Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Steven Forest, appealed a superior court decision that denied his request for pretrial confinement on his sentences for conspiracy to commit burglary and accomplice liability for burglary. In 2007, Defendant was arrested on a parole violation warrant for various parole violations unrelated to the burglary charges. At the time of his arrest, he was also a suspect in a burglary at the A-1 Gas Station in Goffstown. That same day or shortly thereafter, he was formally arrested on charges arising out of the burglary and he was unable to post bail. A month later, a second parole violation warrant was issued in relation to the burglary charges. Defendant waived his right to a preliminary parole violation hearing pending resolution of the burglary charges. Following his arrest, Defendant was initially housed at the Hillsborough County House of Corrections; however, at some point, he was transferred to the New Hampshire State Prison as a result of the parole violation warrants. The burglary charges were not adjudicated until September 9, 2010. Defendant had been incarcerated for 1,154 days. Defendant filed a motion seeking pretrial confinement credit toward any sentence on the burglary charges for the entire period of his incarceration following his arrest in 2007. Defendant argued that since he had not yet had a parole revocation hearing, his parole had not been revoked and, thus, the entire period of his incarceration constituted pretrial confinement on the burglary charges rather than any other sentence of confinement. That same day, Defendant pled guilty to the charges in this case as part of a plea agreement. Under the plea agreement, Defendant was sentenced on each charge to three and a half to seven years, stand committed, with all but six months of the minimum sentence suspended. The sentences ran concurrent with one another but consecutive to any “parole setback.” This appeal followed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant waived his rights and chose to wait for the burglary charges to be resolved before having a hearing before the parole board on the parole violation charges. "Had Defendant chosen to have a parole revocation hearing within forty-five days, he may have received a punishment for violating parole that he could have served pending resolution of the burglary charges. Any remaining time spent incarcerated before resolving the burglary charges would then have been allotted as pretrial confinement credit." The Court denied any pretrial credit and affirmed the superior court's order.

Petitioner Liberty Assembly of God (Assembly) appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) which upheld a 2008 decision of Respondent City of Concord (City), denying the Assembly's request for a religious use tax exemption. Assembly owns 26.13 acres of land in Concord; approximately twenty acres are in "current use." The undeveloped land is used primarily for agricultural or forestry purposes, although there is a "prayer trail" around its perimeter. From 1994, when Assembly acquired its property, until 2008, the City granted Assembly a religious use tax exemption on all of its property. However, in 2008, the City granted Assembly an exemption on only forty percent of its property, concluding that sixty percent of the property was not used and occupied for religious training or other religious purposes, and was therefore taxable. The City subsequently revised its determination and exempted sixty percent of the property. The City considered the entire second floor of the main building taxable as not being used for religious purposes. Following appeal, the BTLA upheld the City’s apportionment for tax year 2008. Assembly asserted that the BTLA’s ruling was erroneous on three interrelated grounds: (1) the City and the BTLA misinterpreted RSA 72:23, III because it should be read as fully exempting houses of worship from taxation; (2) the City’s inquiries into the religious uses and purposes of each room within the church building unconstitutionally “entangled” the government with religion; and (3) even if the statute and constitution permit parsing taxable from exempt space within a house of worship, all of Assembly's space should be exempt as serving a religious purpose. Having decided that the City’s methodology was not flawed, the Supreme Court deferred to the BTLA’s judgment in determining the weight to be given evidence: "Because Assembly has not demonstrated by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the second-floor restroom was "owned, used and occupied directly for religious training or for other religious purposes," the Court could find error in the BTLA's finding such space taxable.

Petitioner 38 Endicott Street North, LLC appealed a superior court order that dismissed its petition under the Right-to-Know Law and denied its request for attorney’s fees. In 2011, Petitioner sent Respondent the State Fire Marshal, head of the New Hampshire Division of Fire Safety a letter requesting to inspect all records, information, and documents related to a September 17, 2010 fire that took place on its property and the "investigation thereof." Petitioner did not receive a response, and on May 3, 2011, sent a second letter demanding a response. On May 5, 2011, the Fire Marshal replied, disclosing the Incident Initiation Report and its supplement, but withholding all other materials because the investigation was ongoing. On May 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a sought an injunction to direct the Fire Marshal to produce the undisclosed materials pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law. Petitioner also requested attorney’s fees and costs. The Fire Marshal responded that the undisclosed materials are excluded from the Right-to-Know Law under the exemption for records “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the withheld records were exempt from the Right-to-Know Law, denied the petition, and also denied Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the materials were compiled for law enforcement purposes and that disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings. Petitioner also argued that the trial court erred in denying its requests for an in camera review of the materials or the compilation of a Vaughn index, as well as in denying its motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Finding no error, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's judgment.

After a jury trial, Defendant Thomas Willey was convicted of one count of pattern aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial or in the alternative, for further curative instructions to the jury. He also argued that the trial court sentenced him based upon improper considerations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction, but vacated his sentence: "[b]ecause [the Court could not] conclude either that the trial court 'clearly gave no weight' to the improper factors [the Court] identified, or that it would have imposed the same sentence but for any improper factors that it may have considered, [the Court] vacate[d] the defendant's sentence and remand[ed] for resentencing."

Petitioner David Fischer appealed a superior court order on his motions for pretrial bail, claiming that the court delegated authority to Strafford County Community Corrections (SCCC), which is managed by the Respondent, Superintendent of the Strafford County House of Corrections, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The written order stated that bail was set at $50,000 cash "[t]o convert to PR if found accep[table] by SCCC – Whether Bail is Posted or Converted all conditions apply." A pretrial motion to amend bail was denied, stating from the bench "[the judge was] just not going to order [SCCC] to do something it is not inclined to do. I have the power, and I have the discretion to do that, but I'm not going to in this case. The bail remains as is." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bail orders at issue here reflected "a cooperative accommodation among" the judicial and executive branches and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Defendant Roderick Davidson appealed his conviction by a jury on three counts of simple assault and one count of criminal mischief. He argued that the Superior Court erred by: (1) denying his motions in limine to exclude evidence that he "controlled" the complainant; and (2) denying his request for a defense of property instruction. In October 2009, Defendant and the complainant lived together. Consistent with their habit of "br[eaking] up every other day," Defendant broke up with the complainant. They nonetheless drove home together, napped together for about three hours, and then went to dinner together at a restaurant. After dinner, during which they both consumed some alcohol, Defendant drove the couple home, where they began to argue about money. The complainant insisted that they talk, and in an attempt to do so, Defendant grabbed her and threw her into a wall. The complainant ended up on her back at the bottom of the stairs with Defendant above her, and that his hand made contact with her face. The following day, the complainant had a bruised eye, which she tried to conceal with makeup. After speaking with several people, she ultimately decided to go to the police. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts. However, the Court concluded the trial court erred in admitting "unlimited context" evidence as inherently prejudicial. In light of the Court's reversal of Defendant’s convictions for improperly admitted evidence, it did not reach Defendant’s jury instruction argument.

Defendant Derrick DiMaggio appealed a superior court's denial of his motion for pretrial confinement credit for approximately 471 days he participated in the Grafton County Drug Court Sentencing Program. Finding there was no dispute that he was entitled credit for at least sixty-three of those days (for failing to comply with the Program’s rules), the Supreme Court was asked to review whether Defendant was entitled to credit for the days he was at liberty while participating in the Program. The Court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to pretrial confinement credit, and affirmed the superior court’s denial of his motion.

Defendant Joshua Guild appealed his conviction on one count of felonious assault and one count of aggravated felonious assault (ASFA) involving the same minor victim. He contended that the superior court erred by: (1) violating New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 615 and RSA 632-A:6, IV (2007) by failing to sequester the minor victim’s mother; (2) erroneously denied his motion to disqualify a juror without first conducting a voir dire of the juror; and (3) erroneously denied his motion to dismiss the AFSA charge. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court held that when, in a criminal trial, a trial court has violated Rule 615 and RSA 626:6, IV by failing to sequester a witness, a new trial is in order unless the State proves that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying that rule to this case, the Court concluded that any presumption of prejudice was rebutted. Furthermore, because Defendant's conviction was supported by other substantial evidence, and because the evidence did not support a conclusion that the victim’s mother tailored her testimony to the victim’s testimony, the Court held that any error in failing to sequester the victim's mother was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the AFSA charge, the Court found Defendant did not preserve the argument for the Supreme Court’s review. Defendant’s convictions were upheld.

Defendant Deicy Urena Ortiz appealed a district court's denial of her motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her misdemeanor conviction. On appeal, she contended her plea was not knowing because the court did not advise her of its potential adverse immigration consequences. Defendant had been a lawful resident of the United States since 2002. In 2007, she was charged with the class A misdemeanor of shoplifting. She appeared before the district court and entered a plea of nolo contendere. She was not represented by counsel. Defendant signed a standard acknowledgment and waiver of rights form, which, at the time, contained no acknowledgment of the potential adverse immigration consequences of entering either a guilty or nolo plea. During the plea colloquy, the court did not advise Defendant that her plea could result in adverse immigration consequences. In 2011, the federal government commenced removal proceedings against Defendant, contending that her shoplifting conviction constituted "a crime involving moral turpitude," a deportable offense. In response, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea and vacate her conviction. In her motion, she argued that her plea was not “knowing” because: (1) the court failed to inform her "that a conviction could subject her to deportation"; and (2) she "was affirmatively misled (albeit innocently) [by the prosecutor] that there would be no such consequences." The State objected. Acknowledging that it did not advise Defendant of the possible immigration consequences of her plea, the court concluded that Defendant raised a "pure issue of law," and, therefore, there was "no need for a hearing on the factual basis for [her] request." The court was not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)) supported her appeal. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because immigration consequences are collateral, the court’s failure here to advise Defendant of them did not render her nolo contendere plea unknowing.

Plaintiff Robert Pelkey appealed a superior court’s decision that granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc., d/b/a Dan’s City Auto Body. In 2009, Plaintiff brought suit against his landlord and Defendant alleging Defendant towed his car pursuant to a parking policy at his apartment complex. At the time, Plaintiff was confined to bed due to a serious medical condition and did not realize that his car had been towed. Soon thereafter, he was admitted to the hospital for a procedure to amputate his left foot, during which he suffered a heart attack. Plaintiff’s attorney had learned that Defendant had possession of the car and had scheduled to sell it a public auction two days later. After the attorney informed Defendant that his client wished to arranged for the return of the vehicle, Defendant falsely told the attorney that the car had already been sold. Defendant later traded the car to a third party, but Plaintiff received no remuneration for his loss. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit alleging that Defendant violated: (1) the Consumer Protection Act; (2) RSA chapter 262(a statute permitting a towing company to place a lien on a vehicle for reasonable charges incident to towing and storage and prescribing the requirements for collection of those charges by selling the vehicle at auction); and (3) the common law duty of a bailee to exercise reasonable care while in possession of a bailor’s property. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that a provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted Plaintiff’s claims. Finding that Plaintiff’s claims were not preempted, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings.