Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Bonita Pitt visited inmate defendant Ralph Sowell in a prison area monitored by security cameras. Sergeant Salvatore D'Amico of the Department of Corrections (DOC) observed Pitt and defendant lean forward. Defendant appeared to kiss Pitt on the cheek. She lifted her shirt slightly, reached into her left front pocket, took out an item, and placed it in defendant's hand. D'Amico then saw defendant lean back and place the item into a bag of potato chips. D'Amico immediately radioed an officer to seize defendant and the bag of chips. When the officer approached defendant, D'Amico, still monitoring the security cameras, saw defendant place the bag of chips under the seat next to him, and an officer recover the bag of chips. D'Amico emptied the contents of the bag of chips, which contained a balloon with thirty envelopes of heroin inside it. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant admitted to a DOC investigator that he received drugs during the visit. Defendant was charged with drug offenses. At trial, D'Amico testified as to his observations, and the State played the videotape recording of the entire incident. A DOC investigator was accepted as the State's expert in "narcotics investigation." During testimony, the expert opined that "an exchange of narcotics took place." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court centered on whether the State properly elicited expert testimony in response to a hypothetical question that in this case, "an exchange of narcotics took place." Upon review, the Court concluded that the expert's opinion was improper because it related to a straightforward factual allegation that was not beyond the understanding of an average juror and because the expert referred to facts not contained in the hypothetical. The Court affirmed defendant's conviction however, concluding that under the plain error standard, there was overwhelming evidence in the record of his quilt. View "New Jersey v. Sowell" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the investigatory stop of defendant Don C. Shaw was constitutional, and if not, whether discovery of an outstanding parole warrant for his arrest was an intervening circumstance that broke the causal chain between the unlawful detention and a subsequent search. In 2011, a police task force arrived at a multi-unit apartment building to execute an arrest warrant on a named fugitive just as two people, Shaw and Niam Gardner, exited from the common entrance of the building. Detective Brown saw the two men part ways, but he did not observe any criminal activity. The officers stopped Shaw and Gardner to determine whether either one was the fugitive identified in the arrest warrant. The officers had the name and description of the fugitive, but the only features that Detective Brown recalled that the fugitive and Shaw shared in common were that both were black men. The officers held Shaw because he refused to give his name, and Brown was prepared to take Shaw to the State Police barracks to run his fingerprints to determine if he was the fugitive they were seeking. Police ultimately determined that Shaw was not the target of the fugitive arrest warrant, but that he was on their list of named individuals wanted for parole violations. Shaw was arrested, and a search revealed he was carrying heroin. Shaw was then charged with possession of a controlled dangerous substance and related offenses. Shaw moved to suppress evidence of the drugs. The trial court found that Shaw was the subject of an unreasonable stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but declined to suppress the drugs, concluding that the parole warrant dissipated the taint from the illegal detention because the warrant stood as an independent basis for arresting and searching Shaw. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the police did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory detention, which was based on nothing more than a non-particularized racial description of the person sought. The parole warrant was not an intervening circumstance that sufficiently purged the taint from the unlawful detention. View "New Jersey v. Shaw" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Defendant Stanley Smith (a/k/a Jerry Johnson) contended that the police improperly obtained certain telephone toll records and that evidence developed from those records should have been excluded at his trial. Defendant further contended that certain remarks by the prosecutor in summation were so improper, he was entitled to a new trial. Shortly before 5:30 p.m. on December 31, 2001, Robert Priester was shot to death while sitting in his automobile in the parking lot of the M & M Deli in Ewing, New Jersey. Defendant was charged with murdering Priester, and a jury found him guilty. The trial court sentenced him to serve thirty years in prison, subject to the parole ineligibility provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected Defendant's arguments on appeal and affirmed. View "New Jersey v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Johnnie Parker was seventeen years old when he was questioned by police about the stabbing death of Demetreas Fletcher. Parker gave a statement to officers admitting that he and a friend, also a juvenile, had killed Fletcher, but he claimed that he was pressured to commit the crime by a drug dealer known as "Polo Mike," for whom Parker worked. Parker expressed to the officers his belief that he would have been killed if he had not complied with Polo Mike’s orders. The other individual involved in the slaying corroborated Parker’s statement that Polo Mike had ordered Fletcher’s death and that they feared for their lives if they did not comply. The Family Part waived jurisdiction and both young men were indicted for murder and other crimes. Parker eventually entered a negotiated plea of guilty to an amended charge of aggravated manslaughter, and the State agreed to recommend a sentence of twenty-five years in prison. When Parker appeared before the trial court to plead guilty, his attorney did not mention Parker’s belief that he would be