Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Logan Schulz appealed his convictions for being an accomplice to possession of cocaine, and an accomplice to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He argued that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search warrant for his home was unconstitutional both on its face and in its execution. In 2010, a Haverhill Police officer went to the home that Defendant shared with his mother to serve her with a notice against trespass and harassment. While lawfully inside the home, the officer saw three long guns near a staircase. Knowing that the defendant's mother was a convicted felon and prohibited from possessing firearms, the officer sought a warrant to search the home. Early in the search, they learned that the three guns near the staircase were, in fact, "BB" guns and were not unlawful for the defendant's mother to possess. The officers then continued the search and asked the defendant whether there were any additional guns in the house. The defendant informed them that he had a muzzle loader rifle and took them to his bedroom to show it to them. In the room, the officer observed a lock box large enough to contain a handgun but too small to contain a long gun, and told the defendant to open it, noting that the officers could open it by force if necessary. Both the defendant and his mother protested on the grounds that the police had no reason to believe they had a handgun. The defendant's mother then became upset and admitted that the lock box contained cocaine and money. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the police were required to discontinue their search after discovering that the guns they had believed to be firearms were, in fact, BB guns. The warrant contained no other facts upon which the police might have relied in continuing to believe that the search was justified. As a result, the officers' continued search of the defendant's home under authority of the warrant was unconstitutional. View "New Hampshire v. Schulz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kenneth Bond and Deborah Thibault, on behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated, appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to the defendants, the City of Manchester and Paul Martineau in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Manchester Welfare Department (collectively, the City). In January 2010, the plaintiffs applied for general assistance from the City pursuant to RSA chapter 165. See RSA 165:1, I (2002). On February 24, 2010, the City approved $140.00 per week in rental assistance. On March 18, 2010, the City suspended this assistance for seven days because of the plaintiffs' failure to provide certain documentation, including that which related to $30 the plaintiffs used to buy gas for a vehicle. The City lifted this suspension on March 25, 2010, noting that the plaintiffs were "unable to show compliance with the $30 purchase of vehicle gas that [they] stated [they] had previously purchased through an alternate financial resource." On April 9, 2010, the City revoked an April 8 voucher and denied the plaintiffs all assistance for six months because they had misrepresented information related to their vehicle. The plaintiffs petitioned the superior court to enjoin the City from suspending their assistance. Because the Supreme Court held that RSA 165:1-b and the Guidelines pertaining to rental assistance actually conflict, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bond v. Martineau" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Ball appealed his conviction following a bench trial on stipulated facts one felony count of possessing child sexual abuse images (child pornography). On appeal, he argued that the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence derived from the search of his home computer. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Ball" on Justia Law

The State appealed a superior court order that dismissed charges filed against Defendant Burton Hollenbeck, Jr. because it determined that the statute upon which they were based violated Defendant's state and federal substantive due process rights. Defendant was a licensed psychologist who provided services to the complainant in 2007. Less than a year after the therapy ended, the two became sexually involved. In April 2010, defendant was charged with thirty counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) for engaging in sexual penetration with the complainant between February 1, 2008, and December 9, 2008. The indictments alleged that by engaging in sexual penetration with the complainant "within one year of the termination of their therapeutic relationship," defendant "act[ed] in a manner which is not professionally recognized as ethical," thereby violating RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1). In December 2010, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing, inter alia, that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) violated his state and federal rights to substantive due process because it "criminalizes the private sexual conduct of consenting adults." The trial court agreed, and this appeal followed. Because defendant did not meet his burden of proving that RSA 632-A:2, I(g)(1) was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose in all circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded after its review of the case that his facial challenge failed. The Court reached the same result under the Federal Constitution as it did under the State Constitution because the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances.

