Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Dave Adams (fictitious name) filed a complaint against his uncle Wayne Anderson (fictitious name) alleging Anderson had sexually assaulted him at various times when Adams was a minor. Adams sought compensatory and punitive damages, interest, and costs of suit. Anderson answered, denying Adams's allegations and raising the statute of limitations as a defense. He also counterclaimed for frivolous litigation, defamation (both libel and slander), infliction of emotional distress, and violations of his "statutory and constitutional rights." In 2000, a "Lopez" hearing was held to determine whether to grant Anderson's motion for summary judgment. The Court dismissed Adams' complaint because it was filed nine years after the "normal" statute of limitations would have run without sufficient justification. Anderson obtained a jury award of damages and interest, and found that Adams' statements constituted false and defamatory statements. No appeal ensued. Subsequently, Adams declared bankruptcy to avoid paying the damages award against him. The bankruptcy court determined the judgment was non-dischargeable. Anderson obtained a contempt order against Adams for failing to comply with post-judgment discovery requests. While fighting the contempt charge, Adams created a website on which he recounted his claims of sexual abuse by Anderson, including direct quotes from the trial transcript and allegations of perjury and intimidation of a witness. Anderson's attorney asked Adams's attorney to shut down the site because it contained "per se defamatory statements" along with the same allegations made in the earlier lawsuit. He also threatened to file a defamation suit if Adams did not close the website. Adams received notification of the letter on February 16 and closed the website on February 21. In March 2007, Anderson filed a new complaint alleging that Adams's website contained defamatory statements. Adams failed to answer and Anderson moved for the entry of default, which was granted. Thereafter, he moved for the entry of default judgment. With that motion pending, in May 2008, Adams entered a special appearance challenging service of process, seeking to vacate the entry of default, and requesting the court to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The judge granted the motion to vacate the default, but denied the motion to dismiss. In December 2008, Anderson moved for summary judgment. In January 2009, the judge denied the motion, despite finding that Adams's statements were defamatory per se because they accused Anderson of having committed a criminal offense and of engaging in serious sexual misconduct. The judge concluded that he could not permit the jury to evaluate the claim without any evidence of cognizable damages. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the vitality of the doctrine of presumed damages: if defamatory, constituted libel rather than slander, and whether it is an open question of whether "the doctrine of presumed damages should apply to claims made by a private-figure plaintiff when no public interest is implicated." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that where a plaintiff does not proffer evidence of actual damage to reputation, the doctrine of presumed damages permits him to survive a motion for summary judgment to obtain nominal damages, thus vindicating his good name.

In June 2005, police discovered Defendant Juan Pablo Santos naked and in bed with a fourteen-year-old girl. He was arrested and, after receiving "Miranda" warnings, admitted that he lived with the girl and that they had an ongoing sexual relationship. Santos was indicted by a grand jury on one count of second-degree sexual assault and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. The State proposed a plea agreement under which Santos would plead guilty to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child in exchange for the State’s agreement to drop the sexual assault charge and recommend that his term of imprisonment be limited to time served. After consulting with his attorney , Defendant decided to accept the deal. Less than three weeks after Defendant was sentenced according to the terms of the plea agreement he negotiated with the State, the United States Department of Homeland Security removed him to Mexico based on this criminal conviction. Defendant illegally reentered the United States. He was found and removed again to Mexico. In 2009, Defendant filed a post-conviction relief petition alleging that he had not read, and his attorney had not explained, the plea form before he signed it, and that his plea lacked an adequate factual basis. The PCR court determined that Defendant's allegations were sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that Defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, which the court scheduled. Before the hearing, Defendant filed a motion seeking leave to testify telephonically from Mexico. The State opposed the motion, pointing out that telephonic testimony would deny the court the opportunity to evaluate Defendant's demeanor and assess his credibility. The court granted Defendant's motion and turned to examine the mechanics of how Defendant's testimony would be taken. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the grant of an evidentiary hearing in which Defendant was to be permitted to provide telephonic testimony must be reversed and the matter remanded for full reconsideration by the post-conviction relief (PCR) court as to whether Defendant could meet the standard for entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.

In 2007, the Legislature passed a series of reform measures designed to lower property taxes. Among other issues, the reforms attempted to address the problem of excessive benefits for high-level school administrators. The following year, the Commissioner of Education issued various regulations to implement the new laws. The regulations limited certain benefits in new contracts for high-level administrators, and also capped payments for accumulated unused sick leave. In 2008, Plaintiffs-Respondents the New Jersey Association of School Administrators, Dr. Terry Van Zoeren, Dr. Simon Bosco, Joseph Abate, Jr., and John Golden filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the use of the regulations, as well as other provisions in N.J.A.C. 6A:23A-3.1(e) on federal constitutional and state law grounds. The court denied the application for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the lawsuit. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine known as "Burford" abstention, to allow the state courts the opportunity to determine important questions of state law. The Appellate Division held that the challenged regulations impermissibly reduced the compensation of tenured assistant superintendents, in violation of the tenure statute, and improperly deprived certain administrators of vested rights. The Appellate Division also concluded that the challenge to the sick leave cap was partially mooted by a newly enacted law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Legislature had the authority to modify terms and conditions for future contracts for public employment in a manner that did not raise constitutional concerns. Furthermore, the Legislature properly exercised its power when it directed the Commissioner to issue regulations for new contracts for superintendents and assistant superintendents. The regulations that followed were consistent with their respective enabling statutes and advanced the Legislature's goals. They also protected benefits that employees had already accumulated. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division.

