Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

I.S. and E.S. are the divorced biological parents of twin girls. Following a series of reported events, I.S. admitted she was overwhelmed and needed help, and acknowledged the children needed placement in a residential facility where they could receive medical supervision and intensive counseling. In 2007, the Division of Youth and Family Services conducted an emergency removal and sought custody of the twins. The trial court concluded that the Division failed to establish I.S. abused or neglected the children, but because she could not protect them from injury, the court ordered the twins' placement in a residential facility. Though the court found no evidence of abuse or neglect, it ultimately granted sole custody to one of the girls prior to E.S., and sole custody of the other to I.S. I.S. appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division judgment awarding E.S. custody to one of the twins. The Court reversed the trial court's order to the extent that it was based on continued jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.50(c). View "N.J. Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove the statutory standard of care under the New Jersey Ski Act. Skier Robert Angland died from injuries sustained following a collision with a snowboarder. Angland's estate sued Mountain Creek Resort and the snowboarder, arguing they failed to comply with the statutory duty of care. The snowboarder moved for summary judgment, arguing that the common law recklessness standard applied to him and not the Ski Act's standard of care; he therefore was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence he acted recklessly. The trial court concluded the Ski Act did indeed apply to the snowboarder, and that the trial court record had sufficient evidence to allow a jury to decide whether his actions fell below the statutory standard of care. Both the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the trial court. View "Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexually assaulting T.P., his nine-year-old great-niece, during a sleepover at a relative's house. Before trial, T.P. and defendant each gave a video-recorded statement to investigators. In T.P.'s statement, she described how defendant touched her inappropriately. In defendant's statement, he first denied having sexual contact with T.P., but then admitted that "in a moment of weakness" he lifted T.P.'s legs, grabbed "her booty," and placed his mouth on her vagina. At trial, defendant acknowledged making the statement, but he insisted that his admission was false. The video recordings of both interviews were marked as exhibits, played at trial, and introduced in evidence. During deliberations, the jury requested access to play both recordings in the jury room. The judge discussed the request with the prosecutor and defense counsel, who did not object. Defendant's attorney stated it was the "equivalent" of a written statement marked into evidence and given to the jury in the jury room. The judge instructed a court officer to set up equipment in the jury room. The jurors were allowed to play the recordings at their discretion and discuss them as they watched them. The jury found defendant guilty on all charges. The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether video recordings of the pretrial statements given by the defendant or a victim, could be given to the jury to review in whole or in part and as many times as it desires in the jury room during deliberations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a video-recorded statement must be replayed in open court under the direct supervision of the judge. Applying the "invited-error" doctrine in this case, however, the decision to permit unfettered access to the video-recorded statements during deliberations was not plain error and did not warrant reversal of the conviction. View "New Jersey v. A.R." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for financial crimes. He applied for public defender representation and provided information about his financial status that was collected by court staff on a UDIR form. Defendant's application was granted. Because the State's investigation suggested that defendant owned substantial assets, it issued a trial subpoena to the Morris County Superior Court's custodian of records demanding the production of financial data provided to court staff, including defendant's UDIR form. Although it used a trial subpoena, the State represented that it did not intend to use defendant's UDIR form at his pending trial; instead, it would be used to determine whether the State should separately indict defendant for making intentional false statements to obtain free counsel and to determine whether to apply for the removal of defendant's appointed counsel. The trial court quashed the subpoena on its own motion pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. The trial court denied the State's motion for reconsideration, reaffirming its view that the attorney-client privilege protected disclosure of defendant's financial information. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the attorney-client privilege protected the information sought. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the subpoena was properly quashed because defendant was "entitled to the benefit of the long-standing practice embodied in Directive 1-06 - that 'information on the intake form may not be used in grand jury proceedings or at trial.'" View "In re Subpoena Duces Tecum on Custodian of Records" on Justia Law

