Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Daniel Bent was convicted by a jury on one count of second degree assault and three counts of reckless conduct. In 2007, the superior curt sentenced him to three to six years in the state prison, and ordered him to pay restitution, plus a statutory administrative fee. The victim of the assault brought a civil suit against Defendant, his employer and the employer's insurance carrier. The parties came to a settlement agreement. In 2010, Defendant moved the court to vacate the restitution order as a result of the settlement reached in his case. Following a hearing, the court denied his motion. After a request for clarification of its order, the court set an amount for restitution. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in setting the amount of restitution because the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating the amount of the victim's economic loss that could be attributed to the assault. Furthermore, Defendant argued that even if the record supported the amount set, the trial court erred in setting an amount without determining whether it would be a double recovery to the victim. Finding that the trial court had not determined the amount of restitution to be set in Defendant's case, nor whether any portion of that amount would result in a double recovery to the victim, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Michael Smith appealed a superior court order that imposed previously suspended sentences for felony convictions. In February 2008, Defendant was charged with six class A misdemeanors. Subsequently, in March and April 2008, Defendant was indicted on six felony charges. In January 2010, Defendant pled guilty to the six misdemeanor charges and was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months in jail, these sentences also running concurrently with his felony sentences. On three of the felony charges, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of between two and seven years at the state prison, with six months of the minimum and all of the maximum terms suspended for seven years. On the other three felony charges, Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of between two and five years at the state prison, all suspended for a period of five years from release from his stand-committed prison sentences. While incarcerated, Defedant attempted to contact a woman whom he was forbidden to contact under the terms of his misdemeanor sentence. Although the prison’s system blocked his call, the State moved to impose the suspended sentences of all six felony convictions, arguing that the attempted call violated the condition of good behavior in those sentences. The superior court agreed that the call violated the good behavior condition, and imposed six months of the minimum and one year of the maximum sentences leaving the other sentences suspended. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence supported the superior court's decision and affirmed it.

Defendant, Robert Towle, appealed his conviction on four counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault and and four counts of criminal liability for the conduct of another all stemming from inappropriate and illegal contact between he and his wife with their minor son. On appeal, Defendant argued that the superior court erred by denying his motion to proceed pro se. Defendant believed his counsel and he had a conflict of interest because his counsel was a candidate for municipal office. In the middle of a pre-trial conference, Defendant asked, when the court gave the opportuity, to proceed pro se. The court denied this request, and Defendant "moved" to correct the court's understanding of his request. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the superior court indeed disregarded Defendant's constitutional right when he "knowingly, intelligently" and with "awareness of the dangers of self-representation" requested to represent himself. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Adam Mentus appealed his conviction on manslaughter charges. In 2008, he took a Lorcin handgun home to show his brother. In the car, he placed a full clip of ammuitio in the gun, and placed it in his pocket. Reaching in to move the gun from him pocket to underneath the car seat, it discharged, puncturing front-seat passenger Diedre Bydzyna's lung through the back of the seat. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred: (1) by providing him with only $1,200 of the $3,000 he requested to hire a firearms expert, and (2) by overruling his objection to the State's closing argument. At a hearing, the trial judge said, "[T]hese are hard economic times. I’m not going to just easily approve $3,000 for a firearms expert." Based upon this statement, Defendant argued the judge denied his “request solely because of concerns about the source of funding" and that this amounted to reversible error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the denial of funds did not substantially prejudice him at trial. Furthermore, the Court found that the prosecutor made no impermissible statements. Accordingly, the Cout held that the trial judge's overruling of Defendant's objections was not an abuse of discretion, and affirmed his conviction.