Shortly before the trial was scheduled to begin, Defendant Marcus King's attorney informed the trial court that Defendant wished to represent himself at his trial. The trial court questioned Defendant with respect to his knowledge of particular areas. At one point during the colloquy, defendant stated: "I am willing to go to trial with what I have prepared for myself. I can’t explain it. I can’t sit and explain it to you in legal terms. But I know in my terms what I am ready to do." The trial court stated that it was not "satisfied" that defendant "fully under[stood] the nature and consequences of this decision." It pointed to the fact that Defendant was unable to state what he had written down while doing research in the law library a few days ago and could not adequately answer the court’s questions about the court rules or the evidence rules. The court found that defendant’s "inability to do that" precluded an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant’s application and directed that the trial proceed with defense counsel representing defendant. Defendant appealed the trial court's decision, contending that the court improperly denied him the right of self-representation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's examination was insufficient and, as a result, its ultimate determination was flawed. The Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court considered whether "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010)) could be applied retroactively on collateral review, and whether defendants' attorneys were ineffective under "State v. Nunez-Valdez" (200 N.J. 129 (2009)). In 2004, Defendant Frensel Gaitan was indicted for multiple possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and distribution charges. He pled guilty to the charge of third-degree distribution of a CDS within one thousand feet of a school in 2005, and was sentenced to five years’ probation. Gaitan did not file a direct appeal. In 2008, based on the drug conviction, a removable offense, Gaitan was removed. He thereafter filed a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Although Gaitan had responded "yes" to Question 17 on the plea form, which asked "Do you understand that if you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty," he asserted that counsel failed to warn him that his plea carried with it potential immigration consequences. In 2007, Defendant Rohan Goulbourne was indicted on multiple CDS possession and distribution charges. He agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession of a CDS with intent to distribute within one thousand feet of a school. The prosecutor, in return, recommended a sentence of three years' imprisonment with a fifteen-month period of parole ineligibility. At a March 2008 plea hearing, both defense counsel and the court informed Goulbourne that he "may very well" be deported as a result of the plea. The court also noted that Goulbourne answered all the questions on the plea form, which included Question 17, and that he signed the form after reviewing it with his attorney. Satisfied that Goulbourne knowingly and voluntarily was pleading guilty, the court accepted the plea. The court imposed the recommended sentence, and Goulbourne did not appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Padilla" represented a new constitutional rule of law that for Sixth Amendment purposes, was not entitled to retroactive application on collateral review. Although "Nunez-Valdez" governs the standard of attorney performance in these cases, the Court concluded Defendants were not entitled to relief under that decision because neither was affirmatively misadvised by their counsel, nor did they establish prejudice.

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court considered whether "Padilla v. Kentucky" (130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010)) could be applied retroactively on collateral review, and whether defendants' attorneys were ineffective under "State v. Nunez-Valdez" (200 N.J. 129 (2009)). In 2004, Defendant Frensel Gaitan was indicted for multiple possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and distribution charges. He pled guilty to the charge of third-degree distribution of a CDS within one thousand feet of a school in 2005, and was sentenced to five years’ probation. Gaitan did not file a direct appeal. In 2008, based on the drug conviction, a removable offense, Gaitan was removed. He thereafter filed a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Although Gaitan had responded "yes" to Question 17 on the plea form, which asked "Do you understand that if you are not a United States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty," he asserted that counsel failed to warn him that his plea carried with it potential immigration consequences. In 2007, Defendant Rohan Goulbourne was indicted on multiple CDS possession and distribution charges. He agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession of a CDS with intent to distribute within one thousand feet of a school. The prosecutor, in return, recommended a sentence of three years' imprisonment with a fifteen-month period of parole ineligibility. At a March 2008 plea hearing, both defense counsel and the court informed Goulbourne that he "may very well" be deported as a result of the plea. The court also noted that Goulbourne answered all the questions on the plea form, which included Question 17, and that he signed the form after reviewing it with his attorney. Satisfied that Goulbourne knowingly and voluntarily was pleading guilty, the court accepted the plea. The court imposed the recommended sentence, and Goulbourne did not appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Padilla" represented a new constitutional rule of law that for Sixth Amendment purposes, was not entitled to retroactive application on collateral review. Although "Nunez-Valdez" governs the standard of attorney performance in these cases, the Court concluded Defendants were not entitled to relief under that decision because neither was affirmatively misadvised by their counsel, nor did they establish prejudice.