After attacking and sexually assaulting victim P.F., defendant Eric Clemente Rangel was charged with various crimes including first-degree aggravated sexual assault, and second-degree attempted aggravated sexual assault. At the conclusion of the State's case, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the first-degree aggravated-sexual-assault charge, claiming that the State failed to show that he had committed an act of sexual penetration during an "aggravated assault on another." Defendant contended that the words "on another" referred to a person other than the victim. The trial court denied the motion, finding that "on another" refers "to acts upon the victim." The jury convicted defendant on all counts and he was sentenced. The Appellate Division reversed defendant's aggravated-sexual-assault conviction, concluding that the phrase "on another" referred to a third party. The panel entered judgments of acquittal on the convictions for first-degree aggravated sexual assault and second-degree attempted aggravated sexual assault, and remanded for resentencing on all remaining counts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3) and a textual reading of the statute as a whole, the phrase "on another" referred to someone other than the victim. View "New Jersey v. Rangel" on Justia Law

In 2008, acting on a tip from a reliable confidential informant that an African-American male was selling controlled dangerous substances (CDS) from an apartment in a Newark public housing project, Detective James Cosgrove and fellow undercover officers went to defendant’s apartment. The officers intended to buy CDS from defendant in order to corroborate the tip. Officer James Rios, who served as the buyer, knocked at the apartment door. An African-American man, later identified as defendant, answered it. He was smoking a hand-rolled cigarette. Cosgrove immediately recognized the burning smell of marijuana. When defendant saw that one of the officers had a police badge around his neck, he threw the cigarette into his apartment, retreated, and attempted to slam the door shut. Rios stopped the door from closing, followed defendant into the apartment, and arrested him. According to Cosgrove, he and three officers entered the apartment to prevent defendant from fleeing, destroying evidence, retrieving a weapon, or in some other way impeding his arrest for possession of marijuana. In plain view in the living room, the officers saw a plastic bag containing marijuana, envelopes of heroin stamped "Horsepower," a plastic bag containing cocaine, a marijuana cigarette, a dark-colored plate with cocaine residue on it, a razor blade, and a digital scale. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court concerned the warrantless entry into defendant Rashad Walker's apartment and whether police officers, who saw defendant smoking a marijuana cigarette during a brief interaction with him, had probable cause to arrest the defendant and seize evidence observed in plain view inside his apartment. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence collected following that police search, which was ultimately denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under both the New Jersey and federal constitutions, probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into defendant's apartment and the seizure of the marijuana cigarette and all the CDS found there. View "New Jersey v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant Michael Cahill was involved in an automobile accident after a night of drinking. Following his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI), and after administration of an Alcotest, he was charged with various motor vehicle offenses, including driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, consumption of alcohol in a vehicle, and possession of an open container. He was also charged with aggravated assault. A few months later, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with assault by auto. Defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree assault by auto, and a judge sentenced him to a one-year term of probation plus all applicable fines and penalties. A Superior Court judge remanded the driving-while-intoxicated charge to the municipal court where it languished until defendant received a letter notifying him that the matter was scheduled for trial approximately one month later. Sixteen months elapsed between the sentence date for the indictable offense and notice of trial in the municipal court. Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that his right to a speedy trial was violated, thereby requiring the dismissal of the DWI charge. Applying the four-factor analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in "Barker v. Wingo," the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the sixteen-month delay between the remand of the DWI charge to the municipal court and the notice of trial deprived Defendant of his right to a speedy trial and that charge should have been dismissed. View "New Jersey v. Cahill" on Justia Law

