Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial court erred in denying Defendant Stanford Yough's motion for a mistrial after the victim of a robbery testified that he observed the perpetrator more times than he had indicated in his statement to police. At trial, the victim testified during his direct examination that he was certain Defendant was one of his attackers. But on cross-examination, defense counsel highlighted the inconsistency between the victim's direct testimony and the statement he gave to police. In charging the jury on identification, the judge instructed the jury that it could consider the victim's testimony that he knew the perpetrator from having seen him before the incident. The instructions did not suggest that the victim observed Defendant after the robbery. Defense counsel did not object to the jury charge or request a limiting instruction on the use of the victim's testimony. The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree robbery and imposed a fifteen-year term of imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act. Despite defense counsel’s failure to object to the victim's testimony as "prior bad-acts evidence" or to the jury charge, and his failure to seek a curative charge, the majority of the Appellate Court found the statement inadmissible and highly prejudicial "that undermined the fairness of the trial to the extent that cautionary or limiting instructions were not a feasible alternative." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: "[t]rials are not perfectly orchestrated productions. The testimony of witnesses may not always be predictable, particularly in criminal cases where depositions are not a typical tool of discovery. On the stand, a witness may give testimony that is different from or more expansive than an out-of-court statement recorded by the police. In many instances, discrepancies will advantage a defense attorney attempting to discredit a witness -- but not always. Every witness's digression from a prior statement cannot be grist for the granting of a new-trial motion."

Rodney Harper was shot to death in a Camden apartment early in the morning on January 1, 2003. James Womble was present when two men forcefully entered the apartment, seeking to collect money from Harper. Womble knew one of the men, co-defendant, George Clark, but the other man was a stranger. According to the State's evidence, Clark shot Harper while the stranger held a gun on Womble in a small, dark hallway. Thirteen days later, police showed Womble a photo array from which he identified Defendant Larry Henderson as the stranger. At trial, additional evidence relevant to Womble's identification was adduced. Neither Clark nor Defendant testified at trial. The primary evidence against Defendant was Womble's identification and a detectiveâs testimony about Defendantâs post-arrest statement. The jury acquitted Defendant of murder and aggravated manslaughter charges, and convicted him of reckless manslaughter, aggravated assault, and weapons charges. He was sentenced to an aggregate eleven-year term subject to a parole ineligibility period of almost six years. The Appellate Division reversed, presuming that the identification procedure in this case was impermissibly suggestive under the first prong of the "Manson/Madison" test. The court remanded for a new 'Wade' hearing to determine whether the identification was nonetheless reliable under the test's second prong. The panel contained its finding to what it considered to be a material breach of the Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the current legal standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence must be revised because it does not offer an adequate measure for reliability; does not sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct; and overstates the jury's ability to evaluate identification evidence. The Court held that Defendant was entitled to a new pretrial hearing, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

At issue in this case was whether suggestive behavior by a private party, without any state action, should have been evaluated at a pretrial hearing to determine whether an eyewitnessâ identification could have been admitted at trial. Defendant Cecelia Chen was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, armed robbery, and weapons offenses for her role in an attack on her ex-boyfriendâs wife. Nearly twenty-two months after the attack, police presented a photo array to the victim and an eyewitness for the first time. A detective testified that one of the reasons the police waited to show the photo array was out of concern that the website pictures might have prejudiced the victim. The victim and eyewitness separately selected Defendantâs picture. Defense counsel moved for a Wade hearing, arguing that the victimâs identification was based on seeing photos that her husband showed her rather than her memory of the attack. The trial court denied the motion finding the procedure followed by the police was not impermissibly suggestive. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that even without any police action, when a defendant presents evidence that an identification was made under highly suggestive circumstances that could lead to a mistaken identification, trial judges should conduct a preliminary hearing, upon request, to determine the admissibility of the identification evidence. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 2006, Plaintiff J.D. and Defendant M.D.F. terminated a long-term relationship that resulted in the birth of two children. J.D. continued to live in the house the parties had purchased, along with the children, and she became involved in a new relationship with a boyfriend, R.T. In 2009, J.D. filed a domestic violence complaint. The complaint alleged that J.D. and R.T. observed M.D.F. outside of J.D.âs residence to harass her. When asked about the incident, M.D.F. requested that R.T. be sequestered and that he be given an opportunity to question him. After the court sequestered R.T., M.D.F. did not deny that he had gone to the residence and had taken pictures, but claimed that his purpose was not harassment, but to obtain evidence to support a motion to transfer custody. The court found that line of attack irrelevant and, without allowing M.D.F. to question R.T., granted a Final Restraining Order. As explained by the court, M.D.F. conceded that he had been taking pictures and, in light of the nature of the earlier incidents, his acts constituted harassment. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether M.D.F.'s due process rights were violated during the proceedings that resulted in the Final Restraining Order. The Court found that the trial court failed to sufficiently articulate its findings and conclusions, and the record contained insufficient evidence to sustain the Final Restraining Order. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for a re-hearing to protect M.D.F.âs due process rights and to permit the trial court to evaluate the testimony and the evidence.

A Union County Grand Jury indicted the two defendants for first-degree murder, third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, and second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. After closing his bar, Luis Lecaros proceeded to drive home several of his employees in his pickup truck, including Sandra Narvarro and his son Paul. At some point, Luisâ truck slid on the rain-slicked road and slammed into the rear of a black Honda, shattering its back window and causing its rear bumper to fall off. The Stateâs theory was that Defendant Timyan Cabbell was driving the Honda and that Defendant John Calhoun was a passenger. Immediately after the collision, Cabbell and Calhoun, armed with handguns, opened fire on the pickup truck, and then fled in the Honda. The central issue at trial was the identification of the shooters. Two key State witnesses gave statements to police about the shooting, but in front of the jury, neither wished to testify. Because the witnesses insisted they did not wish to testify, the trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearing outside the presence of the jury. At this point, neither Defendant was given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses before the jury. The witnesses' out-of-court statements were deemed admissible under a hearsay exception. The primary issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Defendants were provided an opportunity to cross examine the State's key witnesses consistent with the Confrontation Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that both defendants were denied their federal and state constitutional rights to confront one of the two key witnesses before the jury. For that reason, that witness' out-of-court statement to the police incriminating Defendants should not have been read to the jury and the admission of that statement was not harmless error. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Defendant Marie Hess shot and killed her husband Jimmy Hess, a police officer. Defendant entered into a plea agreement in which she pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter; acknowledged that she would receive a thirty-year sentence; conceded that aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors as to make the term appropriate; agreed that neither she nor her attorney would affirmatively seek a lesser term of imprisonment; and agreed not to appeal her conviction. The plea agreement did not bind the court to give any particular sentence, and nothing in the plea agreement denied defense counsel the opportunity to provide mitigating evidence. Defendant did not pursue a direct appeal. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) claiming that she was denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. At the PCR hearing, Defendantâs PCR counsel alleged that trial counsel made numerous errors, including that he failed to argue mitigating factors and to bring to light evidence suggesting defendant was a battered woman. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Defendant was denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to present and argue mitigating evidence at her sentencing. The Court also held that Defendant's plea agreement provisions that restricted the right of counsel to argue for a lesser sentence were void.

A mother and her adult son were found dead and bound together in the son's home. Each had been killed by a gunshot wound to the back of the head, and the son's throat had been slashed. An investigation lead police to three suspects: Keith Mercer, Defendant Dwayne Gillispie and Defendant Gregory Buttler. Before trial, the State moved to introduce evidence that Gillispie and Buttler had participated in a robbery and shooting that took place in a New York barbershop twenty days before the murders. The trial court conducted a joint hearing to determine whether "other-crimes" evidence was admissible under state law. The court found the evidence was probative to identify who committed the murders. Although the court acknowledged the evidence was prejudicial, it concluded that the probative value outweighed the prejudice and admitted it. Gillispie and Buttler were tried separately, and separate juries found Gillispie and Buttler guilty on all charges against them. In an unpublished decision, the appellate court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases for new trials. The appellate court found that the other-crimes evidence was too prejudicial, and that the probative value did not outweigh the prejudice. Upon consideration of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and affirmed its decision. The Court held that the admission of this evidence was harmless error that ultimately would not have affected the outcome of the trials. The Court remanded the cases back to the appellate panel for disposition of other issues unanswered due to its "new trial" order.

Defendant Zarik Rose was incarcerated in 1995 on charges relating to the to the attempted murder of Charles Mosely. While awaiting trial, Defendant allegedly told one of the State's witnesses against him that he wanted to have Mosely "whacked," and that Defendant solicited the witness to kill Mosely. The State moved to admit Defendant's comments at trial. The trial court found some of the evidence admissible as "res gestae." During the trial, the court provided instructions to guide the jury's use of that evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that, among other things, all evidence relating to his incarceration on attempted murder charges was improperly admitted at trial. In this appeal, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Defendant's conviction, finding that the trial court appropriately instructed the jury on use of the admitted statements. However, by this case, the Court ended the practice of using "res gestae" as an explanation for the admission of evidence: "[e]vidence of uncharged misconduct that is not intrinsic evidence of the crime is inadmissible unless proffered for a proper purpose. ... The Court direct[ed] trial courts to make the Rules of Evidence the touchstone for the analysis of all bad acts categories of res gestae evidence, and disapproves further use of res gestae to support evidential rulings."