killed if he did not comply with Polo Mike’s directions. At the sentencing hearing, Parker’s attorney made no argument on his behalf and merely expressed sympathy for the victim’s family and asked the judge to sentence Parker in accordance with the negotiated plea. Parker did not file a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence. Parker filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in 2007, and counsel was assigned to represent him. In the petition, the attorney argued that the performance of Parker’s trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to investigate the surrounding facts, did not argue that Parker had acted under duress, and did not assert at sentencing that Parker should receive a lesser period of incarceration. The judge reviewed the petition and supporting documents and denied post-conviction relief. The Appellate Division affirmed. After considering the arguments in support of post-conviction relief, and applying the strong presumption in favor of oral argument for initial post-conviction relief petitions, the Supreme Court concluded that Parker was entitled to oral argument and remanded the case back to the trial court. View "New Jersey v. Parker" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the nature of the nexus that must be proven by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) under the Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act or Act) against Sue’s Clothes Hanger (Sue’s), the only direct defendant that remained in the case, for costs expended in the investigation and remediation of contaminated groundwater that tainted private wells in Bound Brook. The trial court dismissed the Spill Act claim, concluding that even if the building where Sue’s was located is a contamination source, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Sue’s discharged PCE that contaminated the groundwater. The court found: the groundwater and soil contamination preceded Sue’s dry cleaning operation; there was no evidence that the drip from Sue’s continued or the pavement below showed signs of contamination; the DEP took no other action regarding the drip, suggesting it was not considered to be significant; there is no evidence that PCE in the groundwater or soil came from Sue’s rather than from others who had conducted dry cleaning operations in the building; and because there are alternative sources of contamination from the building and Zaccardi’s, the DEP had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Sue’s contributed to the groundwater contamination. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division in holding that in order to obtain damages under the Spill Act, the DEP must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, a reasonable connection between the discharge, the discharger, and the contamination at the damaged site. The proofs failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the groundwater contamination and Sue’s discharge during its operation. View "New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Dimant" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a thirteen-year-old's confession provided outside of the presence of his father should have been suppressed. After it was reported that thirteen-year-old A.W. sexually touched his five-year-old cousin K.P, A.W.'s father voluntarily brought him to the county child advocacy center for an interview. A.W. is bilingual, but because his father speaks very little English, the interview was conducted initially entirely in Spanish. A detective advised A.W. and his father of A.W.'s rights using a pre-printed juvenile rights form, written in Spanish. A.W. initially denied touching K.P. and blamed their other cousin J. At A.W.'s request, the detective permitted him to state what J. had said about touching K.P. in English, but then resumed the questioning in Spanish. Approximately twenty minutes into the interview, A.W. asked in English, "could I tell everything in private, like without my dad here, outside, it will be easier." The detective explained that to his father in Spanish. Although A.W.'s father immediately stood up to leave, the detective advised A.W.'s father that he would need to waive his right to be present during the interview before leaving and that he could return to the interview room at any time. A.W.'s father then signed the required parental waiver form without objection and left the interview room. Thereafter, A.W. continued to deny wrongdoing before eventually admitting that he had touched K.P. sexually. A.W. was charged as a juvenile with two counts of aggravated sexual assault. Considering the totality of the circumstances, A.W.'s father willingly and voluntarily left the interview room, the questioning comported with the highest standards of fundamental fairness and due process, and the confession was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; the Supreme Court concluded A.W.'s confession was admissible. View "In the Interest of A.W." on Justia Law

This case required the Court to address the standard to be applied by Family Part judges when they determine whether the prosecution has demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It arose from a 2009 shooting in which one victim was killed and one seriously injured, allegedly by a group of men led by Angel Ramos, the father of one of the two juveniles in this case -- A.D. #1. Ramos was alleged to be a leader in a street gang. The incident closely followed a fight in which A.D. #1 and A.D. #2 were beaten by an uncle of A.D. #2 and others. According to the prosecution, the two juveniles, motivated by a desire for revenge following the fight, contacted A.D. #1's father and participated in a conspiracy to murder A.D. #2's uncle and others, precipitating an assault in which the targeted uncle was unhurt, but another uncle of A.D. #2 was killed and A.D. #2's mother was severely wounded. The two juveniles, both approaching their eighteenth birthdays, were charged with murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy and attempted murder, among other offenses. The trial court denied the prosecution's application to waive the juveniles