During a meeting with staff members of defendants Rutgers University and the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ), plaintiff D.D. disclosed private health information that she requested be kept confidential. D.D. later discovered press releases issued by defendants that disclosed her private health information. Plaintiff immediately sent a letter directing defendants to cease and desist from communicating her personal information. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, met with representatives of defendants, accompanied by counsel. According to plaintiff, based on apologies and assurances made during the meeting, she believed that the matter could be handled privately. Plaintiff’s attorney subsequently asked plaintiff for additional information, which she promptly provided. Although her attorney assured her that he would "take care of everything," he was thereafter unresponsive to her efforts to contact him, which included at least ten telephone calls. Because she was unable to reach him, plaintiff retained new counsel in April 2010. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was: (1) whether the inattention of plaintiff’s counsel or her medical conditions constituted the "extraordinary circumstances" needed to excuse an untimely notice of tort claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA); and (2) whether a timely oral notice of tort claim could be permitted under the doctrine of substantial compliance. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that neither attorney inattention nor incompetence constituted an extraordinary circumstance sufficient to excuse failure to comply with the ninety-day filing deadline under the TCA; plaintiff's medical proofs were insufficient to meet the extraordinary circumstances standard; and the doctrine of substantial compliance could not serve to relieve a claimant of the TCA's written-notice requirement. View "D.D. v. Univer. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the constitutionality of the execution of a knock-and-announce search warrant that included the use of a flash-bang device. The Manalapan Police Department investigated defendant after an anonymous informant reported that he was selling illegal drugs out of his garage. Officers determined that although defendant had been denied a handgun permit because of a previous arrest, defendant’s father, with whom he lived, legally owned four firearms. Police conducted surveillance of defendant’s residence for six days in August 2007. Officers observed defendant briefly admit individuals into the garage after opening the overhead garage door and visitors leave holding objects that had not been with them when they arrived. Officers also observed groups of people smoking what the officers believed to be marijuana in the garage. The officers applied for a no-knock warrant to search defendant’s residence and began planning their operation pursuant to a no-knock and a knock-and-announce search warrant. A warrant was ultimately granted. Officers then approached defendant’s home. Defendant opened the garage door and was standing with another man on the driveway near the open door, the first team deployed a flash-bang device on the driveway and repeatedly announced, "Police, we have a search warrant" for approximately fifteen seconds. Defendant and the other man retreated into the garage. A search yielded a substantial volume of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) and other evidence. Defendant was charged with numerous crimes. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the flash-bang device was lawfully used in the execution of the knock-and-announce warrant. Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court declined to adopt a bright-line rule that would preclude the use of a flash-bang device in the execution of a knock-and-announce search warrant. "The objective reasonableness of law enforcement’s execution of a warrant should be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances. Here, the officers’ execution of the warrant was objectively reasonable and, thus, constitutional." View "New Jersey v. Rockford" on Justia Law

The taxpayer, Bocceli, LLC, is the taxpaying sublessee of a commercial property owned by Penns Grove Associates in the Township of Carney's Point. The Township's tax assessment list incorrectly listed Prime Accounting Department as the owner. In 2007, the Township wrote to Prime Accounting requesting updated income and expense information for purposes of assessing the value of the property. Prime Management's interest in the property transferred to a new lessee, WIH Hotels, Inc. That inquiry eventually reached WIH, which submitted a late response and paid taxes for 2007. WIH entered into a sublease with Bocceli, which became responsible for property tax payments. In 2008, the managing member of Bocceli visited the tax collector's office, made a tax payment, and requested that the tax assessment list be changed to designate "Bocceli, LLC" as the owner and that notices be sent to the property. According to the Township, the clerk advised the managing member that a deed needed to be presented to the assessor's office to change the list. No deed was presented, and Prime Accounting remained on the list. The tax assessor sent the annual request to Prime Accounting. When it was returned undelivered, the Township reviewed its records and discovered that WIH had responded to the prior year's request. It sent another request to WIH, which did not forward it to Bocceli. Later that year, the tax collector advised the tax assessor of the address that the managing member had provided, but it continued to list Prime Accounting as the owner. In early 2009, the assessor notified Bocceli of the annual tax assessment. Thus, at that time, the assessor was aware of Bocceli's responsibility to pay property taxes and used Bocceli's mailing address to serve the notice of assessment that prompted this tax appeal. The tax assessment list continued to designate Prime Accounting as the entity responsible to pay the taxes. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a tax appeal complaint timely filed, but one which did not name the aggrieved taxpayer as the plaintiff, should have been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that Bocceli's misdesignation of the plaintiff did not deprive the tax court of subject matter jurisdiction. "The defect in the complaint did not prejudice the Township and [could] be corrected by an amended complaint that relate[d] back to the filing of the original complaint." View "PrimeAccounting Department v. Township of Carney's Point" on Justia Law