Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Oscar Porter was denied an evidentiary hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. Charges against him stemmed from an armed robbery that ended with the shooting death of one man and the wounding of another. Defendant filed his PCR petition pro se. Subsequently, assigned counsel submitted a brief alleging numerous deficiencies on the part of trial counsel, primarily the failure to investigate an alibi defense. With respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to investigate an alibi defense, the Supreme Court concluded defendant made out a prima facie showing and raised material facts in dispute, entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on that issue. View "New Jersey v. Porter" on Justia Law

Until her death in March 2009, defendant Gene Hinton’s mother was the tenant in an apartment owned by the Newark Housing Authority. Although Hinton lived with his mother, he did not have a lease or any other documents identifying him as a tenant. The landlord commenced a summary dispossession action, and a warrant of removal was issued. When no one answered his knock, a Special Civil Part Officer served the warrant by placing it under the apartment door. Hinton moved to suppress his statements to the police, as well as the evidence seized from the apartment. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the officer’s actions were not governmental in nature and the officers had probable cause to conduct a search based on Pratt’s reliable citizen informant tip. Although it did not address whether Hinton had a reasonable expectation of privacy, it found that the State’s actions fell within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. Hinton was convicted of third degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance and possession with intent to distribute and was sentenced to two years of probation. Hinton appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that: (1) his motion to suppress the seized evidence should have been granted; (2) his statements to police were improperly admitted; (3) the court’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (4) his sentence should be modified. The Appellate Division agreed that the officer’s entry into the apartment did not raise constitutional issues, but determined that Hinton had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Therefore, the officers conducted an improper warrantless search. Without reaching Hinton’s other arguments, the panel reversed the denial of his suppression motion and his conviction. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that where an eviction proceeding has advanced to the point that a warrant of removal has been executed, a tenant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. Therefore, the police action in Hinton’s apartment was not a “search” under either the federal or state constitutions. View "New Jersey v. Hinton" on Justia Law

East Allendale, LLC owned a 2.13 acre parcel of land in the Borough of Saddle River. Part of the property was located in the office zone, which restricted improved lot coverage to 30 percent of the lot's total area. In 2004, East Allendale submitted an application to the Borough's Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board) for a permit to build a 10,000 square foot bank building and parking lot on the property. The site plan required approval of a bulk variance to allow 42 percent improved lot coverage. The Board initially denied the permit and East Allendale subsequently withdrew its application in the face of critical questioning prior to the Board's final action. The Borough later filed a complaint exercising its power of eminent domain in order to acquire the subject property for use as a public park. After the parties agreed that the Borough duly exercised its power of eminent domain, the court appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation owed to East Allendale. The commissioners completed their appraisals and the court entered an order determining the just compensation for the taking to be $1,593,625. The parties appealed the amount and demanded a jury trial. Just compensation was the sole trial issue. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether it was proper to allow the jury to hear evidence on the likelihood of a zoning change without the trial court first determining outside of the jury's presence that there was a reasonable probability of a zoning change. The Court concluded the jury heard evidence about the probability of a zoning change that should have been ruled on by the judge in advance and outside of the jury's presence. A new trial on just compensation was thus required because the jury heard speculative evidence that undermined the soundness of its property valuation determination. View "Borough of Saddle River v. 66 East Allendale, LLC" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the armed robbery of the home of supermarket owner Syoma Shnayder (Sam) and his wife Rita. Igor Chichelnitsky planned the robbery when Sam turned down his offers to supply products to Sam's supermarket stores. Chichelnitsky recruited defendant Juan Rodriguez, and Nathan Jakubov to commit the robbery. According to the State, defendant and Jakubov drove in Jakubov's car to Shnayder's home, at which time defendant took photographs of the house. A few days later the pair returned. Rita was not home but arrived during the robbery. At some point during the ordeal, Rita managed to run out of the house and called 911. Sam was able to get himself loose from zip ties, at which time defendant shot him in the abdomen and ran out of the house. Rodriguez, who was upstairs, heard the gunshot and came downstairs. He saw defendant running from the home and he ran too. Outside, Rodriguez saw Jakubov driving away with defendant. Rodriguez fled on foot with the stolen property: $7000 in cash and two expensive watches. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the trial court was required to instruct the jury sua sponte on accomplice liability and whether it was also required to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of attempted theft by receiving stolen property and conspiracy to receive stolen property. The Supreme Court concluded trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte instruct the or by rejecting defendant's request to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses. View "New Jersey v. Maloney" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on drug charges. His privately retained attorney appeared at the initial trial court hearing, during which a trial date was set. The trial did not proceed on that day. Defendant continued pro se at the next hearing and the subsequent trial date. Defendant was then assigned a public defender. The court set a hearing date for defendant’s motion to suppress. The public defender informed the court that she could not try the case, but did not formally request an adjournment for change of counsel. Defendant's new public defender was told that he was being transferred from the OPD’s juvenile unit to a new trial team and that he would serve as defendant’s trial counsel. The trial judge denied counsel's request for a continuance to allow counsel additional time for preparation. Defendant’s attorney spent ten to eleven hours preparing for trial, but had no contact with defendant. At issue in this appeal was the propriety of the trial court’s denial of a request for adjournment by a defendant who met his appointed counsel for the first time on the day of trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge’s denial of an adjournment did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to effective representation, was not an abuse of discretion, and did not violate principles of fundamental fairness. View "New Jersey v. Miller" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the validity of the most recent iteration of regulations applicable to the third round of municipal affordable housing obligations (Third Round Rules) adopted pursuant to the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Council on Affordable Housing proposed a "growth share" methodology for assessing prospective need in allocating a municipality’s fair share of the region’s need for affordable housing. The Supreme Court held that the Third Round Rules were at odds with the FHA, which incorporated the "Mount Laurel II" remedy. Although that thirty-year-old remedy imposed should not be viewed as a "constitutional straightjacket" to legislative innovation of a new remedy, the FHA remains the current framework controlling COAH's actions. With respect to the current version of the FHA, the Third Round Rules were deemed ultra vires. View "In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96, 5:97 by N.J. Council on Affordable Housing" on Justia Law

In two consolidated cases involving remediation of contaminated properties, the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association (Guaranty Association) took over the administration of the claims of an insolvent insurance carrier on the risk pursuant to the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Act. The solvent insurance company paid the property-damage claims in each of the two cases and then sought reimbursement from the Guaranty Association under the Owens-Illinois methodology. The Guaranty Association claims that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5 and -12b, it was not responsible for making any contribution until the policies of the solvent carrier were fully exhausted. The solvent carrier contended on appeal that the Guaranty Association must pay the share of the insolvent carrier in accordance with the Owens-Illinois allocation scheme, and that its position is consistent with the PLIGA Act. The trial court agreed that the Guaranty Association is subject to the Owens-Illinois allocation methodology. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5 expressly carves out an exception to Owens-Illinois and requires exhaustion of the solvent carrier's policies before the Guaranty Association's reimbursement commitments are triggered. Finding no error with the appellate court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law

A police officer observed defendant William O'Driscoll after watching him drive his SUV across the center line of the road twice. Defendant failed a number of field sobriety tests. Consistent with the implied consent and refusal laws, the officer read defendant a standard statement designed to inform him of the consequences of refusal and to impel him to provide a sample of his breath. Although the officer correctly told defendant that if he refused, his license could be revoked for up to twenty years, the officer read from an outdated form and misstated three other parts of the potential penalty. Both the municipal court and the Law Division found the discrepancies immaterial and convicted defendant of refusal. The Appellate Division reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding courts should consider whether an error in the reading of the standard statement is material in light of the statutory purpose to inform motorists and impel compliance. Because the errors in this case were not material and could not have reasonably affected defendant's choice to refuse to provide a breath sample, the Court reversed and reinstated defendant's conviction. View "New Jersey v. O'Driscoll" on Justia Law

Prior to killing his uncle, defendant had a history of psychiatric problems for which he received in-patient treatment at several hospitals. Evidence derived from those hospitalizations reveals that defendant suffered from delusions about having been sexually and physically assaulted. Defendant expressed fear that he was always in danger of being assaulted and made a handwritten list of people whom he believed had sexually assaulted or harmed him. Although there were approximately forty names on the list, his uncle's name was first. Five months prior to the stabbing death of his uncle, defendant was admitted for treatment after physicians determined that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Defendant's competency was evaluated on several occasions, with different professionals reaching different conclusions. During the competency proceedings before the trial court, the State argued and defense counsel did not contest, that defendant was competent to stand trial. However, the State also asserted, and defense counsel agreed, that even though defendant was competent to stand trial, he was not competent to waive the insanity defense. Both counsel agreed that the two defenses, insanity and self-defense, could not be tried in a single, unified proceeding. The State argued that the insanity defense should be tried first, while defense counsel argued that the self-defense claim should be tried first. The trial court ruled that defendant was competent to stand trial as long as he continued to take his medications; that he was not competent to waive the insanity defense; that the "Khan" bifurcated trial procedure should be utilized; and that the insanity defense would be tried first because it related to a substantive element of the offense rather than to an affirmative defense defendant sought to interpose. The trial court found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to treatment. Although continuing to conclude that the defenses should be tried in a bifurcated proceeding, the Appellate Division declined to follow the sequence mandated by "Khan," instead holding that a court should not require a defendant to present an insanity defense during the first phase of a bifurcated trial. After its review of the matter, the Supreme Court disapproved the bifurcated trial procedure created in "New Jersey v. Khan," and overruled it. In the future, trials that involve both a substantive defense and an insanity defense must be unitary proceedings. The matter was remanded back to the trial court to afford defendant the opportunity to continue in a second phase of his trial. View "New Jersey v. Handy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division in this case. The defendant appealed his 2010 conviction for third-degree eluding a police officer. The Court held that because the reliability of the State's evidence of out-of-court photographic identifications of defendant by two police witnesses should have been assessed at a "Wade" hearing. The Appellate Division unanimously determined the State's evidence was impermissibly suggestive under the first prong of the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in "Manson v. Brathwaite," adopted in "New Jersey v. Madison." The majority exercised original jurisdiction, made factual findings, and weighed the evidence in order to consider the second Manson/Madison prong. One appellate judge dissented, and urged remand to the trial court for a new Wade hearing. Defendant appealed as of right based on that dissent. The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the dissenting judge and remanded the case to the Law Division for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. Micelli" on Justia Law