Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a sentencing court may consider a defendant's ability to pay when setting a monetary penalty. Defendant Carlos Bolvito pled guilty to three offenses arising from sexual assaults of his stepdaughter. Predicate offenses triggered the imposition of mandatory penalties under the Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund (SCVTF), but the plea agreement presented to the trial court did not specifically address the SCVTF penalties to be assessed against defendant. Defendant signed a plea form acknowledging his understanding that "as a result of [his] guilty plea [he would] be required to pay a mandatory [SCVTF] penalty." The form disclosed the applicable maximum penalty amounts for each offense to which defendant pled guilty, totaling $4,000.00. During the plea colloquy, the court also asked whether defendant understood that he would have to contribute to the SCVTF, and defendant responded that he did. Satisfied that defendant had set forth an adequate factual basis for a plea of guilty as to all three charges, and that defendant understood the consequences of his plea, the trial court accepted defendant's plea. After analyzing the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment, imposed parole supervision for life, ordered defendant to pay $6,230.40 in restitution, and assessed an SCVTF penalty of $4,000.00 in addition to other fines, charges, and penalties. The court did not provide a statement of reasons or identify the factors that it considered in setting the amount of the SCVTF penalty. In addition to challenging his custodial sentence and the order of restitution, defendant argued that he should not be required to pay the SCVTF penalty because the court did not hold a hearing to determine his ability to pay the penalty, and the record did not indicate how the penalty was calculated. The Appellate Division remanded the case for reconsideration of the restitution order, but otherwise affirmed defendant's sentence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a sentencing court may impose the mandatory Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund penalty in any amount between a nominal figure and the upper limit prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10(a) for the degree of the offense at issue. In setting the penalty, the sentencing court should: (1) consider the nature of the offense and the defendant’s ability to pay the penalty during any custodial sentence imposed and after his or her release; and (2) provide a statement of reasons as to the amount of any penalty. View "New Jersey v. Bolvito" on Justia Law

R.F., when he was seventeen years old, engaged in sexual conduct with two children, ages twelve and thirteen. He pled guilty in adult court to endangering the welfare of both children and was sentenced to a five-year term at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center at Avenel. Before R.F. completed his sentence, the State petitioned to have R.F. civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). Although the trial court found that R.F. committed predicate sexual offenses and suffered from a personality disorder, but concluded that the State had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that R.F. was highly likely to engage in sexually violent behavior if not civilly committed. The Appellate Division reversed, determining that the opinions of the State’s experts were “well-supported by the record and amply substantiate the State’s petition for R.F.’s commitment under the SVPA.” Selecting the facts it deemed more credible, accepting the opinions it viewed more persuasive, and drawing its own inferences from the record, the panel came to a different conclusion than the trial court. The issue before the Supreme Court was not whether members of the panel would have decided the case differently had they heard the case. Nor was the issue whether evidence in the record supports the opinions of the State’s experts. Rather, the Supreme Court determined the central issue of this case was whether sufficient credible evidence in the record supported the trial court's findings. "Those findings are entitled to deference, for Judge Perretti was not only intimately familiar with the case file but also had the unique opportunity to hear the witnesses, to judge their credibility, and to weigh their testimony - things that cannot be gleaned from the cold record." As such, the Supreme Court concluded that he trial court’s findings in a civil commitment hearing under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, were entitled to deference, and a reviewing court could not overturn the commitment court’s ruling based upon its determination that it would have come to a different conclusion had it sat as the trier of fact. View "In the matter of the Civil Commitment of R.F." on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Ates, lived in Florida and had family in Florida and Louisiana. He was arrested and charged with the murder of his former son-in-law in New Jersey. As part of the criminal investigation, a New Jersey wiretap judge authorized wiretaps on six telephone numbers assigned to and known to be used by defendant and his family members. Law enforcement officers monitored all of the wiretaps from New Jersey. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress conversations that involved himself, his wife (Florida residents), his mother (Louisiana resident), and his sister (who lived in both Florida and Louisiana). Defendant claimed that the wiretap orders were "extraterritorial" and that New Jersey officials should have asked the proper authorities in Florida and Louisiana to consent to the wiretaps. Defendant also asserted that the Wiretap Act should have been declared unconstitutional because it permits New Jersey authorities to act outside their jurisdiction and wiretap individuals with no connection to New Jersey. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the Act constitutionally permits intercepting and monitoring out-of-state communications in New Jersey. The jury found defendant guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction. The Supreme Court concluded New Jersey’s Wiretap Act was constitutional under both the federal and state constitutions: "the 'point of interception' is a rational approach because the inherent mobility of cell phones would make it impractical, if not impossible in some instances, for law enforcement to intercept cell phone conversations if agents could only rely on orders issued in the state where a call was placed or received." View "New Jersey v. Ates" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with third-degree possession of cocaine. Prior to trial, she challenged the admissibility of her statements to a patrolman. At a pretrial "Jackson-Denno" hearing, the patrolman testified that he showed a clear packet to defendant and asked "what is this," to which she replied that she "did not know." The Patrolman read defendant her Miranda rights and defendant, who was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained, indicated that she was willing to speak with him. Patrolman Buss again asked defendant if she knew what the substance was and she replied that it was "crack," and that she knew this because she "had been in trouble for it in the past." The judge who conducted the Jackson-Denno hearing issued a written decision determining that defendant's statements to the patrolman would be admissible at trial. The judge also determined that defendant's post-Miranda statements were admissible. The jury found defendant guilty, the trial judge denied defendant's motion for a new trial, and imposed a one-year probationary term, subject to service of 270 days in jail. Defendant appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the admission of defendant's other crimes constituted harmful error: "Defendant's prior admissions of drug use are not relevant to any material issue in dispute. Even if they were, the minimal relevance would be substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice. The statements that defendant admitted to prior crack cocaine use and to using crack cocaine, alcohol, and Vicodin two days prior to the incident . . . may lead jurors to the conclusion that defendant must have possessed crack cocaine on this occasion because she has a propensity for having and using illegal substances generally and cocaine specifically. That is precisely the sort of reason for which N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence cannot be introduced." View "New Jersey v. Carlucci" on Justia Law

