Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The State appealed a superior court order granting defendant Seth Hinkley's motion to suppress his confession and subsequent statements made during an interview with the police. On appeal, the State argued the trial court erred in finding that the defendant’s confession was involuntary because the police officer’s statements constituted a promise of immunity and the defendant’s confession was induced by the officer’s statements. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no error, judgement was affirmed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Hinkley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Anna Carrigan filed suit against defendants, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services and the Department’s commissioner, alleging they were failing to meet their statutory and constitutional duties as a result of their “irresponsible” spending decisions. She asserted standing under Part I, Article 8 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which provided New Hampshire taxpayers who were eligible to vote with standing to seek a declaration that the State or a local government “has spent, or has approved spending, public funds” in violation of the law. The Superior Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for want of standing, and plaintiff appealed. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed because plaintiff failed to challenge any specific spending action or spending approval, by the Department, as necessary to maintain standing under Part I, Article 8. View "Carrigan v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Defendants, the New Hampshire Secretary of State (Secretary) and the Attorney General (collectively, the State), appealed a superior court order ruling that Laws 2017, chapter 205, also known as Senate Bill 3 (SB 3), was unconstitutional because it unreasonably burdened the right to vote in violation of Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution and violated the equal protection guarantees of the New Hampshire Constitution. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that SB 3 violated Part I, Article 11 of the State Constitution. Because the Court determined that SB 3 had to be stricken in its entirety, it did not address the State’s assertion that the trial court erred in determining that SB 3 also violated the equal protection guarantees of the State Constitution. View "New Hampshire Democratic Party v. New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust (SAE) appealed a superior court order ruling that the Town of Hanover Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) had subject matter jurisdiction to hear SAE’s administrative appeal in the related case of New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover, 172 N.H. 69 (2019) (SAE I). Defendant Town of Hanover (Town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees. Dartmouth College notified the Planning and Zoning Office that the chapter of the New Hampshire Alpha Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon was suspended by the national organization. The College officially derecognized the fraternity, which meant the facility became ineligible to operate as an “I” district student residence. Continued use of the property as a residence would have been a violation of the zoning ordinance. In subsequent proceedings, SAE challenged the ZBA’s jurisdiction to hear SAE’s appeal in the first instance. The Town argued it was entitled to attorney’s fees because SAE’s challenge in this case was frivolous with no good faith basis in fact or law, and asserted that it was only intended to waste time and needlessly delay final judgment in this matter. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed judgment to SAE’s appeal and the Town’s cross-appeal. View "New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law

The State appealed filed an interlocutory appeal of certain superior court rulings which held: (1) the State had to prove, as an element of the offense of driving after suspension pursuant to RSA 263:64, IV, that defendant’s prior driving under the influence (DUI) conviction was the basis of her prior license suspension; (2) the certified case summary offered by the State was admissible, but not dispositive, evidence of the defendant’s prior DUI conviction; and (3) denial of the State’s motion to continue. In December 2018, defendant, Teresa Mercon was arrested and subsequently charged pursuant to RSA 263:64, IV for driving while her license was suspended as a result of a 1997 DUI conviction. In August 2019, she was convicted at circuit court and sentenced to serve a mandatory seven-day jail sentence as required by RSA 263:64, IV. Defendant then appealed to the superior court for a jury trial de novo. Finding no error in the superior court’s rulings, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Mercon" on Justia Law

Defendant Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), appealed a superior court order denying her motion to dismiss and granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by plaintiff “Jane Doe.” Plaintiff’s petition sought her release from New Hampshire Hospital (NHH) on the ground that she failed to receive a probable cause hearing within three days of her involuntary emergency admission, as required by RSA 135-C:31, I (2015). The trial court ruled in her favor, and finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jane Doe v. New Hampshire Dept. of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Soulia was convicted by jury on three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. He appealed, arguing the superior court erred in denying his motions to strike for cause three prospective jurors, in violation of his right to an impartial jury under the New Hampshire and Federal Constitutions. He also argued the trial court may have erred when it failed to disclose certain confidential records following in camera review of those records. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "New Hampshire v. Soulia" on Justia Law

Defendant Bryan Luikart appealed a circuit court order which imposed a portion of his suspended sentence. Defendant argue the trial court erred in finding that the State met its burden of proving he violated the good behavior condition of his suspended sentence by committing witness tampering. In 2018, defendant pled guilty to various charges and was sentenced to 90 days’ incarceration, suspended for a period of two years. Conditions on defendant’s suspended sentence included that defendant “complete [a] batterer’s intervention program and be of good behavior.” Following his sentencing, defendant enrolled in his first batterer’s intervention program, but his participation in the program ended on January 24, 2019, for reasons irrelevant to this appeal. As a result of defendant’s departure from the program, the State moved to impose defendant’s suspended sentence on February 8. Defendant enrolled in a second batterer’s intervention program on February 19, and the State withdrew its motion to impose. Three days later, defendant sent an e-mail to his ex-wife. On March 7, the State filed a new motion to impose defendant’s suspended sentence. After a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion to impose, finding the evidence before it “sufficient to grant the State’s motion, at least generally.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence adduced at the motion hearing failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant committed witness tampering. Witness tampering was the only theory advanced by the State in support of its motion alleging that defendant violated his condition to be of good behavior, and Supreme Court did not interpret the trial court’s ruling as having independently found, from the evidence before it, that the defendant’s behavior amounted to another type of criminal conduct which violated the good behavior condition. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Luikart" on Justia Law

Defendant Eduardo Lopez, Jr. committed murder at age 17. Following his conviction, defendant received a statutorily-mandated sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), ruling that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Accordingly, in 2017, the trial court held a two-day resentencing hearing at which it heard testimony from the arresting police officer, several members of the murder victim’s family, an addiction psychiatrist, a forensic psychologist, several members of the defendant’s family, and the defendant. Following the hearing, taking into consideration the record before it, “the nature and circumstances of the underlying crime, the characteristics of the defendant, and the traditional sentencing factors,” the court imposed a sentence of 45 years to life. Defendant appealed that sentence, arguing 45-year-to-life constituted a de facto equivalent of of lifetime imprisonment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held the trial court did not err in determining that the 45-year-to-life sentence it imposed, under which defendant had an opportunity to be considered for parole when he reached 62 years of age, was not a de facto life sentence under the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lopez, Jr." on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Supreme Court accepted this petition for original jurisdiction filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 11 by the New Hampshire Division of State Police (“the Division”) to determine whether the Superior Court erred when, in the course of litigation between Douglas Trottier, formerly a police officer in the Town of Northfield, and the Northfield Police Department (“Northfield PD”), it ordered the Division (a nonparty) to produce a file related to the Division’s pre-employment background investigation of Trottier. The Division argued the trial court erred because it ordered a nonparty to produce discovery without a proper “jurisdictional basis,” such as a subpoena. It also argued the court erred when it concluded that RSA 516:36, II (2007) did not bar discovery of the pre-employment background investigation file. Although the parties never served the Division with a subpoena, the Supreme Court found that the trial court ultimately afforded the Division ample notice and the opportunity to object to disclosure of the file, and, therefore, there was no prejudicial error. Because the Supreme Court also held that RSA 516:36, II did not apply to the pre-employment background investigation file, and, therefore, the file is not shielded from discovery, it affirmed the trial court. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division of State Police" on Justia Law