Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the Court determined whether N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provided immunity to the Plainfield Rescue Squad as an entity, regardless of any negligent delay in transporting a gunshot victim to a hospital. According to the report of the Plaintiff's expert, the Rescue Squad members "wasted over 30 minutes" performing ineffective CPR, depriving the decedent of "any chance of surviving his injury." The decedent needed an immediate transport to the nearby emergency room, where a surgical trauma team could have opened his chest and taken him to the operating room for surgical repair. Had the decedent been transported promptly, he would have had a twenty to thirty percent chance of surviving. The expert concluded that the Squad members engaged in "significant deviations" from usual standards of practice that were significant contributing factors to the decedent's death. Plaintiffs filed a wrongful-death/survival action against the Plainfield Rescue Squad and others. Ultimately, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. With respect to the Rescue Squad, the trial court found immunity under both N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 and another statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, determining that only N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 shielded the Squad from civil liability. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed: "[a]lthough N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provides immunity to 'officers and members' of a rescue squad for civil damages in rendering 'intermediate life support services in good faith,' the plain language of the statute does not provide immunity to a rescue squad as an entity. Thus, Plainfield Rescue Squad is subject to a civil suit for negligence based on the facts alleged by plaintiffs."

In this appeal, the Supreme Court clarified the factors that courts may consider as part of their review of petitions for expungment of a criminal record. The Court concluded that defendants seeking expungement have the burden of proof to demonstrate why their case warrants relief under the statute's public-interest prong. In early 2000, law enforcement officials investigated the sale of controlled dangerous substances (CDS) at a nightclub in Somers Point, New Jersey. Defendant was indicted for three counts of distribution of CDS, three counts of possession of CDS with intent to distribute, three counts of distribution of CDS within 500 feet of a public zone, and three counts of possession of CDS. The trial court sentenced Defendant to forty-five days in county jail (subject to daily reporting), a three-year period of probation, and various fines and penalties. After eighteen months, Defendant successfully completed all of the conditions of probation. Seven and one-half years later, Defendant filed a petition to expunge his conviction. In support of his application, he offered proof that he completed college and received a Bachelor of Science degree, and certified that he worked full-time while in school and had become active in various community service projects. The trial court in this case found that expungement was "not consistent with the public interest." Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that balancing of the factors that remained in the record of this case suggested that expungement was in the public interest. "In an abundance of caution," the Court remanded the case to the trial court to weigh the relevant factors again in light of the above principles and to evaluate petitioner's conduct since the court denied his petition in 2010.

The question raised in this appeal was whether records of a legal clinic at a public law school were subject to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA). The Rutgers Environmental Litigation Clinic represented a private group that opposed a plan to build an outlet mall. The mall's developer, Sussex Commons Associates, LLC (Sussex Commons or Sussex), sought documents from the Clinic under OPRA. The trial court concluded that the Clinic was exempt from OPRA requests, and the Appellate Division reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division and held that records related to cases at public law school clinics are not subject to OPRA. "[The Court found] no evidence that the Legislature intended to apply OPRA to teaching clinics that represent private clients, or that it meant to cause harm to clinical programs at public law schools when it enacted OPRA." The Court also concluded that the common law right of access does not extend to case-related records of law school clinics.

In September 2005, Defendant Leroy Munroe was charged with murder and weapons offenses for the shooting death of Christian Natal. In March 2007, he pled guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter in exchange for dismissal of the murder count and other charges. At the plea hearing, defendant admitted that he and Natal had a dispute, he shot Natal at close range, and Natal died. Also, defendant’s attorney stated: “I would stipulate that it’s circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” Shortly after the plea hearing, a probation officer interviewed defendant to prepare the presentence investigation report. During the interview, defendant stated that he had been robbed by Natal more than once, so he armed himself with a gun for protection. Defendant further stated that on the day in question, Natal “pulled out a knife on him,” defendant backed up while Natal was swinging his knife, and, at a point when defendant was leaning on a car, he shot Natal in “self-defense.” Nothing in the presentence report, which included the State’s version of events, directly contradicted that account. Indeed, at the scene, police found a box cutter in Natal’s hand. Before sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that he had a viable affirmative defense of self-defense. The court did not accept defendant’s asserted justification for the use of deadly force and denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion and should have allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in the interests of justice. "Defendant asserted a colorable claim of innocence based on a plausible defense of self-defense; there would not have been undue delay or prejudice had the case proceeded to trial; and the factual issues in dispute identified by the trial court should have been decided by a jury."

