Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted on several charges, including third-degree burglary, third-degree theft, and third-degree receiving stolen property. Defendant filed a motion to suppress. The trial court found that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy under State law and that the police should have obtained a warrant before tracking defendant via cell-tower information from T-Mobile. Nonetheless, the court admitted the evidence under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. Defendant pled guilty to third-degree burglary and third-degree theft and was sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence and later allowed defendant to reopen his appeal to challenge the suppression ruling. The Appellate Division affirmed on different grounds, concluding that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information and that the police lawfully seized evidence in plain view. The panel did not consider the emergency aid doctrine. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition review of the validity of defendant's arrest based on law enforcement's use of information from defendant's cell phone provider about the general location of the cell phone and the application of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. The Court concluded that the New Jersey Constitution protects an individual's privacy interest in the location of his or her cell phone. Police must obtain a warrant based on a showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant requirement, to obtain tracking information through the use of a cell phone. View "New Jersey v. Earls" on Justia Law

Defendant Samandar Dabas worked part-time at a dollar store. One day in August 2004, he brought his wife, Renu, with him for his scheduled shift. At some point, Dabas left Renu stocking shelves while he went to a nearby liquor store to purchase a bottle of Scotch. Dabas drank two coffee mugs of Scotch and water, closed the store at 9 P.M. and walked with Renu to his parked minivan. As Dabas began driving out of the parking lot with Renu seated beside him, the minivan struck a tree, causing the airbags to deploy. Renu would later die from blunt-force trauma caused by the accident. A patrol officer arrested Dabas for driving while intoxicated. At police headquarters, an investigator conducted a "pre-interview" of Dabas, which, in accordance with the procedures of the prosecutor's office, was not electronically recorded. While on the stand recalling what was said during the pre-interview, the investigator did not testify from his notes, instead referring to a 2006, typewritten final report into which he had purportedly incorporated his hand-written notes. Per the prosecutor's office policy the pre-interview notes had been destroyed. At the charge conference, the defense requested that the court instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse inference from the investigator's destruction of his pre-interview notes. The trial court declined to give the adverse-inference charge. The jury found Dabas guilty of both murder and attempting to leave the scene of a fatal motor vehicle accident. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division reversed the murder conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in not giving the requested adverse-inference charge. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor's office violated its post-indictment discovery obligations under Rule 3:13-3, when its investigator destroyed his notes the pre-interview. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for a charge that would have allowed the jury to draw an adverse inference from the destruction of the interview notes more than a year after the return of the indictment. View "New Jersey v. Dabas" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with multiple counts of burglary, sexual assault, and weapons offenses for his alleged assaults and rapes of four women. The State sought to have one trial of all matters on the theory that there were sufficient similarities to make them "signature crimes," and that viewed as a whole they were relevant to the issue of the perpetrator's identity. The trial court held that the indictments involving offenses against two of the four women could be tried together because the assault of one would have been admissible at the trial of the assault of the other, and vice versa, if tried separately. The court found that the attacks against these two women in particular were "so nearly identical as to constitute the defendant's signature crime or handiwork" based on the attacker's condom use, racial comments, and use of a knife to cut off their underwear. The court ruled that the assault against a third woman had to be tried separately because those identifying features were not present. The trial court also ruled that the fourth burglary could be joined with either trial or admitted as other-crimes evidence because it demonstrated the identity of the defendant and how he came to be linked to the earlier crimes. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether joinder principles were properly applied in the two trials. The Court concluded it was error to join three crimes into one trial and to admit evidence relating to the third burglary at the trial involving the fourth victim. The convictions involving the first and fourth victims were properly reversed. However, based on the strong evidence against defendant in respect of the crimes committed against the second and third victims, the errors were harmless and did not require retrial. View "New Jersey v. Sterling" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Doreen Longo worked in the sales department for East Coast News Corp, a company involved in distribution of "adult products." At one time, plaintiff had a pleasant relationship with her co-worker, defendant March Kercheval, but it deteriorated after Kercheval allegedly threatened to sexually assault her, suggested she trade sexual favors with a client, threw a chair, and told her he wanted to gouge out another co-worker's (their supervisor's) eyes. On several occasions, plaintiff told the supervisor she was terrified, but nothing was done. She later sent two e-mails to the supervisor asking for help and explaining that she feared Kercheval was becoming dangerous. Plaintiff sent a copy of her last e-mail to the general manager, Michael Savage, who told her he was too busy to do anything. One week later, plaintiff met with Kercheval, the owner of the company, and the head of Human Resources. The owner screamed at plaintiff and Kercheval, each of whom later received warning notices. Kercheval was fired. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was told that her complaints about Kercheval disrupted the laid back office environment, and she was let go too. Plaintiff then filed suit under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether an "upper management" jury instruction was required in deciding punitive damages in the context of the Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that an upper-management jury instruction was required to support a punitive damages award for claims under the Act. Punitive damages can only be awarded if the jury finds wrongful conduct under a clear-and convincing standard of evidence. The trial court failed to give the upper management instruction. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Longo v. Pleasure Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant John Lawless, Jr. was driving under the influence of alcohol. He struck ad killed another driver and seriously injured the other driver's wife and daughter who were passengers in the other vehicle. Defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter and several other crimes including DWI, and driving on a suspended license. The prosecution and defense reached a plea agreement pursuant to which defendant pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter and DWI, and the other charges were dismissed. Defendant was not convicted of any charges relating to the injuries sustained by the passengers. The trial court imposed the maximum sentence of the applicable range, thirty years’ imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that the sentencing court should not have found aggravating factor two because the term "victim" meant only the driver and not the passengers. The panel found a distinction between the direct harm inflicted on the victim of the crime of which defendant is convicted and the harm inflicted on third parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because defendant pled guilty to only one criminal offense (aggravated manslaughter), the sole "victim" was the driver, and the harm inflicted upon the passengers was irrelevant to aggravating factor two; the passengers' injuries could be considered part of the "nature and circumstances of the offense." Therefore, the sentencing court could consider aggravating factor one when resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Lawless" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the Executive Reorganization Act of 1969, authorized a Chief Executive to abolish an agency such as the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), which the Legislature created and placed "in, but not of," an Executive Branch department. Because COAH is "in, but not of," an Executive Branch department, the plain language of the Reorganization Act does not authorize the Governor to abolish an independent agency like COAH. The Court held that to abolish independent agencies, the legislative and executive branches must enact new laws that are passed by the Senate and Assembly and signed by the Governor. View "In re Plan for the Abolition of the Council on Affordable Housing" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kelly Ruroede, a police officer on temporary sick leave, was suspended without pay and ultimately terminated from his employment based on numerous charges originally stemming from an off-duty verbal and physical altercation outside a restaurant and bar. The Borough of Hasbrouck adopted the recommendation of a disciplinary hearing officer and terminated him. Plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court; the Court found that the disciplinary hearing deprived plaintiff of due process, reversed, placed plaintiff on inactive-paid status, and remanded for a new hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the superior court. In its appeal to the Supreme Court, the Borough challenged the Superior Court's decision. The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court erred by vacating the termination and ordering a remand. Furthermore, the Court concluded there was sufficient evidence presented at the disciplinary hearing to satisfy plaintiff's due process rights, therefore plaintiff's reinstatement to inactive-paid status was also in error. Both the Superior Court and Appellate Division were reversed. View "Ruroede v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kane Properties, LLC contracted to purchase a piece of property in Hoboken zoned for industrial use. It applied for the necessary variances to construct a residential building. The Zoning Board granted the requested variances. The principal objector to plaintiff's proposal, Skyline Condominimum Association, Inc. appealed to the Hoboken City Council. Before the hearing, Skyline's attorney accepted an appointment as the City Council's attorney. Plaintiff objected to the attorney's participation in the appeal, and the attorney recused himself. Council reversed the zoning board's decision. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the attorney's involvement in the Skyline appeal in spite of a conflict of interest had irreparably tainted the City Council’s decision. The trial court affirmed the City Council’s decision. Plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Division. After applying an appearance-of-impropriety standard and finding a conflict of interest, the panel concluded that the attorney's participation in the appeal tainted the City Council’s action. The matter was remanded to the City Council for a proceeding de novo. But Plaintiff filed a petition for certification to the Supreme Court, arguing that a remand back to the City Council was inappropriate. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court set aside the City Council's decision because the Court found it was tainted by its new attorney's conflict of interest. View "Kane Properties, LLC v. City of Hoboken" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that in a case involving issues for zoning variances under the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), evaluation of the suitable standard is a fact-specific and site-sensitive matter requiring a finding that the general welfare would be served because the proposed use was peculiarly fitted to the particular location. Although the availability of alternative locations is relevant, it does not bar a finding of particular suitability. View "Price v. Himeji, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for the shooting death of Alyssa Ruggieri. Before sentencing, he signed a written waiver excusing him from appearing at the hearing. The victim's mother moved to compel defendant to be there. The trial court found defendant had no right to be absent and ordered him to appear. The Appellate Division affirmed. Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to be absent from his sentencing hearing. The trial court has discretion whether to accept a defendant's waiver. The trial court must balance the interests of the public, the victims, the State and the defendant. In this case, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Tedesco" on Justia Law