Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Timothy Perri appealed his convictions for kidnapping, aggravated felonious sexual assault, attempted aggravated felonious sexual assault, and criminal threatening. He argued on appeal that the Superior Court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress eyewitness identification evidence; (2) limiting his ability to cross-examine the victim; and (3) allowing the admission of evidence of a pocket knife discovered on his person when apprehended by the police. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the superior court record nor abuse of the court's discretion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "New Hampshire v. Perri" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court decision dismissing its indictment against defendant Thomas White for violating RSA 651-B:4-a (Supp. 2012), which requires registered sex offenders to report to law enforcement the creation of an "online identifier." RSA 651-B:4-a requires registered sex offenders to report to law enforcement "any changes to an existing online identifier, or the creation of any new online identifier," before using it. "[O]nline identifier" includes "electronic mail address, instant message screen name, user identification, user profile information, and chat or other Internet communication name or identity information." The indictment alleged that the defendant "did knowingly fail to . . . report a MySpace account" as required under the statute. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the defendant used his own name and already-reported e-mail address to create the account; thus, the trial court concluded, the defendant was not required under the statute to report the account's existence. The Supreme Court reversed. Construing "user profile" to include defendant's Myspace account "also comports with the general purposes of sex offender registration and reporting requirements, including the twin goals of 'investigating crimes committed online by registered sex offenders' and discouraging registered sex offenders 'from engaging in such criminal activities.'" The Court concluded that a Myspace account includes "user profile information," which, therefore, is an "online identifier" subject to the reporting requirement of RSA 651-B:4-a. View "New Hampshire v. White" on Justia Law

After a jury trial defendant Mohamed Ouahman was convicted of two counts of kidnapping, and two counts of robbery. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the State's use of its peremptory challenges to strike male jurors. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court's determination that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination was not clearly erroneous. View "New Hampshire v. Ouahman" on Justia Law

Defendant Samuel Biondolillo appealed his conviction of disorderly conduct. He argued: (1) that his conviction violated his constitutional right to free speech; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) that, for several reasons, the trial court committed plain error. Finding none of Defendant's arguments persuasive on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Biondolillo" on Justia Law

The petitioners, Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc., Dixville Telephone Company, Dunbarton Telephone Company, Inc., and Granite State Telephone, Inc., four exempt incumbent rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), appealed an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that denied their motion to rescind or declare null and void registrations of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) authorized by the PUC to engage in business as telephone utilities in the service territories of RLECs. Citing RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, among other statutes, the petitioners alleged that the PUC, before issuing the registrations, had failed to provide notice, hold hearings, and determine whether allowing such competition would be consistent with the public good. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Appeal of Union Tel. Co.," the petitioners specifically argued that federal law did not preempt these requirements. The PUC ultimately denied the petitioners' request and ruled that section 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act preempted RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, II. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that section 253(a) preempted state and local laws, regulations, and requirements that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." View "Appeal of Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Following a jury trial in Superior Court, Defendant Dianna Saunders appealed her convictions for being an accomplice to first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, theft by unauthorized taking, and theft by misapplication of property. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred when it: (1) instructed the jury that where a case involves both direct and circumstantial evidence, the evidence does not have to exclude all rational conclusions other than the defendant’s guilt; (2) found that the defendant consented to a general rather than a limited search of her home; and (3) did not address the constitutionality of the warrant to search the home. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Saunders" on Justia Law

In this petition for original jurisdiction, defendants Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC) and Bernard Bettencourt, Jr., D.O., sought review of a superior court's decision that three provisions of the statute governing medical injury screening panels (RSA 519-B:8-:10 (2007)), violated the Separation of Powers Clause of the State Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in so ruling, the trial court erred. Nonetheless, the Court affirmed portions of the trial court's decision on alternative grounds. View "Petition of Southern New Hampshire Medical Center" on Justia Law

Defendant John Brooks appealed his conviction following a jury trial for capital murder involving solicitation, capital murder in the course of a kidnapping, first degree murder (as an accomplice), and conspiracy to commit capital murder, in connection with the death of Jack Reid, Sr. On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) permitting the State to authenticate documents by use of affidavits, rather than live testimony, in violation of his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions; (2) permitting an FBI agent to testify that the defendant's account may have been untruthful; (3) permitting the State to introduce a new opinion from the medical examiner during the trial; (4) failing to instruct the jury that it must determine the "predominating cause" of death, pursuant to "State v. Seymour;" (5) failing to instruct the jury that the solicitation variant of capital murder requires a finding that the defendant acted for his personal pecuniary gain; and (6) failing to instruct the jury that the kidnapping variant of capital murder requires a finding that the defendant intended to confine Reid to commit a crime other than murder. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Charest appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court following his conviction by a jury for being a felon in possession of a firearm. After the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the felon-in-possession charge, the trial court asked the jury to issue a special verdict on whether it unanimously found that the defendant possessed, rather than controlled or owned, a firearm. The jury answered "yes." The trial court sentenced the defendant to three to six years' imprisonment. The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of three years under RSA 651:2, II-g, which applies "[i]f a person is convicted of a felony, an element of which is the possession . . . of a deadly weapon, and the deadly weapon is a firearm." At sentencing, the trial judge explained to the defendant, "You were just sentenced to the minimum. . . . I don't have any discretion . . . to do anything other than to sentence you . . . to . . . those terms." The defendant did not appeal his conviction, but argued that the trial court erred when it imposed the minimum mandatory sentence under RSA 651:2, II-g because: (1) the offense he was charged with, RSA 159:3, I, did not have as an element the possession of a firearm in a manner that rendered it a deadly weapon under RSA 625:11, V; and (2) the jury did not find that he possessed a deadly weapon within the meaning of RSA 625:11, V. Because the defendant did not make these arguments before the trial court, he invoked the plain error rule, which allowed the Supreme Court to correct errors not raised before the trial court. Because the trial court erroneously failed to exercise the discretion afforded to it at sentencing, the Court found that the error affected the integrity and fairness of the judicial proceedings. Accordingly, Defendant's sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. View "New Hampshire v. Charest" on Justia Law

Defendant Calvin Dunn, III appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to vacate the imposition of a suspended sentence. In 2006, defendant pled guilty to one count of accomplice to burglary and one count of tampering with witnesses. Under the plea agreement, he was sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of three and one-half to seven years, suspended for five years on the condition of his good behavior. On May 11, 2010, the Laconia District Court found defendant guilty of two counts of simple assault and one count of criminal threatening in connection with a physical altercation that occurred in 2009. Defendant appealed to the superior court for a jury trial. Later in May, the State filed a motion to impose the 2006 suspended sentence, alleging that the physical altercation constituted a violation of the good behavior requirement. The defendant requested that the hearing on the motion to impose be deferred until final disposition of the pending criminal trial. The State objected, and the court denied defendant's request. On July 6, 2011, defendant was tried by a jury on the charges stemming from the 2009 altercation. At trial, he argued that his actions were justified by self-defense. The jury acquitted him of all the charges. On July 21, defendant filed a motion to vacate the imposition of his sentence for the 2006 convictions. He argued that his actions in the 2009 altercation were justified by self-defense, as evidenced by the jury's acquittal on those charges, and, thus, he did not violate the good behavior requirement of his 2006 suspended sentence. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Dunn" on Justia Law