into adult criminal court, concluding that the State had not demonstrated probable cause under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a)(2). It found "no evidence" that the two juveniles had understood that their response to the fight would lead to murder. The State appealed, and an Appellate Division panel reversed the determination of the trial court, holding that the trial court had committed several legal errors in its application of the probable cause standard to the setting of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision: "the probable cause standard that governs waiver of juvenile complaints into adult criminal court under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is similar to the standard that guides a grand jury's determination whether or not to indict. If the trial court finds that the State has presented evidence which, combined with reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, leads to a well-grounded suspicion or belief that the juvenile has committed one or more crimes enumerated in the statute, the "probable cause" standard of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 is satisfied. "

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether a plaintiff, who was removed from public employment after positing a claim of employer retaliation in a civil service disciplinary proceeding, should have been barred from seeking to circumvent that discipline through a subsequent Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA) action also alleging retaliation. Plaintiff was terminated from his position following two close-in-time proceedings involving separate disciplinary matters before the Civil Service Commission (Commission). The first resulted in a demotion and the imposition of a sixty-day suspension. The second proceeding involved a distinct set of charges relating to plaintiff's abuse of sick leave. Following full discovery practice before the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) and the commencement of an evidential proceeding in the second matter, the employer moved for partial summary decision, which was granted by the administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ found it significant that despite plaintiff's defensive theme of employer retaliation, he did not provide support for that claim in his response to the employer's motion seeking partial summary judgment, and plaintiff's termination, for sick-leave misuse. "This matter raises significant and practical concerns about the intersection of administrative disciplinary proceedings and the important protection provided to whistle-blowing employees through CEPA. Although this matter does not present a textbook record for transparent application of the elements required for application of collateral estoppel, [the Supreme Court was] persuaded that preclusion should apply to plaintiff's subsequently filed retaliation claims against his former employer." The Court reversed the appellate court and held that under the facts of this case, plaintiff's CEPA action was barred.

Defendant Manaf Stas, was convicted of allowing an intoxicated person to operate a vehicle over which he had custody and control. Defendant and another individual, Joseph Putz, were involved in an automobile accident in a minivan owned by defendant's sister, minutes after leaving a bar where both had been drinking. After police arrived on the scene, Putz told the investigating police officer that he had been driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. After failing field sobriety tests, Putz was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). Defendant stood nearby in silence as Putz told police that he had driven the car, failed field sobriety tests, and was arrested. He offered no comment on Putz's confession to being the driver at the time of the accident. Given Putz's admission that he was the driver, the police did not subject defendant to field sobriety tests or administer a breathalyzer. Instead, defendant was given a summons for allowing Putz, while intoxicated, to drive the minivan. Defendant and Putz were jointly tried in municipal court. Rejecting the proffered testimony, the municipal court found defendant and Putz guilty of different violations of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). Defendant appealed, and the Law Division also convicted defendant. The Law Division relied upon defendant’s silence while Putz was questioned and arrested, construing that silence to be "an admission on [defendant's] part." Defendant appealed, and an Appellate Division panel affirmed. The panel concluded that if the Law Division's invocation of defendant's silence constituted error, it was harmless. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the municipal court for a new trial. The Court concluded that defendant was entitled to the protection of the constitutional, statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination in the quasi-criminal proceedings before the municipal court and the Law Division, and that the use of defendant's silence as substantive evidence of his guilt and for the purpose of assessing his credibility violated defendant's federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and his state statutory and common law privilege against self-incrimination.

In this appeal the Supreme Court considered the extent to which the Board of Governors of Rutgers, the State University (University) complied with the requirements of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), and if its compliance was deficient, the extent to which plaintiff was entitled to a judicial remedy. Plaintiff Francis McGovern is an alumnus of the University who attended regularly the meetings of the University's Board of Governors. Concerned at what he perceived to be a persistent disregard on the part of the Board for OPMA's mandates, he filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs. The trial court ultimately granted defendants' motion to dismiss this complaint. Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in part and reversed in part. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint.