in the House of Representatives. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the office of the Attorney General, alleging that defendants violated the Robocall Statute, because they were "responsible for calls containing a prerecorded political message that lacked the statutorily required disclosures." In August 2011, the Democratic Party entered into a consent agreement with the attorney general to resolve claims for the alleged violation of the statute; the agreement was not an admission that defendants violated the statute. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit and denying his motion for summary judgment. He contended that the plain language of the statute was broad and intended to include candidates who are the subject of a prerecorded political message. Alternatively, he claimed that, even if the statute was deemed to be ambiguous, the legislative history did not support the trial court’s interpretation. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that plaintiff did not allege an injury flowing from the alleged statutory violation. Therefore, he did not have standing. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "O'Brien v. New Hampshire Democratic Party " on Justia Law

Defendant Tariq Zubhuza was convicted by jury of criminal restraint, and criminal threatening with a firearm all connected with his involvement with a home invasion. He argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss those charges. Finding the evidence sufficient to support those convictions, and finding no reversible error in the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Zubhuza" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Addison moved to disqualify the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office from further participation in his case, and moved for the appointment of a special prosecutor. Defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 2008. In August 2009, Attorney Lisa Wolford, who had been employed by the New Hampshire Public Defender for approximately seven years, began working with the New Hampshire Appellate Defender. When Wolford began her rotation, the appellate defender office was preparing a brief regarding the standards applicable to our mandatory review of the defendant’s sentence. In early 2010, Wolford was reassigned from the defendant’s defense team. In March 2012, she submitted her resume to the attorney general’s office, requesting consideration for a position with the criminal justice bureau’s appeals division. Wolford was offered a position with the attorney general’s office; she began employment there in early July 2012. The defendant argued to the Supreme Court that it should "follow a line of cases that requires per se disqualification of an entire prosecutor’s office from a defendant’s case when (a) the defendant’s attorney switches sides and joins the prosecutor’s office in the middle of the case and (b) the defendant does not waive the conflict." The Supreme Court found Wolford had no involvement in the defendant’s case at the pre-trial or trial stages and participated in a limited aspect at one preliminary phase of the defendant’s multi-phased appeal approximately three years before joining the attorney general’s office. As such, the Court rejected defendant's per se argument, and further concluded defendant suffered no prejudice as a result in Wolford's change of employment. Accordingly, the Court denied defendant's motion to disqualify the Attorney General's office. View "New Hampshire v. Addison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lucien Vincent appealed a Circuit Court's judgment in favor of defendant Davina MacLean on his small claim complaint against her. In late January 2012, while incarcerated at the New Hampshire State Prison, plaintiff filed a small claim complaint against the defendant, his former girlfriend, seeking to recover seven thousand dollars for "[i]dentity theft, personal earnings and [b]enefits." He argued on appeal that the trial court erred by disregarding "overwhelming" evidence in his favor and failing to hold the defendant liable and by denying his motion to appear in person at the hearing on the merits, which he alleges violated his right to due process. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vincent v. MacLean" on Justia Law

Defendant Osahenrumwen Ojo appealed after a jury convicted him of theft by deception in Superior Court. The conviction followed a previous jury trial for a related charge, which ended in a mistrial based upon a hung jury. On appeal, he argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution barred the second trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Ojo" on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Wells was indicted on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and one count of felonious sexual assault against his minor daughter. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss one of the indictments alleging aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA). Defendant appealed his convictions on the remaining three AFSA charges and the charge alleging felonious sexual assault (FSA). On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) failing to grant a mistrial after the child testified to uncharged acts; and (2) admitting testimony regarding out-of-court disclosures made by the child. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Wells" on Justia Law

Defendant Chad Belleville appealed his conviction for second degree assault. He argued that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction. Finding the evidence sufficient to support his conviction, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Belleville " on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Mueller was convicted by jury on three counts of felony wiretapping. On appeal, he argued that the superior court erred in instructing the jury that a violation of the felony wiretapping statute required a "purposely" mental state when the statute called for a "willful" standard. The State agreed that the trial court’s instruction as to the requisite mens rea was erroneous, but asserted that reversal of the defendant’s convictions was not warranted because the prerequisites for application of the plain error doctrine have not been met. The Supreme Court agreed with defendant's argument on this issue, reversed the trial court, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "New Hampshire v. Mueller" on Justia Law

Juvenile Trevor G. was arraigned on a delinquency petition alleging he had endangered the welfare of a minor. He moved to dismiss the petition because none of the State's witnesses against him were present, and therefore the State could not proceed with its case. The State acknowledged none of its witnesses were present and did not object to the motion, but requested leave to file for reconsideration if it learned there was a good reason why its witnesses did not show. The case was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and the State did not move for reconsideration. A few months later, the State refiled its petition. Trevor moved to dismiss, arguing that the adjudicatory hearing was outside the statutory time limit. The court again held a hearing, and again the witnesses did not show. The Court denied Trevor's motion, finding that because Trevor initiated the dismissal, the State was not barred from re-filing. The Supreme Court granted the trial court's request for interlocutory appeal. The issue before the Court was whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that the statutory time limits for the State to re-file its delinquency petition for lack of prosecution was not violated because the dismissal was initiated by the juvenile. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation, and reversed the order denying Trevor's motion to dismiss. View "In re Trevor G." on Justia Law