Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner and Albuquerque resident David Crum was registered to vote in New Mexico as a qualified voter who declined to designate or state his political party affiliation (DTS). He sought to vote during the 2014 primary election by selecting either a Democratic or a Republican ballot without having to amend his voter registration. Crum was not permitted to vote during the June 3, 2014 primary election because he was not registered as either a Democrat or a Republican1 on or before May 6, 2014. Crum contended that the Free and Open Clause of Article II, Section 8 of the New Mexico Constitution entitled him to vote during primary elections without registering with a major political party because he was a qualified voter under Article VII, Section 1. The Supreme Court disagreed: “[a]lthough the Free and Open Clause is intended to promote voter participation during elections, the Legislature has the constitutional power to enact laws that ‘secure the secrecy of the ballot and the purity of elections and guard against the abuse of [the] elective franchise.’” The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Crum’s complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Crum v. Duran" on Justia Law

Defendant Marcos Suazo became agitated while roughhousing with his friend Matthew Vigil. Suazo retrieved his shotgun and pointed it at Vigil. Vigil grabbed the shotgun and placed the barrel in his mouth. Suazo pulled the trigger, killing Vigil and severely injuring his friend Roger Gage, who was standing behind Vigil. A key contested issue in this case was whether Suazo knew the shotgun was loaded when he pulled the trigger. Among other crimes, Suazo was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. He appealed his second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeals, contending that the district court erred by excluding the witness testimony and by modifying the uniform jury instruction for second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals certified his case to the New Mexico Supreme Court due to the significant public importance of the jury instruction issue. The Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the hearsay evidence because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Suazo’s statements, which were overheard one hour after the shooting, were neither excited utterances nor present sense impressions; and (2) the district court erred by modifying the uniform jury instruction for second-degree murder because in 1980 the Legislature amended the definition of second-degree murder to specifically require proof that the accused knew that his or her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Because the modified instruction misstated an essential element, the Supreme Court reversed Suazo’s conviction for second-degree murder and remanded for a new trial. View "New Mexico v. Suazo" on Justia Law

Trevor Begay pleaded no contest to a petty misdemeanor count of battery. The County Magistrate Court imposed a 182-day sentence, suspended 171 days, credited Begay with 11 days of pre-sentence confinement, and imposed supervised probation. Begay failed to comply with the terms of his probation; he neither completed a life skills class nor performed community service. The magistrate court consequently ordered Begay to appear for a hearing. When Begay failed to appear, the magistrate judge issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Had Begay complied with the terms of his probation, his original probationary sentence would have concluded on December 27, 2012. Instead, on that day, Begay was subject to an outstanding warrant. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court’s review was whether a magistrate court had jurisdiction to revoke probation when a defendant violated the terms of probation and was in bench-warrant status when the defendant’s original probationary period expired. The Court held that NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-8 (1977), does not deprive a magistrate court of jurisdiction to revoke a defendant’s probation under these circumstances. The Court reversed the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for the execution of the sentence imposed by the magistrate court. View "New Mexico v. Begay" on Justia Law

Laticia Lucero (Baby) died on June 9th, 2010, just 47 days after she was born to Mother and defendant Jadrian “Jay” Lucero. Baby’s autopsy revealed that she died as a result of the type of injuries one might expect after being ejected from a vehicle in a high-speed collision or falling from a third-story window and landing on one’s head. During the investigation into Baby’s death, Defendant told law enforcement that Baby was under his care on the afternoon of June 9th, and that he had found her “not breathing” when he went to check on her in her crib. Defendant was indicted on a single count of intentional child abuse resulting in Baby’s death, and a jury convicted him of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child less than twelve years of age under NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(D), (H) (2009). The district court sentenced him to life in prison. Defendant raised two issues on appeal: (1) the jury instructions improperly defined the intent element for the crime of intentional child abuse by endangerment and, therefore, resulted in fundamental error; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to hold an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s conviction. View "New Mexico v. Lucero" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Bailey appealed his conviction for second-degree criminal sexual contact of a minor. Defendant argued on appeal that admission of evidence of his uncharged conduct was improper under Rule 11-404(B)(1) NMRA and Rule 11-403 NMRA. Because the other-act evidence that Defendant objected to was properly admitted for the purpose of demonstrating Defendant’s intent under Rule 11-404(B)(2), and the evidence was not unduly prejudicial under Rule 11-403, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. And, by this opinion, the Court further explicated the proper application of Rule 11-404(B) in state district courts as it pertained to admission of other-act evidence bearing on an accused’s intent. View "New Mexico v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant Jennifer Stephenson placed her two-year-old son Isaiah in his room at bedtime and locked the door for the night. Isaiah’s father heard Isaiah whimpering the next morning and found him with his legs pinned between a dresser and a crossbar on the bed. Isaiah developed "compartment syndrome," which required an aggressive surgery to correct. A jury convicted Defendant of one count of second-degree abandonment of a child resulting in great bodily harm after being unable to find that she committed child abuse by failing to act for Isaiah’s welfare and safety. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Defendant's conduct did not fall within the meaning of “leaving or abandoning” because she did not leave Isaiah with the intent not to return. The State petitioned for certiorari review to determine whether the Court of Appeals’ definition of “leaving or abandoning” was correct and whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction. The Supreme Court interpreted NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1(B) (2009) differently than the Court of Appeals did, but agreed with the outcome. "Perhaps the most important lesson from this case is that the Legislature must clarify its intent with respect to the crime of child abandonment. Nevertheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Defendant could not be found guilty of abandoning Isaiah because there is no evidence that Defendant intentionally left Isaiah with the intent not to return." The Court also concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that Defendant intentionally departed from Isaiah, leaving him under circumstances where Isaiah might have or did suffer neglect - where his well-being was at risk of harm. The Court therefore reversed Defendant’s conviction and remanded for an entry of a judgment of acquittal. View "New Mexico v. Stephenson" on Justia Law

