Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Glendon Hill appealed his conviction for aggravated felonious assault on the ground that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. At trial, the State elicited testimony from Defendant's young step-daughter that he subjected her to various types of sexual abuse. Her statements being the only evidence introduced by the State, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictments before putting on a defense, arguing that the mode of questioning was so suggestive that the State had failed "to provide a rational jury with proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that he committed the elements of the charged crimes. The trial court agreed that the direct examination of the child contained leading questions but denied the motion, reasoning that the child's testimony was sufficient to submit the matter to the jury. After calling a single witness to the stand, the defense rested. The jury convicted, and Defendant appealed without making any post-trial motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant did not preserve his challenge to the weight of the evidence. As such, the Court affirmed his conviction.

Defendant Daniel Matton appealed a superior court order that denied his motion to preclude the State from seeking an extended term of incarceration under RSA 651:6 II(a). In 1998, Defendant was convicted of arson and sentenced to seven and one-half to fifteen years in state prison, all suspended, and five years of probation. In 1999, Defendant was found to have violated the terms of his probation and ordered to serve three and one-half to seven years in prison. In 2002, Defendant was convicted of assault by a prisoner and sentenced to prison for one and one-half to three years. In 2010, Defendant pled guilty to one count of second degree assault. The State, pursuant to a capped plea agreement, indicated its intent to request an extended term of incarceration under RSA 651:6, II(a) (2007) based upon Defendant's prior record. Defendant moved to preclude the application of RSA 651:6, II(a), arguing that he had only one qualifying prior conviction (that for assault by a prisoner) because his imprisonment on the arson charge resulted from a probation violation rather than from the original, suspended, sentence he received on the arson conviction. The superior court denied the motion, ruling that Defendant had served two terms of imprisonment within the meaning of the statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court correctly found that the statutory requirements were satisfied, and properly denied Defendant's motion to preclude.

Defendant Christina Smith appealed her conviction for driving while intoxicated. She argued the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the State failed to establish that the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that she had violated the law when he stopped her. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found the district court did not err in issuing its decision, and affirmed the court's ruling.

In consolidated appeals from a decision of the New Hampshire Personnel Appeals Board (board), Petitioner Timothy Alexander appealed the Board's affirmance of his dismissal from employment with the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the State appealed the board's reinstatement of William Harris to his employment with HHS. In 2009, Alexander and Harris were involved in the restraint of a resident at the Sununu Youth Services Center (SYSC). Alexander was employed as a Youth Counselor III and Harris was a full-time probationary employee, Youth Counselor I (Trainee). A Center report noted that the resident responded rudely when questioned whether the had permission to sit somewhere other than his assigned table. When told to move, the resident responded "disrespectfully," an altercation ensued. An investigation of the incident resulted in Alexander and Harris losing their jobs for using "excessive force" against the resident. Alexander and Harris appealed their dismissals to the Board. Alexander argued that: (1) the board unlawfully upheld his dismissal on a different factual basis from that stated in his termination letter; (2) the facts found by the board do not warrant termination; (3) he should be reinstated because SYSC failed to comply with the personnel rules; and (4) he is at least entitled to a new hearing because the board violated several statutes and, along with SYSC, violated his rights to due process. The Supreme Court did not "share Alexander's interpretation of the Board's decision." The Court affirmed Alexander's dismissal. As to Harris, the Court concluded the Board should not have "interfered" with HHS's exercise of discretion in terminating Harris's employment. The Court reversed the Board's decision as to Harris.

Respondents the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Banking Department and the New Hampshire Banking Department (collectively, the Department), appealed an order of the Superior Court that permanently enjoined the Department from pursuing an administrative proceeding against Petitioner Jeffrey Frost on the ground that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioners Frost, Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC, and Frost Family, LLC, cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying their request for attorney’s fees. Frost is a member and designated manager of Chretien/Tillinghast, LLC (Chretien), and a member of Frost Family, LLC (Frost Family). Chretien and Frost Family (collectively, the LLCs) are New Hampshire limited liability companies organized for the purpose of real estate acquisition, holding, and development. The underlying dispute arose as the result of two seller-financed real estate transactions, one conducted by Frost Family and the other by Chretien. After both instances of seller-financing, Petitioner submitted a loan originator license application to the Department. At the time the administrative proceedings were initiated, the Department notified Petitioner that he could request a hearing with the Department. Petitioner did not file such a request. Instead, all Petitioners initiated a declaratory judgment proceeding in superior court, which included a request for a temporary restraining order. The petitioners contended that Respondents lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed against Frost and violated the State Constitution's prohibition against retrospective laws by seeking to impose a $25,000 fine for each alleged violation. After a hearing, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction, concluding that "[w]hile the [Department] may have jurisdiction over Frost because he is now a loan originator, it [could] take no action against him based on the September 2008 or the March 2009 transactions." Further, the trial court concluded that since the Department "may not impose any penalties on Frost," it did not need to consider the issue of the retrospective nature of the sanctions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Department lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and affirmed the superior court's judgment.