Plaintiff Kenneth Van Dunk and his wife filed this suit in the Law Division after he suffered serious injuries in a trench collapse at a construction site workplace. Following discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment to the employer-defendants Reckson Associates Realty Corporation and James Construction Company, Inc. Based on its assessment of the totality of circumstances, the court concluded that plaintiff did not demonstrate an intentional wrong within the meaning of the Act, notwithstanding that the employer was issued a federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) "willful violation" citation as a result of the incident. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, and returned the matter to the trial court. The Supreme Court granted the Defendants' petition for certification seeking review of that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendants' conduct fell short of an intentional wrong creating a substantial certainty of bodily injury or death. Therefore the workers' compensation statutory bar against common-law tor actions precluded this suit, and the appellate court's ruling was reversed.

In 2004, an argument escalated into an altercation which left Julio Colon dead. Defendant Reynaldo Galicia and Hector Cordero drove from Vineland to Newark to confront Colon about a sport utility vehicle (SUV) that he had borrowed but failed to return. Cordero implored Colon to renew a romantic relationship the two shared, and both Cordero and Defendant begged Colon to return to Vineland with them. The three men battled over the keys to the SUV, and Colon exchanged punches and kicks with Cordero and Defendant. With Cordero in the passenger seat, Defendant twice drove his car toward Colon, prompting Colon to climb on the hood of the car and bang his fists on the window. As Colon clung to the car, Defendant accelerated and drove several blocks, running a stop sign. Defendant abruptly stopped the car, and Colon fell from the hood to the pavement. He sustained severe head injuries and died a week later. Tried separately from Cordero, Defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated manslaughter, second-degree aggravated assault, disorderly persons theft and weapons charges. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Appellate Division. At issue was New Jersey's "passion/provocation" statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the facts of this case, as developed in the trial record, did not support passion/provocation finding under the statute. The Court further held that the verdict sheet used at trial incorrectly guided the jury in its consideration of the passion/provocation issue, and reversed that portion of the Appellate Division's decision that deemed the sheet not to constitute error ("[n]otwithstanding the trial court's correct instruction to the jury that it could not find Defendant guilty of murder unless it concluded that passion/provocation did not apply, the verdict sheet improperly directed the jury not to consider the issue of passion/provocation unless it had already reached a guilty verdict on the murder charge." The Court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision that rejected Defendant's belated invocation of self-defense as a defense to the charges against him.

The issue in this appeal was whether Defendant Buddy Randolph should have been permitted, at the remand for his resentencing, to present evidence of his rehabilitative efforts between his initial sentencing and resentencing. This case involved five multiple-count indictments against Defendant arising from separate handgun-related incidents. In exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining counts, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of second-degree aggravated assault, one count of third-degree aggravated assault, five counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and other weapons offenses. At the time of sentencing in 2002, Defendant was twenty years old, had not completed high school, and had a serious, untreated substance abuse problem. He had been arrested twelve times over a two-year period and had an extensive juvenile history. The court found that there were no mitigating factors; that aggravating factors three and nine applied (risk Defendant will reoffend and need to deter Defendant and others, and that those factors supported imposing a term greater than the presumptive on each count. The court imposed three consecutive maximum term sentences but did not include its reasons on the record. Defendant appealed and the matter was remanded for resentencing. The trial court re-imposed the same sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence should be remanded again for a reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether three consecutive maximum terms were justified. Upon review by the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that when a trial court reconsiders a sentence, it should view Defendant as he stands before the court on that day unless the remand order specifies a different and more limited resentencing proceeding such as correction of a plainly technical error or a directive to view the sentencing issue from the vantage point of the original sentencing. The Court did not infer such a limitation in the circumstances of this case; thus, Defendant was entitled to present evidence of his post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts at resentencing.

Defendants were charged with a series of robberies that took place in Middlesex, Essex, and Bergen Counties. Defendant Alnesha Minitee was apprehended almost immediately after the Bergen County incident, while Defendant Darnell Bland was arrested several months later when one of the victims of the Bergen County crime identified his picture in a photo array. When Minitee was arrested, she was standing next to a red SUV that the police had followed from the robbery scene. The search of that vehicle produced evidence linking the parties to the series of robberies. Defendants Bland and Minitee both moved to suppress the results of that search but were unsuccessful. At the trial of Defendant Minitee, which led to her conviction, the State introduced evidence that was obtained during the search of the SUV. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether, in the circumstances of this case, evidence obtained from the warrantless vehicle search conducted after the vehicle was towed to police headquarters should have been suppressed. Upon review, the Court held that under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly denied the Defendants' motion to suppress because the warrantless search of the SUV that was involved in the robbery fit within the scope of the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement.

In 2003, twelve year old C.A. engaged in instant message conversations with seventeen adult men; communications with six of those men included sexually explicit language. In her instant messages, C.A. did not mention Defendant or report any history of sexual abuse. Instead, C.A. laced her communications with sexual vulgarities in an attempt to impersonate a sexually experienced adult. C.A.'s mother discovered the instant messages. At a meeting attended by C.A.'s school guidance counselor, her parents, and her homeroom teacher, C.A., for the first time, accused Defendant of sexual abuse. Defendant was subsequently indicted on one count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, six counts of second-degree sexual assault, and three counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Some of these charges related to Defendant's former stepdaughter and the trials were ultimately severed. Defendant consistently maintained that his relationship with C.A. was entirely appropriate and denied any sexual abuse. Defendant moved to compel production of C.A.'s instant messages. The trial court found that the instant messages were protected and permitted their limited use at trial only for the limited purpose of explaining a physical injury to C.A. in the event that the State were to proffer an expert to prove such injury. The trial court also ruled that the fact that C.A. had sent and received explicit messages could be admitted to show that C.A.'s allegations "did not arise until the victim had been officially confronted by the authorities." A jury convicted Defendant on the single count of first-degree sexual assault and three counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant was sentenced to a twenty-year prison term with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility for the single count of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, and a concurrent ten-year prison sentence for the remaining counts. In 2011, an Appellate Division panel affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for certification "limited to the issue of whether Defendant should have been permitted to introduce the sexually explicit content of the instant messages sent by the minor, female victim to other adult males." Upon review, the Court held that the content of the instant messages written by and to the victim in this case constituted "sexual conduct" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7(f), and that content was therefore protected by New Jersey's Rape Shield Law. Any probative value of the content of the victim's messages was substantially outweighed by its prejudice.

Plaintiff Mazdabrook Commons Homeowner's Association, Inc. manages a common-interest community in which individual owners agree to certain common rules and restrictions for the benefit of the entire group. The Rules and Regulations of the community bar signs except as provided in a "Declaration." Defendant Wasim Khan lived in a planned townhouse community managed by Mazdabrook Commons. In 2005, Defendant ran for Parsippany Town Council and posted two signs in support of his candidacy at his private residence: one inside the window of his townhouse and another inside the door. Mazdabrook notified Defendant that the signs violated the association's rules and ordered their removal. Mazdabrook's regulations banned all residential signs except "For Sale" signs. Upon review, the Supreme Court "balance[ed] the minimal interference with Mazdabrook's private property interest against [Defendant's] free speech right to post political signs on his own property" and found that the sign policy in question violated the free speech clause of the State Constitution.