In 2005, "The Record," a newspaper owned by Defendant North Jersey Media Group, published an article about an SEC complaint. The headline of the article read: "3 N.J. men accused in $9M stock scam." Neither the SEC complaint nor the article suggested that Plaintiffs Ronald Durando and Gustave Dotoli were arrested. The North Jersey Media Group also owns Defendant "The Nutley Sun," which received permission to reprint the Record article about Plaintiffs. In 2008, the Sun prepared the article for publication in its December 8 edition (a promotional issue circulated to 2500 non-subscribers in addition to the weekly's regular subscribers), but wrote a new headline for the article: "Local men charged in stock scheme." The day after publication, Plaintiffs' attorney sent an email to The Sun pointing out that his clients had not been "arrested," and demanded a retraction. The North Jersey Media Group gave approval for the filing of a retraction, and indeed one was published in boldface and large print on the front page of The Nutley Sun's December 22 edition. This edition was not circulated to the 2500 non-subscribers who received the December 8 edition with the erroneous teaser. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging libel against the Sun and North Jersey Media Group. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims and dismissed the complaint. The court determined that there was not "sufficient evidence from which a jury could clearly and convincingly conclude that any . . . of the defendants acted with actual malice." In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed, finding no 'clear and convincing' evidence of actual malice to warrant a jury trial on defamation or false light. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough this case unquestionably involves sloppy journalism, the careless acts of a harried editor, the summary-judgment record before the Court cannot support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the editor knowingly or in reckless disregard of the truth published the false front-page teaser."

Defendant John Wessells was arrested and charged with various offenses, including first degree conspiracy to commit murder, purposeful or knowing murder by use of a handgun, and first degree attempted murder. He moved to suppress statements he made during two separate interrogations. At a hearing, the focus was on Defendant's waiver of his "Miranda" rights: during his direct testimony, Defendant asserted that when the detectives started asking about the murders, he denied knowing anything about them and asked to speak with a lawyer. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that he had been informed about the purpose of the interrogation and had waived his rights prior to making the statements. However, without explicitly finding that the questioning had stopped based on Defendant's asserted invocation of his right to counsel, the court concluded that the reinitiation of questioning violated Defendant's constitutional rights. The Appellate Division reversed the order suppressing part of Defendant's statements, reasoning that once Defendant was released from custody, he was afforded an adequate opportunity to consult with counsel. Once investigators reinitiated questioning, Defendant was again advised of his rights, and that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. After the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted certiorari, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Maryland v. Shatzer," (130 S. Ct. 1213). Because Defendant had not been tried for the crimes with which he had been charged, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded Defendant was entitled to the benefit of the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Maryland v. Shatzer,"and the statements he made during his second interrogation should have been suppressed.

Plaintiff Roland Davis had been a resident of the Devereux New Jersey Center (operated by Defendant Devereux Foundation) since shortly before his twelfth birthday. Plaintiff was diagnosed with autism, mental retardation, pervasive developmental disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and had a history of combative and aggressive behavior. Plaintiff's mother (as his guardian) filed a complaint alleging breach of a "non-delegable duty" to protect Plaintiff from harm, negligent care and supervision, and vicarious liability after a counselor assaulted Plaintiff. The trial court granted Devereux's motion for summary judgment, finding that to the extent claims were for negligence, they were barred by the Charitable Immunity Act (CIA). The court further concluded that New Jersey law does not compel imposing a "non-delegable duty" upon Devereux. The Appellate Division affirmed in part, also finding no "non-delegable duty," and reversed in part, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the counselor acted in part within the scope of her employment. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether to impose upon an institution that cares for developmentally disabled residents a "non-delegable duty" to protect them from harm caused by employees' intentional acts; and (2) whether the employee in this case could be found to have acted within the scope of her employment when she criminally assaulted the resident, thereby subjecting the non-profit facility to liability pursuant to "respondeat superior." The Court reaffirmed the duty of due care imposed upon caregivers with in loco parentis responsibilities to persons with developmental disabilities. However, applying the analysis set forth and developed by prior opinions, the parties' relationship, the nature of the risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and public policy, the Court concluded the circumstances of this case did not justify imposing on caregivers a "non-delegable duty" to protect residents from harm caused by employees' intentional acts. Furthermore, the Court held that no rational factfinder could find that the Devereux counselor's criminal assault on Plaintiff was conducted within the scope of her employment.

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether a defendant's prior convictions for disorderly persons offenses (inadmissible because they are not crimes) could be used to find that earlier criminal convictions were not too remote and would then be admissible to impeach the defendant's credibility if he testified. Defendant Derrick Harris was indicted for second-degree robbery and second-degree burglary. He was tried for these offenses approximately thirteen years after he was sentenced to concurrent four-year custodial terms for "disorderly persons" offenses in the intervening years. At a hearing, Defendant argued that the prior convictions were too remote to be admissible; the prosecution noted that Defendant had accumulated a significant number of convictions for disorderly persons offenses. The trial court was persuaded that while the disorderly persons convictions were not themselves admissible, they could serve to "bridge the gap" between Defendant's two earlier criminal convictions and his trial in this matter. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it viewed Defendant's intervening convictions for disorderly persons offenses as having removed the bar to admission of those convictions as too remote. Thus, Defendant's prior criminal convictions would be admissible if he testified at trial.