The main issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to police during an interview were voluntary. A portion of the interview was videotaped. Paramedics were called to the home of Defendant Nicole Belonga when Defendant's twenty-one-month-old child was sick. The child was left in the care of Defendant's boyfriend David Kaley who was living with Defendant at the time. The child suffered a seizure and was admitted to the hospital. She was discovered to have serious brain injuries and later transported to a hospital in Boston with a pediatric intensive care unit. Nashua Police arrived at the hospital and requested Defendant give a statement to them at the station. At first she did not agree to go so that she might be with her daughter in Boston, but Defendant later acquiesced. Detectives made clear that Defendant was at the police station voluntarily, but in her pre-trial motion, Defendant argued that her statements to the detectives were involuntary and the admission of those statements at trial would violate her constitutional rights. After a hearing, the court denied her motion. Her statements were admitted at trial through the videotape and the testimony of the detectives. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's pre-trial motion: "the jury had before it overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The defendant’s description of the incidents in which she used physical force against her daughter closely correspond with the doctors' testimony. The defendant's testimony, together with the doctors' testimony, strongly supports the conclusion that the defendant was caring for her daughter when [the] injuries occurred. The defendant made several statements suggesting she had had used too much physical force against her daughter and that she did something wrong. Also, the defendant's general description of the events paints a picture of a person using unwarranted and dangerous physical force against a very young child. Accordingly, [the Court] concluded that the evidentiary errors at trial were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

Defendant Roscoe White appealed his convictions by jury of first degree murder and attempted first-degree assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to an informant. He asserted on appeal that the informant's questions about his pending drug charges violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, and that his statements about the shooting should have been excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." He further argued that "[a]llowing the State to intentionally violate the constitutional rights of an accused in order to elicit incriminating statements is fundamentally unfair and violates due process." Finding that use of an informant does not constitute a per se constitutional violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of the statements Defendant made to the informant.

Plaintiff Dana Chatman appealed a superior court order that dismissed his negligence claims against Defendant Paul Giampa, and his respondeat superior claim against Defendants Strafford County and the Strafford County Department of Corrections. Plaintiff was participating in a work program run by the Corrections Department, under the direct supervision of Giampa. Giampa directed Plaintiff and others to load numerous tables and chairs onto a trailer. The trailer was not yet hitched to another vehicle, and not situated on even ground. Giampa directed Plaintiff and the others to lift the trailer and hitch it to a pickup truck when a weld on the trailer jack/hitch failed, causing the trailer to fall on Plaintiff's left leg and ankle. Plaintiff sustained permanent injury to his leg and ankle. The trial court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff's claims did not fall within the scope of RSA 507-B:2 because the truck and trailer were not being "operated" at the time of the loading/hitching, and declined to find that RSA 507-B:2 was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Supreme held "that the entire range of activities inherent in the loading and unloading process must be considered to determine whether a vehicle was being operated" and that "[o]peration includes participation in loading and unloading activities." The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Respondent Erica Blizzard appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Department of Safety (DOS) that suspended her boating privileges. Carrying two passengers, Respondent piloted a motorboat on Lake Winnipesaukee. There was almost no visibility due to dark and inclement weather conditions. As the respondent later told investigators, she was unable to see the bow of her boat. She was operating the boat at eighteen to twenty miles per hour, unsure of her location or depth, when the boat collided with an island. The collision killed one passenger and seriously injured the respondent and the second passenger. As a result of the collision, the respondent was charged with boating while intoxicated and negligent homicide. A jury found her guilty of negligent homicide, but not guilty of boating while intoxicated. Respondent argued on appeal: (1) whether DOS lacked the authority to suspend boat-operation privileges because it has failed to promulgate associated regulations; (2) whether RSA 270-E:17 delegated legislative authority in violation of Part I, Article 37 of the State Constitution; and (3) whether the hearing notice complied with Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution. Finding the DOS had the requisite authority to suspend Respondent's boating privileges, the Supreme Court affirmed the Department's decision.

Petitioner Donald Gentry appealed a superior court decision that denied his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The trial court held that Petitioner (an offender whose parole was revoked) was not entitled to receive credit against his ninety-day term of recommitment to prison imposed pursuant to RSA 651-A:19 for the period between his arrest and the revocation of his parole. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that RSA 651-A:19 did not permit the parole board to credit the time the petitioner spent in confinement between his arrest and revocation of his parole against his ninety-day recommitment period, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision.