Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Lynn Dion was convicted by jury of negligent homicide. She appealed her conviction arguing: (1) using a cell phone while driving does not constitute the requisite wrongful conduct to establish the culpable mental state for criminal negligence, and therefore the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine to exclude certain cell phone records admitted into evidence. The State introduced at trial over defendant's objection her cell phone records that revealed defendant made and received a number of calls in a thirty-seven minute car ride, "sometimes using the 'call waiting' feature to switch back and forth between conversations." At the close of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that her use of the cell phone while driving was not illegal, and that was the only conduct the jury could attribute to her. Finding that "although talking on a [cell] phone would not establish as a matter of law, it is at least some evidence from which a jury could infer that the driver was not devoting her full time and attention to her driving. . . that she was not exercising reasonable care under the circumstances," the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Dion" on Justia Law

Respondent William Rines appealed a superior court order that enjoined him from excavating on his property until he obtained a local use variance from Petitioner Town of Carroll. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that respondent's excavation was exempt from the permitting requirements, the Town's zoning ordinance required the variance before respondent began excavating, and that state law did not preempt the local zoning ordinance. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's injunction, but remanded the case with respect to the calculation of attorney's fees. View "Town of Carroll v. Rines" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Thompson appealed his conviction of driving while intoxicated (DWI) for which he was sentenced to enhanced penalties for a third offense. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in sentencing him for a third DWI because the State failed to submit evidence of his two prior convictions in its case-in-chief. Finding no merit to Defendant's argument, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Defendant Thavone Souksamrane appealed his convictions for criminal threatening and being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to question him about the veracity of other witnesses. The State conceded that the questioning in this case was improper. However, because of the "overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt," the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Souksamrane" on Justia Law

Defendant Alan Lathrop appealed his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in finding that Alderberry Lane in Moultonborough, where the accident took place that ultimately resulted in his arrest, was a "way" (and therefore not open for public use) for purposes of the DWI statute; because only members, guests and a loose category of invitees are permitted to use the road, it is not "open." After review of the statutory authority, the Supreme Court rejected Defendant's contention: " it would be contrary to legislative intent to construe the statute to provide that a private road in a lakeside community that is used by residents…. Is a DWI-free zone." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "New Hampshire v. Lathrop" on Justia Law

Defendant Peter Gibbs appealed his convictions on two counts of criminal restraint and one count of being an armed career criminal. On appeal, Defendant argued that: (1) his right against double jeopardy was violated when he was twice convicted of a single criminal restraint; (2) his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of being an armed career criminal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the facts of this case demonstrated that the victim was continuously confined from the time he was tied in the basement until the point at which he was able to free himself and, therefore, the defendant engaged in only one episode of criminal restraint. Accordingly, one of the two criminal restraint convictions and sentences must be vacated. The Court vacated one count of Defendant's conviction, but affirmed in all other respects. View "New Hampshire v. Gibbs, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant Cory Furgal appealed his conviction of second-degree murder. At trial, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury that defendant was entitled to use deadly force against the victim for self-defense. The State objected, arguing that the language of "the statute" and case law did not support the defendant's requested instruction. Defendant objected to the instructions the trial court ultimately used, outside the presence of the jury. But the trial court explained that it did not include defendant's "in-concert" instruction because it was not consistent with the language of "the statute." The Supreme Court was not satisfied that defendant's request was inconsistent with statutory law. However, based on the entirety of the instruction, the Court concluded that a reasonable juror would have understood whether the victim, acting alone or in concert with others, was about to use unlawful deadly force against defendant. View "New Hampshire v. Furgal" on Justia Law

Defendant Elliott Bell appealed a superior court decision to deny his motion to suppress evidence that he possessed less than one ounce of "ecstasy." Defendant argued that he was unlawfully seized under the State and Federal Constitutions when the arresting officer said the officers would be “on their way” as soon as the defendant produced identification. He contended that the trial court erred in concluding the police had the requisite reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity, and that the evidence obtained following the seizure must be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. Finding no merit to Defendant's arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "New Hampshire v. Bell" on Justia Law

Respondent Joan M. appealed a family division order that terminated her co-guardianship over minor Matthew L. filed by Mary S., Matthew's biological mother and co-guardian. The parties were in a serious relationship from 2004 to 2008. In 2006, Mary became pregnant and gave birth to Matthew in 2007. At that time, the parties petitioned the court to appoint them as co-guardians. In early 2008, however, Mary ended her relationship with Joan and subsequently petitioned the court to terminate Joan's co-guardianship. The motion was denied in late 2009. In 2010, Mary filed a new motion to terminate. While proceedings were pending, the Supreme Court had decided "In re Guardianship of Reena D." (163 N.H. 107 (2011)). The parties agreed that "Reena D." applied to the 2010 motion to terminate guardianship. The trial court ultimately granted termination of Joan's guardianship, and she subsequently appealed. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Guardianship of Matthew L." on Justia Law

Petitioner New Hampshire Independent Pharmacy Association (NHIPA) appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to the New Hampshire Insurance Department. At issue were the requirements of RSA 415:6-aa and RSA 420-J:7-b, VIII which were enacted by the legislature in 2007. When these statutes first took effect, NHID interpreted them to require health benefit plans and health insurers providing prescription drug benefits to permit their insureds to purchase 90-day supplies of prescription drugs from retail pharmacies, provided that certain conditions were met. Under this construction, health insurers and health benefit plans could not limit coverage of 90-day supplies to those filled through mail-order pharmacies. In 2010, NHID changed its position and began reading these statutes as permitting health insurers and health benefit plans to limit coverage for 90-day prescription quantities to mail-order pharmacies. In response, NHIPA brought this action for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus, asking the trial court to direct NHID to enforce RSA 415:6-aa and RSA 420-J:7-b, VIII in a manner requiring health insurers and health benefit plans to cover 90-day supplies of prescription drugs filled at retail pharmacies. NHID moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted its motion, ruling that RSA 415:6-aa and RSA 420-J:7-b, VIII did not impose such a requirement on health insurers and health benefit plans. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the language of RSA 415:6-aa and RSA 420-J:7-b, VIII to be plain and unambiguous, and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department. View "New Hampshire Independent Pharmacy Assn. v. New Hampshire Ins. Dept." on Justia Law