Patricia Garcia induced an eighty-four-year-old widower, Page Kent, to believe that she was his loving partner and thereby gained access to his bank accounts and depleted over $50,000 of his life’s savings. A jury convicted Garcia of Fraud and Computer Access with Intent to Defraud. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient evidence to support the convictions. The State sought certiorari review only with respect to the fraud conviction. The Supreme Court concluded that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings that Kent relied on Garcia’s misrepresentation and that, because of Garcia’s misrepresentation and Kent’s reliance, Garcia fraudulently obtained over $20,000. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reinstated the jury’s verdict with respect to the fraud conviction, reversed the Court of Appeals’s decision regarding the same, and remanded for the Court of Appeals to consider the other issues raised by Garcia in her appeal. View "New Mexico v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Samora was accused of luring a sixteen-year-old male into his truck by deception, driving him to a secluded location in Albuquerque, and then forcibly having sex. A jury convicted Defendant of second-degree criminal sexual penetration in the commission of a felony (CSP-felony), and first-degree kidnapping. Due to sentencing enhancements, Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty years for his CSP-felony conviction plus a consecutive eighteen-year sentence for his kidnapping conviction. In a direct appeal, Defendant raised a variety of challenges to both convictions, including a challenge to the district court for omitting that the sexual act had to be non-consensual when instructing the jury on CSP-felony. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that it was fundamental error to omit the phrase “without consent” from the jury instructions relevant to CSP-felony, and accordingly reversed and remanded on Defendant’s CSP conviction. The same fundamental error also infected the jury’s findings with respect to Defendant’s intent to inflict a sexual offense against the alleged victim, and that too was reversed. This case was remanded back to the district court, where Defendant could be retried on both charges. View "New Mexico v. Samora" on Justia Law

In 2004, defendant Lucas Trammell pled guilty in part, to false imprisonment of a minor victim. At the time, a conviction of false imprisonment of a minor victim required that defendant register as a sex offender under the New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Defendant’s attorney failed to realize that defendant’s plea included a sex offense requiring SORNA registration. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea six years later, after he was arrested and found to have violated the terms of his probation. After review, the New Mexico Supreme Court, concluded that although counsel’s failure to advise Defendant of the SORNA registration requirement in his plea agreement was per se deficient performance under the first prong of the "Strickland" test for ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant failed to show that under the second prong of Strickland, he had been prejudiced by that deficient performance. The Court of Appeals was reversed for holding otherwise, and remanded this case back to the district court for entry of an order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea agreement. View "New Mexico v. Trammell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court addressed whether shooting at or from a motor vehicle could serve as a predicate for felony murder. A jury found Defendant Eric Marquez guilty of first-degree felony murder, and shooting from a motor vehicle causing great bodily harm. The underlying felony supporting Defendant’s felony murder conviction was the felony of shooting from a motor vehicle. To avoid double jeopardy concerns, the district court vacated Defendant’s conviction of shooting from a motor vehicle, then sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment followed by a minimum period of five years of parole supervision. In his direct appeal, Defendant claimed that: (1) shooting at a motor vehicle cannot serve as a predicate felony in the context of a felony murder conviction; (2) the court erred in precluding evidence of drive-by shootings at Defendant’s home before 2010; (3) the jury instructions on felony murder and self-defense failed to instruct on the essential elements that Defendant did not act in self-defense or with sufficient provocation; and (4) admission of the Medical Investigator’s testimony violated Defendant’s confrontation rights. After review, the Supreme Court held that the crime of shooting at or from a motor vehicle may not serve as the predicate felony in support of a felony murder charge and vacated Defendant’s felony murder conviction. The Court rejected Defendant’s second, third, and fourth claims, and remanded this case back to the district court for entry of an amended judgment reinstating his conviction for shooting from a motor vehicle. View "New Mexico v. Marquez" on Justia Law