"Kyle" had been adjudicated delinquent on three occasions prior to the offense giving rise to this appeal. The first two adjudications involved minor offenses that did not meet N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3)'s predicate requirement of first- or second-degree offense adjudications. Also, neither of those adjudications resulted in his commitment to a juvenile detention facility. However, in March 2008 Kyle was adjudged delinquent of second-degree aggravated assault and was sentenced, consistent with a plea-agreement, to twenty-four months' incarceration at the New Jersey Training School. Kyle was subsequently placed in the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program (JISP). Kyle's participation in the program was terminated after he was deemed noncompliant. The Family Part court, however, dismissed the JISP violation and discharged the few months remaining on Kyle's sentence, noting his approaching eighteenth birthday. Less than two months later, Kyle committed the act of delinquency resulting in his current sentence and this appeal. The Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two separate previous predicate adjudications for the imposition of an extended-term sentence on a juvenile, including one that resulted in incarceration in a juvenile or adult facility, exclusive of the adjudication for which the disposition court is sentencing the juvenile. The Court reversed the extended-term sentence. View "New Jersey in the Interest of K.O." on Justia Law

In 1999, Defendant Joseph Diorio and two others conceived and executed a “bust-out” financial scheme by creating a business for the purpose of defrauding creditors. Defendant and the two others formed a corporation to distribute fresh produce, leased warehouse space, obtained a license from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and submitted information to obtain a credit rating. Once the business established its reliability with suppliers, the size of the orders increased, and payments to suppliers slowed and then stopped altogether. Meanwhile, every shipment of produce immediately left the company’s warehouse and was transported to one of the warehouses operated by defendant and a co-defendant, who commingled the produce with their stock and sold it. Defendant was indicted in 2005. The statute of limitations for the charged offenses was five years. This appeal centered on whether the State returned its indictment on the money laundering and theft by deception charges against Defendant before the statute of limitations expired. Central to the issue was whether the offenses were continuing offenses, because the statute of limitations on such an offense did not begin to run until the prohibited conduct ceased. The limitations period for the theft by deception charge ran from receipt and acceptance of the last shipment of goods or the date on which payment was due. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both offenses were continuing offenses. Furthermore, when property has been obtained by a deceptive transaction that included the extension of credit, the crime of theft by deception is not complete until payment has not been made in accordance with the agreement. View "New Jersey v. Diorio" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a father presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that his transfer of stock to his son was a gift. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a person seeking to rebut the presumption that a transfer of property from a parent to a child is a gift must show clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent. That person is limited to evidence antecedent to, contemporaneous with, or immediately following the transfer, and may also adduce proof of statements by the parties concerning the purpose and effect of the transfer. View "Bhagat v. Bhagat" on Justia Law

Based on information from two confidential informants and a concerned citizen that a dilapidated Camden row house was being used as a "stash location" for illegal drug transactions, a State Trooper set up a surveillance of the property. The Trooper observed what he believed to be four drug transactions. He did not attempt to determine who owned or lived in either residence or to secure a search warrant. One of the two front windows of the house was broken. The front door was padlocked, and the rear door was "off the hinges" and "propped closed" so that no one could exit from inside. Another trooper observed through the front broken window trash bags filled with clothes and soda cans; he did not observe any light fixtures, and the electric meter was missing. The trooper concluded the house was “abandoned” and could be searched without a warrant. Troopers then opened the padlock, entered the residence, and searched the house. There was evidence of criminality inside: a sawed-off rifle inside a floor air vent and drugs and drug paraphernalia on a shelf above the stairs to the basement. Troopers concluded that the next door house was “occupied” and therefore a search warrant was obtained to enter. The search of next door uncovered more cocaine and drug paraphernalia. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized at the "abandoned" house, finding that the State had not satisfied its burden of proving that the house was an abandoned building that justified bypassing the warrant requirement; that defendants had automatic standing to challenge the search because they exercised "possessory control over the premises" by the manner in which the front door was padlocked and the rear door secured; and that exigent circumstances did not justify a warrantless search. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s suppression order. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the State did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the house, though in bad condition, was abandoned or that defendants were trespassers, thus failed to justify the warrantless search of the property. View "New Jersey v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2008, Catrell Robinson picked up his friend, Sharon, her sixteen-year-old sister, S.C., and Sharon’s two-year-old daughter, M.A, to take them to the laundromat. Sharon placed M.A. in the back seat; S.C. sat in the driver’s seat and watched as Sharon and Robinson loaded laundry bags into the car. A man later identified as defendant Jarrett Parker walked by and got into a verbal altercation with Robinson, ending in a fistfight. A group of men who knew Parker rushed to help. Robinson managed to escape and ran a short distance away, but the men caught up to him, knocked him down, and kicked him. Sharon ran to help Robinson as Parker walked toward the Accord. Parker forced S.C. out of the driver’s seat. Sharon and S.C. screamed that M.A. was still in the back, but Parker drove off. Parker would later deny taking the car. At trial, the court ruled that the State could cross-examine Parker as to the number of counts and sentences imposed in two prior convictions, but could not reference specific charges. Parker requested that the State be prohibited from referring to the aliases listed on the judgments of conviction. The State countered that Parker’s aliases were relevant to his credibility. The court, explaining that certified court judgments are admissible, permitted the State to question Parker about his aliases because they were included in the judgments of conviction. During cross-examination, after establishing that Parker had previously lied to the police about his name when it benefited him to do so, the prosecutor asked Parker whether it also would benefit him to lie to the police about the carjacking. During summation, the State asserted that, since Parker would lie about his own name, he also would lie about taking the car and whether he knew M.A. was in the back seat. Parker was found guilty of first-degree carjacking, but acquitted of first-degree kidnapping and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. He was sentenced to a twenty-year prison term subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period and a five-year period of parole supervision. Parker appealed, contending in part that the prosecutor’s summation and references to his aliases for impeachment purposes violated N.J.R.E. 405(a) and 608 and deprived him of a fair trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that an alias which appears on a defendant’s prior judgment of conviction may not be used for impeachment purposes in a future trial unless the alias was the basis for the prior conviction. Thus, the State’s use of Parker’s aliases to demonstrate his character for untruthfulness was in error. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "New Jersey v. Parker" on Justia Law

D.J.B. was adjudged a juvenile delinquent for acts that would be considered crimes had they been committed by an adult. As an adult, D.J.B. pled guilty to fourth-degree receiving stolen property in 1996. In 2011, D.J.B. filed a petition seeking to expunge his 1996 criminal conviction. The trial court denied the petition, finding that “[t]he combination of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 served to prevent a petitioner with an indictable crime from obtaining expungement if that petitioner has a prior juvenile record.” The Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the same reasons. The following month, another appellate panel analyzed a similar question and reached the opposite conclusion about the effect a juvenile adjudication has on an attempt to expunge an adult conviction. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that based on its language and legislative history, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1(a) applied only to the expungement of juvenile adjudications and did not transform a juvenile adjudication into a “crime” that would bar a later attempt to expunge an adult conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2. View "In the Matter of the Expungement Application of D.J.B." on Justia Law