Petitioners the City of Concord, the County of Belknap, and Mascenic Regional School District, appealed superior court order that denied their motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) is a tax qualified pension trust for certain public employees. The petitioners, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated municipalities, counties, and school districts, filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages in superior court, naming the State of New Hampshire and NHRS as respondents. The petition alleged that section 52 was an unfunded mandate that violates Part I, Article 28-a of the New Hampshire Constitution. Both the petitioners and the State moved for summary judgment. NHRS took no position on the constitutionality of section 52, but filed a separate motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was an improper party and that the New Hampshire Constitution and RSA 100-A:15, I, forbid it from using NHRS trust funds as the source of any monetary compensation to the petitioners. The trial court denied the petitioners' motion for summary judgment, granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the merits, and, accordingly, did not reach NHRS's motion. The petitioners appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion for summary judgment, and maintaining that section 52 is an unconstitutional unfunded mandate. The Supreme Court affirmed: "[t]here is also no indication that the amendment was designed to delegate to local governments effective control over the establishment of the state budget and appropriations. Indeed, to interpret the amendment in such fashion would bring it into conflict with Part II, Article 2 of the State Constitution, which confers 'the supreme legislative power' of the State on the House of Representatives and the Senate. Without a far more explicit indication that the people intended such a substantial alteration of fundamental legislative power, we decline to read Article 28-a in this fashion."

Defendant Saad Moussa appealed his convictions, and sentences on three counts of stalking entered following a jury trial in Superior Court. In 2005, the Rockingham County grand jury returned three indictments against the defendant, each alleging a separate incident of stalking the victim, to whom he had been married for approximately eleven years. According to the victim's testimony, they were divorced at the time of trial. Each charged incident involved the defendant allegedly sending a letter to the victim "after having been served with or otherwise provided notice of a protective order issued by the Salem Family Court on 12/10/04, that prohibited him from having contact with [her]." The defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in: (1) requiring him to choose between self-representation and representation by a lawyer he wanted to dismiss; (2) making certain evidentiary rulings; (3) denying his request for counsel at sentencing; and (4) imposing felony sentences. Finding no error in the Superior Court record, the Supreme Court affirmed.

This was an interlocutory appeal from a Superior Court order that certified a class represented by the plaintiff, Karen L. Lawrence, consisting of "all individuals who purchased Marlboro Lights cigarettes in New Hampshire from January 1, 1995, until the date of trial." The superior court transferred a single question for the Supreme Court's review: :Did the Superior Court err in its application of New Hampshire law when it granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification?" The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative and reversed the trial court’s certification order.

Defendant Josiah Davies appealed a district court order that partially denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his conviction. Defendant was charged with two counts of false imprisonment and one count of simple assault following a single incident of alleged domestic violence. On June 1, 2009, he appeared pro se for arraignment on the three class A misdemeanor charges. Prior to his arraignment, he spoke with the prosecutor regarding a potential plea agreement. During this discussion, Defendant indicated his intention to plead guilty, and then signed the acknowledgement and waiver of rights form that the prosecutor provided him. At this time, he was nineteen years old and had a GED and some technical college experience. The scheduled arraignment then went forward as a plea hearing. On appeal, Defendant argued that he did not enter a valid guilty plea because he was not advised of the essential elements of the simple assault charge. He contended, therefore, that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as required by Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, and no violation of his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions to deny Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.

Following a jury trial in Superior Court Defendant, Bryan Alwardt was convicted of second degree assault and criminal restraint based on accomplice liability principles. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to dismiss the assault charge due to insufficient evidence; (2) failing to dismiss the criminal restraint charge as against the weight of the evidence; (3) not ordering disclosure of all of the victim’s counseling records; and (4) prohibiting cross-examination of the victim regarding certain drugs found in her boyfriend’s apartment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.

D.B. appealed the Manchester Family Division's finding of delinquency based on misdemeanor sexual assault. D.B. was accused of inappropriately touching and subsequently threatening the female complainant while the two rode home on the school bus. On appeal, D.B. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the complainant’s direct testimony indicated that D.B. put his hand down her shirt and touched her breasts. She further stated that the he put his hand down her pants and “ran it” down to her ankle. This evidence failed to describe in what way the juvenile overcame her with the actual application of physical force. Nor did the surveillance video from the bus support the State’s position. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to charge D.B. with misdemeanor sexual assault within the meaning of RSA 632-A:2, I(a). The Family Division's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.