Defendant Jon French appealed a superior court order that suspended his deferred sentence. In 1996, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of felonious sexual assault. Deferral of Defendant's sentence was conditioned upon his compliance "with a structured, residential program with 24 hour per day supervision." In 2010, Defendant moved to terminate his deferred sentence. The court held a hearing, at which the State presented the testimony of a clinical consultant to Defendant's treatment facility, who had been providing services to Defendant since he was in high school. The expert testified that while Defendant had the "potential" to be a danger to himself or to society "[t]he real issue here [was] his impulse to drift off that ... course of treatment, to do things that he knows that should be considered to be inappropriate." The trial court issued an order suspending Defendant's deferred sentence for a period of seven years "subject to the terms and conditions set out in the original mittimus of 1996." On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's decision to suspend his sentence for an additional seven years violated his right to due process. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the language of the 1996 sentencing order the court retained only the authority to impose or terminate Defendant's deferred sentence. Thus, the court lacked authority to suspend sua sponte Defendant's deferred sentence. The Court reversed the superior court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioners Residents of Green View Drive appealed a superior court order that: (1) found no "occasion" to lay out Green View Drive as a class V public highway; (2) partially granted and partially denied the petition to quiet title filed by The Ledges Golf Links, Inc. (The Ledges) against Defendant Claire Crowley; and (3) ruled that Ms. Crowley was responsible for the continued maintenance of Green View Drive and could recover road maintenance costs from the Residents. Green View Drive is located in Loudon and provides access to a portion of the golf course operated by The Ledges and to homes owned by the Residents. The Town classified Green View Drive as a private roadway. In 1997, before Green View Drive was built, the golf course property, then owned by Ms. Crowley and her husband William, was sold to the Loudon Country Club, Inc. In December 1999, the country club sold the golf course property to The Ledges. At some point, while constructing Green View Drive, Mr. Crowley mistakenly located a portion of the road on golf course property. As a result, he entered into a settlement agreement with The Ledges and others to resolve this issue. The settlement agreement provided that Mr. Crowley would "grant to the Ledges an easement for the Ledges to have use of [Green View Drive] for all golf course purposes." After Mr. Crowley died, Ms. Crowley petitioned the Town’s board of selectmen to accept Green View Drive as a town road. Her petition was denied. Ms. Crowley again petitioned the Town to accept Green View Drive as a public road; the Residents joined in this request. The Town denied the petition. The trial court construed August 2000 and September 2001 agreements as granting The Ledges an easement to use Green View Drive for the purpose of golf cart travel. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed portions of the superior court's order, finding that the court erred in finding the road was part of the golf course's "infrastructure." Furthermore, the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the superior court's order pertaining to the maintenance of the road. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioners Thomas Morrissey, Dorothy Sears, Reginald Rogers, John Quimby, Michael O’Donnell, Jonathan Chamberlain, Patricia Reynolds, Richard and Barbara Sanders, Margaret Russell, and Robert and Judith Dupuis, appealed a superior court order that granted motions to dismiss filed by Respondents New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services and New Hampshire Fish and Game Department (collectively referred to as the State), and Town of Lyme (Town). Post Pond is in Lyme, held in trust by the State for public use. Petitioners own properties with frontage on Post Pond and the west side of the Clay Brook wetlands. The Town owns property on the east side of the Clay Brook wetlands as well as a contiguous parcel with frontage on Post Pond, which consists of a recreation area. In May 2009, Petitioners filed a petition in equity and writ of mandamus alleging that the Town's removal of beaver dams in the Pond that controlled the natural mean high water mark adversely affected their properties and disrupted the entire Clay Brook wetlands ecosystem. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioners' writ allegations were insufficient to state a claim for taking or nuisance against the Town, and that the trial court did not err in dismissing their claims. Further, the Court concluded that Petitioners failed to plead a claim entitling them to declaratory relief.

Defendant William Ploof appealed a superior court order that committed him to the custody of the state Department of Corrections as a sexually violent predator. He argued on appeal that on its face, the statute under which he was committed violated his right to procedural due process, the state constitution's separation of powers provision, and his right to equal protection. Following a seven-day trial, the jury unanimously found that Defendant was a sexually violent predator and the trial court entered an order committing him to the custody of the department of corrections for a period of five years. Upon careful review of the process by which the state commits persons as a sexually violent predator, the governing statute and the pertinent case law, the Supreme Court remained unpersuaded by Defendant's arguments, and affirmed the superior court order.

After a jury trial, Defendant Horace King was convicted on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his supplemental motion for in camera review of the victim's medical and counseling records. The trial court found that Defendant "failed to articulate how the requested medical records would be material to his defense." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's record did not support its conclusion that the records were not material to Defendant's defense: "Defendant presented specific arguments to carry his burden... [the victim's] prior false allegation of sexual assault, her 'tendency to lie,' and the potential effects her ADD and ODD medical and counseling records may have on her competency as a witness." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Timothy Gingras was convicted of reckless conduct, criminal threatening and criminal mischief following a jury trial in superior court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he challenged only the criminal threatening and reckless conduct convictions, arguing the trial court erred in its jury instructions as to those charges, and that the court failed to give his proposed self-defense instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that reversal was warranted due to the trial court's failure to give a complete jury instruction pertaining to the definition of "deadly force" on his self-defense claim. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for a new trial.